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DEREGULATING RELEVANCY IN INTERNET TRADEMARK 
LAW 
Jane, a 10th grader, is writing a report on ancient Greek religious 
figures for her classical history class. She enters the word "Nike" 
into the Google search engine in an attempt to find source material 
for her report. However, she only ·finds product information 
regarding footwear and clothing from Nike, Inc., because Google has 
removed other content due to liability concerns. Out of frustration, 
Jane abandons her Internet search and turns to the next most 
convenient free resource, her school library. Unbeknownst to Jane, 
her school library's acquisition director is personally interested in 
Roman mythology but finds Greek mythology boring. As a result, 
Jane only finds a few books briefly discussing her subject. 
John is a rock climbing enthusiast with a penchant for the latest 
gear. He has heard rumors about the.new Reebok "Hilltopper 483," 
an advanced technology shoe for rock climbing intended to directly 
compete with the just-released Nike "Swooshtown 96" model. He 
would like to educate himself about each model to decide if he wants 
to purchase the newest, hottest rock climbing footwear. He searches 
for "Reebok Hilltopper 483" in Yahoo Search but this only leads him 
to the official website of Reebok, Ltd. and its authorized distributors. 
These sites have some information about Reebok shoes but no 
neutral or comparative information. Frustrated by his inability to 
find the information he wants, John decides not to buy new shoes 
from either Reebok or Nike. 
These two scenarios illustrate how trademark law could jeopardize the 
Internet's potential as an infonnation resource and a catalyst for competition. 
Emerging trademark law doctrines have allowed trademark owners to excise 
socially beneficial content and to take unprecedented control over their 
channels of distribution. Without limits, trademark law has the capacity to 
counterproductively destroy the Internet's utility for everyone. 
It does not have to be this way. Trademark law's assault on the Internet is 
predicated on a series of factual myths and doctrinal errors. The cliched story 
assumes that predatory marketers steal customers' attention away from 
trademark owners using surreptitiously dishonest means.' Under this story, it 
1 See, e.g., Scott Shipman, Comment, Trademark and Unfair Competition in Cyberspace: Can These 
Laws Deter "Baiting" Practices on Web Sites?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 245, 246-47 (1998). 
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is argued that trademark law needs to protect trademark owners and searchers 
by ensuring that Internet searchers see only content approved by the trademark 
owner. 
This cliche, and its supporting academic commentary, have developed from 
intuition based assumptions about searcher behavior that contradict the 
empirical data about how searchers actually search. This Article corrects those 
mistakes by basing its analysis on what information scientists know about 
Internet search behavior. 
By examining how people search for information on the Internet, it 
becomes clear that Internet search providers compete fiercely with each other 
to help Internet searchers find the content they want. To do so, search 
providers must discern searchers' true objectives from opaque and poorly­
chosen search keywords delivered without any surrounding context. This 
requires search providers to choose what content to present to searchers, 
putting publishers trying to reach those searchers at the mercy of the search 
engme. 
U sing the facts presented by the Article, it becomes possible to develop an 
Internet trademark policy from the ground up. To increase the odds of 
efficient and successful searches, searchers should be able to pick the search 
terms they want, and search providers should be able to use those search terms 
to deliver the most helpful content to searchers. Thus, trademark law must step 
aside when searchers receive relevant content they may want. 
In short, the introductory vignettes above may realistically preview the 
current direction of Internet search. However, with a more rigorous 
understanding of both trademark law and Internet search, there is an 
opportunity to preserve the Internet as a medium that helps searchers find what 
they seek. 
Part I of the Article provides a brief overview of the Internet search 
process. Parts II-IV consider Internet search from three perspectives. Part II 
considers Internet search from the searcher's perspective, concluding that one 
cannot infer searchers' objectives from the keywords they choose. Part II 
considers Internet search from the web publisher's perspective. Part IV 
considers Internet search from the search provider's perspective, explaining 
that search providers, not web publishers, decide what searchers see. Part IV 
also explains that all Internet technologies are converging to use keywords to 
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match searchers with content. Thus, historical distinctions between the domain 
name system, directories, and search engines are collapsing. 
Part V summarizes trademark law and then provides a theoretical 
framework to distinguish beneficial and misappropriative uses of trademarks. 
The framework helps explain why trademark law doctrines like "initial interest 
confusion" are misguided. Part VI offers three concrete solutions: (1) courts 
should consider the search process stage where searchers see a trademark being 
used; (2) the law should modernize the test used to determine consumer 
confusion, most conspicuously by considering content relevancy in any 
infringement analysis; and (3) search providers should have both common law 
and statutory safe harbors. The Article concludes with a brief consideration of 
how keyword-based search benefits society. 
I. A BRIEF PRIMER ON INTERNET SEARCH 
Internet searchers have two primary means of conducting a keyword search 
using keywords to express their interests: search engines and domain names.2 
Search engines allow a searcher to enter a keyword3 into a search box and 
make a query against a database of content. The search engine may be a stand­
alone database, like Google, or a functionality supporting some other business 
objective, such as the search function at Staples's office supply website. Major 
ecommerce websites like eBay and Amazon incorporate a broad variety of 
third-party content into their search databases and depend heavily on users 
conducting keyword searches, so they share a lot of common issues with stand­
alone search engines like Google. 
Stand-alone search engines build their databases in a variety of ways. 
Commonly, a search engine uses automated robots4 to canvass the Internet for 
content, which then make copies of pages they find and add those copies to the 
database.5 Alternatively, or in addition, some search engines allow publishers 
to afatively upload content to the search engine which may be 
2 These methods are converging into a single keyword-based search approach, a topic explored in Part 
N.B infra. 
3 For convenience, this Article refers to "keyword" in the singular. Keywords, however, can be 
composed of multi word phrases, and this Article covers those phrases as well. 
4 Search engine robots may also be called scripts, crawlers, or spiders. 
5 See THOMAS A. POWELL, WEB DESIGN: THE COMPLETE REFERENCE 277-79 (2nd ed. 2002), available 
at http://www.webdesignref.comlchapters/09/ch9-01.htm. 
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incorporated, either automatically or after manual reVIew, directly into the 
index.6 Databases can also be built manually.7 
The domain name system ("DNS") enables searchers to obtain content in at 
least three ways. First, the searcher can guess that a word, when used as a 
domain name, will lead to relevant content. Second, the searcher may already 
know a desired domain name and can type it into the web browser address bar 
directly. Third, if a searcher has already visited the web page, the searcher can 
use bookmarks or the browser' s history to return to the page. 
While search engines and the DNS represent the principal techniques for 
engaging in keyword searches, there are other methods of presenting "search­
like" content. For example, as an alternative to affirmatively entering a 
keyword into a search box, searchers can navigate their way to content through 
directories of editorially-organized links. Links can be graphics, pictures or 
text, and the links can be laconic ("More") or very detailed ("Click Here to 
Learn More About the Canon PowerShot S400 Digital Camera"). Often, 
websites organize links into "taxonomies" that group related items into 
hierarchies.8 This Article refers to the process of navigating through a 
directory of links as "link navigation." Unlike the other two search methods, 
the directory organizer (instead of the searcher) selects the applicable 
keywords that lead to more content. Part IV .B.2 revisits link navigation. 
6 Feeds can contain the entire dataset incorporated into the index or a partial dataset that also instructs 
the search engine how to obtain the remaining data automatically (such as through a robot that collects 
information from a publisher's website in accordance with the instructions contained in the feed). See Google, 
Froogle Beta Information for Merchants, at http://google.comlfrooglelmerchants.htmI(last visited Apr. I, 
2(05). 
7 Many associate manually built databases with Yahoo! and, to a lesser extent, LookSmart. However, 
today Yahoo!, LookSmart, and other directories primarily rely upon publishers to submit feeds which are 
manually evaluated (usually for a fee) before being added to the database. However, "pure" directories still 
exist, the most prominent of which is the Open Directory Project ("ODP"). See Open Directory Project, at 
http://dmoz.org! (last visited Apr. I, 2(05). 
8 Consider this hypothetical four level taxonomy that a searcher might use to find more information on 
the Canon PowerShot S400 digital camera. The home page contains a text link called "Digital Cameras" 
(Level 1 of the taxonomy). On the subsequent page (Level 2), the searcher sees a list of digital camera 
manufacturers, including a text link called "Canon." On the subsequent page (Level 3), the searcher sees a list 
of digital camera brands manufactured by Canon, including a text link called "PowerShot." On the final page 
(Level 4), the searcher sees a list of different models of PowerShot-brand digital cameras, including the 
"S400." 
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II. INTERNET SEARCH FROM THE SEARCHER'S PERSPECTIVE 
This Article takes complementary looks 'at the Internet search process from 
three different perspectives: the searcher, the publisher, and the search 
provider. This Part evaluates Internet search from the perspective of a searcher 
looking for information. 
A. The Complex Process of In ternet Search 
Search processes are complex and defy simplistic analysis. Some searches 
are very simple and directed; other searches are open-ended and meandering.9 
Thus, any attempt to describe a universal search process is inherently 
misleading. 
Nevertheless, Internet searches share sufficient commonalities to develop a 
methodology that applies to many such searches. Specifically, all successful 
Internet keyword-driven searches go through the following eight distinct 
stages: 10 
Stage 1: Objective Formulation 
Stage 2: Search Provider Selection 
Stage 3: Keyword Selection 
Stage 4: Search 
Stage 5: Results Evaluation 
Stage 6: Decision 
Stage 7: Investigation 
Stage 8: Objective Satisfaction 
9 LoUIS ROSENFELD & PETER MORVILE, INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE WORLD WIDE WEB § 
6.2 (1998), available at http://www.monkeytools.com!oreilly/webdesignlinfoarchlch06_02.htm (distinguishing 
different types of search behavior, such as known-item searching, existence searching, exploratory searching 
and comprehensive searching and research). 
IO Cf POWELL, supra note 5, at 276-77 (describing a four-stage search process, consisting of query 
formulation, search, results review, and decision what to do). 
When a searcher uses a software agent, this process may vary some because the searcher prospectively 
delegates authority to the software agent to monitor behavior and interject content when the agent deems 
appropriate. In these situations, the searcher is implicitly selecting a search provider at Stage 2 prior to having 
an objective from Stage I. 
. 
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To better understand the search process, this subsection describes each 
stage in more detail. While this discussion treats each stage as distinct and 
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separate, a searcher may move from stage to stage very quickly, making the 
search process appear seamless and integrated. 
1. Stage 1: Objective Formulation 
A searcher initiates a search by formulating a search objective. 11 
Objectives may range from transacting goods or services, to obtaining 
information to make a nontransaction decision (e.g., checking the weather to 
decide if an umbrella is necessary before departing), to obtaining information 
for general educational purposes (e.g., trying to remember the fIrst name of 
Kramer from the Seinfeld TV show). 
2. Stage 2: Search Provider Selection 
Once a search objective is formed, the searcher decides which search 
provider to use for the search. This involves two separate but related inquiries: 
(1) which search tool is most likely to yield the desired results (i.e., search 
engine, DNS, or link navigation), and (2) which particular vendor is the best 
choice for that search tool. 12 
3. Stage 3: Keyword Selection 
Having formulated a search objective and selected a search provider, the 
searcher picks a keyword that the searcher believes will elicit relevant 
information. Before one can make any inferences about searchers' objectives 
based on the keyword they use, it is important to understand how they choose 
terms. 
Unfortunately, searchers do a poor job selecting keywords. Searchers with 
domain expertise on a topic generally do a better job selecting keywords,13 but 
because searchers routinely have low domain expertise, searchers routinely 
I I  Although this Article contemplates that searchers pursue only a single search objective during a 
search, some searchers "multi task," i.e., pursue multiple search objectives simultaneously. See Amanda Spink 
et aI., Multitasking on Web Search Engines (draft on file with author). 
12 See RAHUL TELANG ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNET SEARCH ENGINE CHOICE (Darden 
School of Business Working Paper No. 03-05, Sept. 2(01) (discussing the factors searchers use to choose 
search providers). 
13 See Giorgio Brajnik et aI., Strategic Help in User Interfaces for Information Retrieval, 53 J. AM. 
SOC'Y INFO. SO. & TECH. 343, 344 (2002) (summarizing the literature showing that novice searchers use 
simple and low efficacy techniques); Barbara M. Wildermuth, The Effects of Domain Knowledge on Search 
Tactic Formulation, 55 J. AM. SOC'Y INFo. SCI. & TE CH. 246 (2004) (showing how researchers improved their 
search process when they had better domain knowledge). 
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choose keywords poorly. Specifically, most searchers use no more than two 
keywords in a keyword search,14 and searchers almost never use advanced 
search methodologies like Boolean logic15 or advanced searching functionality 
offered by search providers. 16 
4. Stage 4: Search 
With all of the preliminary decisions resolved, the searcher next conducts 
the search and receives the search results. If the searcher uses a search engine, 
the searcher may receive multiple search results. If the searcher uses the DNS, 
the searcher is, in effect, taken directly to the search result. 
5. Stage 5: Results Evaluation 
Regardless of the search method used, the searcher evaluates the content 
provided in response to the search. This stage is crucial for both the searcher 
and any legal judgments regarding the searcher's objectives. 
The amount of information presented to a searcher following a search 
varies with the search provider. Search engines almost always display some 
amount of content previewing each website in the search results list. This 
Article refers to the previewing of content as "filtering content." 
For example, Google frequently provides a substantial amount of 
information for searchers to evaluate before they decide which search results to 
explore further. Search results in Google may display some or all of the 
following filtering content:17 a web page title, an excerpt of the page, a 
14 See iProspect.com, Inc., iProspect Natural SEa Keyword Length Study (Nov. 2004), at 
http://www.iprospect.comJpremiumPDFs/keyword_length_study.pdf(88% of search engine referrals are based 
on only one or two keywords); see also DecIan Butler, Souped-Up Search Engines, NATURE, May I I , 200, at 
112, 115 (citing an NEC Research Institute study showing that up to 70% of searchers use only a single 
keyword as a search term); Bernard J. Jansen et al., Real Life Information Retrieval: A Study of User Queries 
on the Web, 32 SIGIR FORUM 5, 15 (1998) (average keyword length was 2.35 words; one-third of searches 
used one keyword and 80% used three keywords or fewer); Jakob Nielsen, Search: Visible and Simple, at 
http://www.useit.comJalertboxl2oo10513.html (May 13,2001) (average keyword length was 2.0 words). 
15 Nielsen, supra note 14 ("Most users cannot use advanced search or Boolean query syntax."); Jansen, 
supra note 14, at 15 (only one in eighteen searchers used any Boolean functions). 
16 Press Release, Vividence, Inc., Google Wins Users' Hearts, But Not Their Ad Clicks (May 25, 2004), 
at http://www. vividence.comJpublic/company/news+and+events/press+releases/2004-05-25+ce+rankings+ 
search.htm ("Although a majority of users expressed interest in advanced search options when asked, less than 
3% actually used advanced search techniques in any given search task . . . .  "). 
17 Google, How To Interpret Your Search Results, at http://www.google.com!help/interpret.html (last 
visited Apr. I ,  2005). 
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summary description of the website, the category into which the website has 
been taxonomized in Google's directory, the web page's format (e.g., HTML, 
PDF, or Microsoft Word),18 a Uniform Resource Locator ("URL") for the web 
page, the web page's file size, and the date Google last indexed the page. 
Unfortunately for searchers, filtering content is sometimes inaccurate. Some 
web publishers use techniques such as cloaking 19 and pagejacking20 to present 
inaccurate filtering content. 
In contrast, a searcher using the DNS does not see filtering content. 
Instead, the searcher gets a single search result (the web page associated with 
that domain name) and is immediately taken there. 
This Article does not distinguish ads from other forms of filtering content. 
Like other filtering content, ads can inform searchers what to expect if they 
investigate further. 2 1  While controversy has brewed over the blurring of 
editorial search results and paid search results,22 searchers often find the 
relevance of paid search results equal to or better than editorial search results.23 
18 Goog1e, Google Web Search Features, at http://www.google.comlhelp/features.html#pdf (last visited 
Apr. I, 2005). 
19 Although definitions vary, cloaking generally occurs when the publisher presents a different page to 
search engine robots than is presented to searchers who select the search result. See Danny Sullivan, Ending 
the Debate Over Cloaking, at http://searchenginewatch.comlsereportlprint.php/34721_2165231 (Feb 4, 2003). 
Although cloaking is not inherently bad (good-looking or ergonomic web pages may be "cloaked" because 
they are not readable by search engine robots or will not be favorably indexed), search engines often penalize 
publishers who are caught doing it. Id. 
20 Pagejacking occurs when a web publisher copies the third party content and incorporates that content 
into the publisher's web page in a way that results in search engines displaying filtering content for the copier 
identical to the filtering content displayed for the copied site. Whatis.com, Page jacking, at http://whatis.tech 
target.comldeflnition/0"sid9..ci213799, OO.html (last visited Apr. I, 2005). See Niton Corp. v. Radiation 
Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998); Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, 
FTC Halts Internet Highjacking Scam (Sept. 22, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opal1999/09/atariz. 
htm (discussing how a pornographer used cloaked pagejacked pages (including the Harvard Law Review) to 
induce users to visit pornography and then mousetrapped them). See generally F. Gregory Lastowka, Note, 
Search Engines, HTML, and Trademarks: What's the Meta For?, 86 VA. L. REv. 835, 862-65 (2000) 
(defining and discussing the terms). 
21 See F. Gregory Lastowka, Search Engines Under Siege: Do Paid Placement Listings Infringe 
Trademarks?, 141NTEu... PRoP. & TECH. LJ. 1, 6 (2002). 
22 Search engines receive some criticism for blurring the line between ads and editorially generated 
search results, including "paid inclusion" programs and ambiguously-labeled zones on search results pages. 
See Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Associate Director, Division of Advertising Practices, Federal Trade 
Commission to Mr. Gary Ruskin, Executive Director, Commercial Alert (June 27. 2002). available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/oslclosingslstafflcommercialalertletter.htm. 
23 See iProspect, Search Engine User Attitudes, at http://www.iprospect.comlpremiumPDFs/iProspectSur 
veyComplete.pdf (Apr.-May 2004) (survey showing that users of several search engines found paid search 
advertisements more useful than algorithmically-generated search results); Leslie Marable, False Oracles: 
Consumer Reaction to Learning the Truth About How Search Engines Work, 21 (June 30, 2003), at 
HeinOnline -- 54 Emory L.J. 518 2005
5 1 8  EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54 
Ultimately, searchers care only about the relevancy of the information they see, 
and artificial divisions between "ads" and "content" mask important 
similarities in the searcher's relevancy determination process. 
When evaluating search results, the searcher judges the relevancy of the 
results to his or her search objective. Assessing relevancy is a complex 
cognitive process not completely understood by information scientists. Part of 
the problem is definitional: Information scientists do not have a single well­
accepted definition of relevancy.24 There is general agreement that relevancy 
consists of multiple factors, of which "topicality" (i.e., being on topic) is an 
essential one. However, information scientists do not agree on the number or 
nomenclature of other factors. 25 
No matter what definition is used, the fact that searchers make 
multifactored assessments of relevancy has two important consequences. First, 
two searchers with the same search objective may grade the relevancy of 
content differently because individual judgments will depend on idiosyncratic 
weightings of the factors. Second, relevancy is not a "binary" determination 
but will exhibit shades of gray,26 as even the best search results may satisfy 
most, but not all, of a searcher's criteria. 
Information scientists believe that relevancy judgments occur in two stages: 
predictive and eValuative.27 Stage 5 (results evaluation) is the predictive stage, 
which generally involves sorting search results based principally on topicality. 
Stage 7 (investigation) is the evaluative stage where the searcher evaluates a 
http://www.consumerwebwatch.orginews/searchengines/ContextReport.pdf (in ethnographic study, twelve of 
seventeen participants found paid search listings helpful in ecommerce searches); Stefanie Olsen, Software 
Tool Smothers Sponsored Search, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml2102-1032_3-
5107846.html?tag=sCutiU>rint (Nov. 14, 2003) (citing a survey showing that 24% found sponsored search 
results more useful than algorithmically-generated search results and 51 % found them just as useful). 
24 See Kelly L. Maglaughlin & Diana H. Sonnenwald, User Perspectives on Relevance Criteria: A 
Comparison Among Relevant, Partially Relevant, and Not-Relevant Judgments, 53 J. AM. SOC'y INFo. SCI. & 
TECH. 327, 328-31 (2002) (stating that "there is not a consensus regarding the definition of relevance"). See 
generally Stefano Mizzaro, Relevance: The Whole Story, 48 J. AM. SOC'y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 810 (1997) 
(summarizing several decades of information science research about "relevance"). 
25 See Rong Tang & Paul Solomon, Use of Relevance Criteria Across Stages of Document Evaluation: 
On the Complementarity of Experimental and Naturalistic Studies, 52 J. AM. SOC'y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 676, 
677-79 (2001) (summarizing the literature). Some example factors include goodness, accuracy, currency, 
usefulness, and importance. See Soo Y. Rieh, Judgment of Information Quality and Cognitive Authority in the 
Web, 53 J. AM. SOC'y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 145, 152 (2002). 
26 See Amanda Spink & Howard Greisdorf, Regions and Levels: Measuring and Mapping Users' 
Relevance Judgments, 52 J. AM. SOC'y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 161 (2001) 
27 See Rieh, supra note 25, at 150. 
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particular search result for "quality" (i.e., the other considerations that 
collectively define relevancy). 
In the predictive stage, searchers sort through heterogeneous search results 
to find relevant matches.28 Sorting is not inherently detrimental to searchers. 
Because no search provider delivers only perfectly relevant results every time, 
searchers expect that they will have to sort search results.29 Furthermore, 
sorting educates the searcher. Scanning search results for topicality gives the 
searcher some feedback about the searcher's choice of keywords and search 
providers. For example, the searcher may realize that the chosen keywords are 
imprecise, capable of multiple meanings, or inferior to some other keyword.3o 
Depending on the quantity and quality of filtering content, the searcher may 
also immediately fulfill the search objective just by scanning the search results 
(without having to do further investigation). 
6. Stage 6: Decision 
Based on the searcher's predictive judgment about the search results, the 
searcher decides what to do next. The searcher can continue on the same 
search path by further investigating one or more search results. This process is 
described more in Stage 7. Alternatively, the searcher may decide that a new 
search approach is needed, in which case the searcher may submit a new 
keyword to the same search provider (returning to Stage 3)31 or try the same 
keyword at a different search provider (in which case the search returns to 
Stage 2)?2 Finally, the searcher may choose to abort the search. 
28 For a discussion of the different techniques used by different searcher segments, see Gord Hotchkiss, 
Inside the Searcher's Mind: It's a Jungle in Here!, at http://searchenginewatch.com/searchday/article.php/335 
7841 (May 26, 2004). 
29 See Martin P. Courtois & Michael W. Berry, Results Ranking in Web Search Engines, available at 
http://www.on1inemag.netJ0L1999/courtois5.html (May 1999). See generally Gregory Shea, Note, 
Trademarks and Keyword Banner Advertising, 75 s. CAL. L. REv. 529 (2002) (arguing that searchers do not 
expect to get only relevant results). 
30 See Nina Elkin.Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right To Exclude 
Indexing, 26 DAYTON L. REv. 179, 185-86 (2001) ("Search results do not simply locate materials. They 
construct meaning. They affect the organization and meaning of information. They structure categories in 
response to users' queries, and thereby have the capacity of creating categories for grasping the world."). 
31 This happens relatively infrequently. See Jansen et aI., supra note 14, at 15 (observing that two-thirds 
of searchers did only one query at a search engine; only one in seven did more than two queries). 
32 See Danny Sullivan, NPD Search and Portal Site Study, at http://searchenginewatch.com/sereport/ 
print.php/34721_2162791 (July 6, 200) (noting that approximately 20% of searchers who have a failed search 
try a different search engine); Press Release, Vividence, Inc., supra note 16 (up to 47% of searchers will try 
another search engine when their search expectations are not met). 
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7. Stage 7: Investigation 
In this stage, which the information scientists define as the evaluative stage, 
the searcher more carefully investigates the search results he or she has 
received. By choosing to invest that time, the searcher is indicating that the 
search results he or she has received appear to have some relevancy to the 
searcher' s objec�ive-at least topically, if nothing else. 
Although described as a single stage, this stage is composed of a potentially 
infinite number of incremental decisions by the searcher. 33 As the searcher 
gains more information, such as by visiting another web page, the searcher 
makes another small calculation: Did I get what I expected?34 Am I still on 
the right search? Will additional investigation of this website lead me to my 
objectives?35 The more times a searcher answers "yes" to these questions, the 
more likely that the web publisher is succeeding in satisfying the searcher's 
objectives.36 
Conversely, if the searcher concludes that the web publisher is not helping 
to achieve his or her objectives, the searcher may return to the search results 
page (Stage 6) and consider selecting a different result to investigate, reinitiate 
the search (with new keywords at Stage 3 or in a new search provider at Stage 
2), or abort the search. As a practical matter, the searching process is often 
iterative. Evaluating and investigating search results causes searchers to refine 
their thinking and become more precise in their objectives.37 This process, 
sometimes called "associative learning," means that a searcher, conducting a 
normal and productive search, may reach Stage 7 multiple times in a search 
sequence. 
In all cases--ven when the searcher has been "tricked" into viewing a 
website through unscrupulous practices-a searcher's costs to change an 
Internet search is trivial. The searcher need only hit the back button, type a 
33 See Marcia J. Bates, The Design of Browsing and Berrypicking Techniques for the Online Search 
Interface, 13 ONUNE REV. 407 (1989). 
34 Rieh, supra note 25, at ISO (stating that the evaluative judgment detennines if the predictive judgment 
was correct). 
35 See Jakob Nielsen, Deceivingly Strong Information Scent Costs Sales, at http://www.useit.comlaiert 
boxl20040802.html (Aug. 2, 2004). 
36 Rieh, supra note 25, at 156. 
37 See ROSENFELD & MORVILLE, supra note 9, § 6.2.3; Rieh, supra note 25, at ISO; Heather Uoyd­
Martin, Delving Deep Inside the Searcher's Mind, at http://searchenginewatch.comlsearchday/article.php/3406 
911 (Sept. 14, 2004 ) (citing a statistic that 70% of searchers begin with a generic keyword and refine the term 
after getting the search results). 
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new web address into the address bar, or select a new bookmark. Any of these 
steps requires just a moment or two of the searcher's time. The costs to switch 
a web search compare very favorably to other offline searches, such as using 
the Yellow Pages (which require extra time to dial, reach a live person and get 
questions answered) or driving around town looking for a particular item 
(where, if a store does not have what the searcher wants, the searcher must get 
back into the car and drive to the next vendor)?8 
8. Stage 8: Objective Satisfaction 
In some cases, the searcher satisfies his or her objectives by transacting 
with a vendor or by fulfilling the searcher's information needs. 
B. Trying To Infer Searcher Objectives from Keyword Selection 
I. "Objective Opaqueness " 
Simply put, one cannot make any legally-supportable inferences about 
searcher objectives based on the keywords used. As already discussed, 
searchers do a poor job selecting keywords that represent their objectives, but 
this is not the core stumbling block. Instead, even if searchers picked 
keywords with more precision, we still could not infer their search objectives. 
This Article refers to our inability to infer searchers' objectives from their 
keywords as "objective opaqueness." 
Objective opaqueness should not really be controversial. Words are 
capable of many meanings, so we always need some method to determine 
which meaning the searcher intends. A searcher might communicate his or her 
intent through very specific keywords: "I am looking to purchase a new in­
the-box Canon PowerS hot S400 digital camera that is not a gray-market good." 
In some cases, the search context will give some clues, such as a keyword 
search for "Canon PowerS hot S400" in a search database provided by an 
ecommerce website that only sells digital cameras. In other cases, one can 
make inferences about searchers' objectives based on their behavior in 
response to the information presented to them: If a searcher explores the 
publisher's website more, chances are the searcher found the website useful; if 
38 Cf. G. Gervaise Davis, II & Eric B. Boustani, Initial Interest Confusion and the Internet: A Confusion 
of Trademark Law Principles, S J. iNTERNET 1. I (Jan. 2002) (discussing the transaction costs incurred by a 
retail store shopper lured by false advertising). 
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a searcher abandons the publisher's website, the searcher probably did not find 
the website useful. 
In the vast majority of situations, when the searchers pick short keywords 
and use them in a search environment that provides no contextual clues-such 
as when a searcher enters a keyword into a stand-alone search engine like 
Google or the DNS-it is effectively impossible for anyone to accurately infer 
the searcher's objectives. An example illustrates the phenomenon. 
Consider a searcher seeking information about the Canon PowerShot S400 
digital camera. The searcher might choose keywords such as "Canon" or 
"PowerS hot" or "S400," or the searcher could combine terms to create 
keywords such as " PowerS hot S400" or even "Canon PowerS hot S400 digital 
camera." Assume that a searcher chooses the last. Even with a comparatively 
lengthy (five words) and precise keyword, it is still unclear, merely from the 
chosen keyword, which of the following possible objectives the searcher has: 
• Prepurchase Information. The searcher may want more information to 
facilitate a purchasing decision, such as product specifications, 
marketing collateral, product reviews (positive or negative), or 
information about product warnings or recalls. The searcher may also 
want comparative information, such as comparative advertising or 
editorial reviews comparing multiple products. 
• Purchase Information. The searcher may have already decided to 
purchase the camera but needs pricing and availability information. 
Often, the searcher will want to know about all vendors, including 
third-party distributors and manufacturers who sell the product 
directly.39 Some searchers may want or be willing to obtain the product 
in used condition from retailers or previous customers. 
• Post purchase Information. The searcher may have already purchased 
the camera and may be looking for postpurchase assistance, including 
customer support or repair or servicing information, from either the 
manufacturer or a third-party vendor. The searcher could also want 
ancillary goods or services such as training courses or after-market 
accessories that are compatible with the camera (camera bags, lenses, 
straps, tripods, etc.). 
39 Although the camera example makes it appropriate to discuss "manufacturers" and "products," the 
discussion applies equally to services and service providers. 
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• Community Information. The searcher may be looking for other camera 
owners to share information or form enthusiast groups or fan clubs. 
The challenge of inferring search objectives is compounded because 
searchers rarely use such precise search terms as "Canon PowerS hot S400 
digital camera" even when they have a very specific search objective in mind. 
With less specific keywords, the range of possible search objectives expands 
even further. 
Assume that the searcher merely used the keyword "Canon" in the search. 
The searcher could be looking for any product bearing the "Canon" brand, and 
any such product may have any of the objectives discussed above. This 
expands the number of possible objectives exponentially, as each of the 
thousands of Canon products creates dozens of additional possible search 
objectives. In addition, a searcher may manifest any of the following 
objectives through the use of the keyword "Canon": 
• Employment Related Information. The searcher may be looking for 
employment opportunities with Canon, Inc., trying to find or organize 
unions associated with Canon, Inc., or trying to communicate with a 
Canon employee. 
• Investor or Financial Information. The searcher may be looking to buy 
or sell stock in Canon, Inc., or for information about Canon's financial 
performance such as reporting documents required by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 
• Supplier Information. The searcher may be trying to establish a vendor 
relationship with Canon, Inc., or find out who Canon's vendors are. 
• News About Canon. The searcher may be looking for information 
about Canon in the news. A Canon product may be involved in a 
newsworthy event, and the searcher may want to know more about it. 
For example, Canon sponsors the Canon Camera Museum,40 so a 
searcher might want to know about a new exhibit running at the 
museum. 
40 Canon Camera Museum. at http://www.canon.comlcamera-museumlindex.html (last visited Apr. 1. 
2(05). 
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All of the foregoing search objectives have some relation to Canon, Inc., 
but other legitimate searches could have nothing to do with Canon, Inc., 
including the following:41 
• Trademark Uses by Third Parties. The searcher may be looking for 
other parties that use the term "Canon" in their trademarks, including 
Chateau Canon la Gaffeliere,42 Canon Law Institute,43 Canongate Golf 
Clubs,44 Canons Regular of Daylesford Abbey,45 and Canon 
Communications LLC (a specialty publisher). Although this discussion 
is specific to Canon, words often have multiple legitimate trademark 
owners. 
• Dictionary Uses. The searcher may be looking for information related 
to dictionary uses of the word "canon." "Canon," among other things, 
means a rule or law (especially in religious contexts) and a singing 
style.46 Canon also means "canyon" in Spanish.47 
• Place Names. The searcher may be looking for information related to 
United States towns named Canon, such as Canon, Georgia,48 Canon 
City, Colorado,49 or Canon Rivers in Washington or Minnesota. 
• Typographical Errors. Some searchers may make a typographical 
error, intending to type a different term such as "cannon." 
In addition, "proxy usage" can further expand the range of possible 
searcher objectives. In some situations, searchers use trademarks as a "proxy" 
for a class of goods, of which the trademarked item is just one member of the 
class.50 Proxy usage can be particularly common when all of the goods in the 
41 While some of these specific searches would be less likely to occur if the trademark were truly fanciful 
and unique, all of the other possible objectives apply to fanciful and nonfanciful terms equally. 
42 U.S. Trademark No. 2,898,806 (issued Nov. 2,2004). 
43 U.S. Trademark No. 2,682,057 (issued Jan. 28, 2003). 
44 U.S. Trademark No. 2,549,929 (issued Mar. 19, 2002). 
45 U.S. Trademark No. 2, 198,586 (issued Oct. 20,1998). 
46 Dictionary.com, canon, at http://dictionary.reference.com!search?q=canon (last visited Jan. 18, 2005). 
47 [d. 
48 See City.Data.com, Canon, Georgia, at http://www.city-data.com!city/Canon-Georgia.htmI (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2005). 
49 See Cafion City Chamber of Commerce, at http://www.canoncitychamber.com! (Iast visited Apr. I ,  
2005). 
50 Stephen W. Feingold, Trademarks: Means To Avoid Confusion, or Propeny Rights? Two Pending 
Cases Outline Dilemma, N.Y. L.J., July 26, 1999, at S2 ("For example, one highly ethical and respected 
advertising executive specializing in the Internet, speaking off the record, believes that someone entering 
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class are fungible and marketers differentiate their products principally through 
branding. 
For example, consider a consumer who wants to purchase a 
pseudoephedrine-based decongestant. The consumer may not even know that 
the products contain pseudoephedrine but, based on heavy brand advertising, 
the consumer may recall the Pfizer brand "Sudafed.,,5 1  The consumer could 
choose the keywords "pseudoephedrine" or "decongestant," but some 
consumers might choose the keyword "Sudafed" as an easier-to-remember 
synonym for those keywords. When searchers use "Sudafed" as a proxy, a 
consumer' s  decision to search for "Sudafed" does not mean that the consumer 
intends to buy the Pfizer-branded version of pseudoephedrine. 
In the case of "Canon," some consumers might use the term as a starting 
point for a search for cameras, copiers, or printers. The searcher' s  thought 
process might go something like this: 
I'm interested in a digital camera but I don't know the digital camera 
brands. I could do a search on the keyword "digital camera" but that 
might be too generic because it could include all types of cameras, 
from junk cameras to professional-grade cameras. I just want a good 
digital camera. I know that a coworker just bought a Canon 
PowerS hot and that person has similar tastes to me. So I'll start with 
the keyword "Canon PowerS hot" as my initial search tenn to learn 
about that camera and, I hope, competitive cameras of the same 
grade. 
Unquestionably, Internet trademark law would be easier if searchers did a 
better job selecting their keywords. Over time, education efforts may improve 
the keyword selection process. 52 In the interim, searchers' keyword selection 
processes should be considered as they are, not as one might wish they would 
be53_and for now, keyword selection is done poorly. 
HONDA in a search engine is just as likely looking for information about Japanese cars as for information 
specifically about Honda. "). 
51 See pfizer, Allergy Cold Cough Sinus, at http://www.allergy-cold.com/#Sudafed (last visited Apr. I ,  
2(05). 
52 See generally Nielsen, supra note 14  (suggesting that at some point better search techniques will need 
to be taught in schools). 
53 Some courts and commentators presumptuously want searchers to change their search methodologies. 
See 1·800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (distinguishing between a 
searcher's choice to search for a generic term like "contact lenses," which indicates that the searcher is "clearly 
looking for general information," and " 1800contacts.com," which inferentially indicates something else); Chad 
J. Doellinger, Trademarks, Metatags, and Initial Interest Confusion: A Look to the Past To Reconceptualize 
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2. Internet Searches Difer from Physical Space Searches 
Although in many respects the Internet does not materially differ from the 
physical world, Internet searches differ from physical space searches in at least 
two principal ways. 
First, Internet searchers can completely control the keyword selection 
process. Contrast this with mass media-such as newspapers, magazines, 
television, radio, and billboards-where searchers receive content unassociated 
with any keyword. In those circumstances, publishers and advertisers embed 
keywords into their content hoping that viewers will recognize the keywords 
and be interested in pursuing more information. In other words, mass media 
bombards viewers with keywords with the hope that enough viewers will find 
the messages relevant. Alternatively, if a viewer has selected a keyword for a 
search, the viewer really has very little way to receive customized information 
back from the mass media publisher in response to the keyword. 
Even when the publisher provides an index of its content, the searcher has 
little control over the search. For example, consider the index in a Yellow 
Pages telephone book. If a searcher has a search keyword that matches the 
editorially selected keywords in the index, the searcher can have a successful 
search. However, the number of keywords supported by the index is 
necessarily limited and may not match the words a searcher would choose.54 
Thus, searchers may need to redefine their keywords to match those selected 
by the Yellow Pages publisher, and searchers with esoteric search terms may 
fail to obtain any relevant information. 
the Future, 4 1  IDEA 173, 2 10 (2001) (UA consumer looking for optimal infonnation regarding a wide variety 
of running shoes should enter 'running shoes' rather than 'Nike. "'); Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and 
Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines with Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 43, 91-92 ( 1998); Note, 
Confusion in Cyberspace: Defending and Recalibrating the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine, 117 HARv. L. 
REv. 2387, 2404 & n.91, 2407 (2004) (generally discussing consumers' selection of keywords, and 
specifically arguing that consumers should pick "car rental" or "travel services" instead of "Hertz" or 
"Expedia" because the generic terms "will typically suffice to communicate the desired information to a user 
expressly interested in these services generally"); cf Paul R. Hagen, Must Search Stink?, Forrester Research 
(June 200 I), at 5 (quoting a manufacturing company assessing its search engine: "Most of the complaints we 
get are due to the way the users search-they use the wrong keywords.") (emphasis added). While better 
keyword selection sounds great in theory, it is backwards to force consumers to pick alternative keywords 
instead of crafting a law that addresses consumer confusion based on the keywords searchers organically 
choose themselves. 
54 See Warren Thorngate, The Economy of Attention and the Development of Psychology, 3 1  CAN. 
PSYCHOL. 262, 267 (1990) (an ad hoc study showed that descriptive keywords selected by knowledgeable 
readers matched the article's published keywords only I I  % of the time). 
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In contrast, Internet searchers can affirmatively sort and receive content 
that responds to their keyword, rather than passively waiting for it to appear in 
mass media. 55 Internet searchers are not constrained to the keyword choices 
made by an intermediary publisher. When search providers index every word 
they find, a keyword search can succeed even if a publisher does not use the 
keyword in any organizational scheme. 
The second way Internet keyword-driven searches differ from offline 
keyword-driven searches is that Internet searches can lack any "context" to 
make inferences about the searcher's objectives. In offline searches, 
significant inferences are often possible regarding the objectives from the 
context when the searcher initiates a keyword-driven search. In online 
searches, a searcher may merely express his or her objectives using just text in 
a "generic" search environment. Text communication inherently limits the 
quantity of information a searcher can communicate. As Albert Mehrabian's  
famous study indicates, 55% of a person' s  communication is  manifested 
through nonverbal means (such as posture, gestures, and facial expressions), 
38% is manifested through tone of voice, and only 7% is manifested through 
the words themselves. 56 In offline searches, a searcher can use the full range 
of communicative elements. If the searcher telephones a merchant, the 
merchant can hear the tone of voice. Online, the searcher "speaks" only 
through text, often only a few words. It should not be surprising that, when a 
search is stripped down to the words itself, communicative elements are lost in 
the process. 
Physical space searches often have a context that facilitates inferences 
about a searcher's intent based on a single keyword. The following example 
illustrates the differences between an Internet search and an offline search, 
Recall the searcher using the keyword "Sudafed." If the searcher says to a 
grocery store clerk "Sudafed?," one might infer from the grocery store context 
that the searcher intends to purchase a decongestant.57 If the searcher says to 
her doctor "Sudafed?," one might infer that the searcher wants more 
55 See Rieh. supra note 25. at 146 (questioning prior research on relevance for failing to distinguish 
between active and passive searchers); see also Bryce J. Maynard. Note. The Initial Interest Confusion 
Doctrine and Trademnrk Infringement on the Internet. 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303 (200). 
56 See Albert Mehrabian. Communication Withaut Words. PSYCHOL. TODAY. Sept. 1968. at 53. 
57 We might further infer that such a keyword search is not primarily targeting the acquisition of more 
information about Sudafed because. depending on the store, grocery stores often do not provide much product 
information beyond product packaging, meaning that such information searches will have low utility. 
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information about Sudafed or decongestants generally. 58 Meanwhile, if the 
searcher says to her automobile mechanic "Sudafed?," this appears to be an 
ambiguous nonsequitur. 
In contrast, in most Internet searches, the search environment provides no 
information about the searcher. Consider all of the things a search provider 
like Google might not know about an Internet searcher. Google may not know 
where the searcher is physically located. Google may not know the searcher's 
physical status, such as if he or she is congested or teary -eyed. Google may 
not know what the searcher was doing immediately prior to the search-was 
the searcher playing computer games, telecommuting, or researching hay 
fever? 
Therefore, it is possible for a search provider to know only one piece of 
information about the searcher : the chosen keyword. In the of fline Sudafed 
examples , the grocery store clerk, the doctor and the mechanic each know 
where the searcher is located, what his or her physical condition is, and what 
the searcher was doing immediately prior to initiating the search. 
Furthermore, even if the clerk, the doctor , or the mechanic cannot figure 
out the searcher's objectives from the searcher's keyword plus the associated 
context, the person can simply ask the searcher for more information. Thus, 
when a searcher says to her auto mechanic "Sudafed?," the auto mechanic can 
request more information before attempting to respond to the inquiry. In 
contrast, many Internet search contexts do not have this iterative quality. At 
Google, a searcher puts the word "Sudafed" into the search box and gets 
results. Google does not ask searchers to clarify their search59 or to provide 
more information about the search objectives. Thus, Google-and any fact­
finder evaluating Google's results must make inferences from a 
decontextualized keyword that has not been iteratively clarified. 
58 We might further infer that the searcher is not planning to immediately acquire Sudafed from the 
doctor directly, because doctors rarely vend over-the-counter pharmaceuticals to their patients. 
59 The only current exception is that if Google thinks the searcher made a typographical error, it may 
prompt the searcher by asking "did you mean [corrected word]." Google, Goog/e Web Search Features, at 
http://www.google.comJhelp/features.html#speU (last visited Apr. 1 , 2(05). See infra note 103. 
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III. INTERNET SEARCH FROM THE PUBLISHER' S  PERSPECTIVE 
This Part looks at the Internet search process from the second of the three 
perspectives. While the previous Part looked at Internet search from the 
searcher's perspective, this section looks at Internet search from the 
perspective of a publisher trying to present content to searchers. 
As the previous section indicated, on the Internet, searchers choose the 
search terms that manifest their search objectives. As a result, publishers 
trying to reach searchers need to (1) anticipate what terms express search 
objectives60 and (2) find ways to get search providers to associate the 
publisher' s content with the keywords searchers use. 
Publishers can communicate words intended to reach searchers through 
"data" and "metadata." In this context, "data" refers to content visibly 
presented when web visitors arrive at a web page, such as the web page's  text. 
Sometimes this is defined as "on the page" content.6 1 "Metadata" refers to 
content about the web page that describes or summarizes the page,62 such as 
the page title, the page URL or domain name, and "metatags." 
"Metatags" are HTML commands that allow web publishers to provide 
automated instructions to search engine robots.63 Two types of metatags, 
60 Jill Whalen, Even Small Businesses Can Gain Valuable Search Traffic, at 
http://www.searchengineguide.comlwhalenl2005/01 13jwl .html (Jan. 1 3, 2(05); see Google, Optimization 
Tips, at https://adwords.google.comlselectltips.html (last visited Apr. I ,  2(05); see also Daina J. Schemo, In 
Online Auctions, Misspelling in Ads Often Spells Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2004, at A I (discussing the 
financial impact to eBay auction sellers of making typographical errors in their auction listings, meaning that 
searchers using the correct spelling do not find them). 
This process of assessing the keywords consumers use is sometimes called "keyword research." See 
Bryan Eisenberg, Keyword Research: Optimization for Conversion, at http://ww.clickz.com!experts/designl 
traffic/print.php/30864 1 I  (Oct. 3, 2(03). 
61 In contrast, attributes outside the publisher's control (such as anchor text and inbound links) are 
referred to as "off the page" factors. Danny Sullivan, How Search Engines Rank Web Pages, at 
http://searchenginewatch.comlwebmasters/print.php/34751_2167961 (July 3 1 ,  2(03). 
62 Technically, "metadata" is usually defined as "data about other data." See Tim Oren, Metadata: 
Promises and Perils, Due Diligence, at http://www.pacificavc.comlblogl2003/0812 I .html (Aug. 2 1 ,  2(03); see 
also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2(03), 
affd, 380 F.3d 1 1 54 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing metadata in the context of MP3 files), cerro granted, 125 S. Ct. 
686 (2004). 
63 See Danny Sullivan, How To Use HTML Meta Tags, at http://searchenginewatch.com!webrnastersl 
print.php/34751_21 6793 1 (Dec. 5, 2(02). Although metatags (other than the title) do not appear in "on the 
page" content, any web visitor can see a web page's metatags by using the "View Source" option in his or her 
web browser, and the description metatag may appear in the filtering content at search engines. 
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"keyword metatags" and "description metatags," deserve special attention. 
Keyword metatags allow the publisher to designate certain keywords that 
summarize or classify a web page's  contents without those references 
appearing in the "on the page" content.64 Description metatags allow the 
publisher to provide a short summary of the website's contents that does not 
appear in the "on the page" content,65 although in some cases search engines 
will display the description metatag' s content as part of the filtering content for 
that page. 
Keyword metatags and description metatags are not the only metatag types; 
there are hundreds of metatags with a variety of purposes.66 Each metatag 
type's  "validity" depends on the degree to which it is recognized and adopted 
by web browser software programs and search providers. Some metatag types 
have been incorporated into widely recognized standards such as the 
specifications for HTML. Many other metatag types are recognized by only 
one or two search providers or web browsers, so few publishers use those 
metatags. 
The Internet creates a virtually unprecedented information environment 
because both data and metadata can be fully searchable by search providers, 
meaning that every word a publisher includes in its website can act as 
marketing for the publisher. In other words, publishers who incorporate a 
keyword into their website may be displayed, through the intermediation of 
search providers, in the search results for that term, which may lead searchers 
to investigate the website. 
This attention from searchers can translate into money, either directly 
through revenue models that pay based on the number of visitors (such as 
banner advertisements which pay per impression) or indirectly because some 
web visitors may choose to transact with the web publisher or those the web 
publisher promotes.67 With money at stake, not surprisingly, some publishers 
64 Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 1 74 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999). 
65 Id. 
66 See A Dictionary of HTML META Tags, at hnp:/lvancouver-webpages.com/MEf A1metatags.detail. 
htrnl (Apr. 4, 2(03). 
67 In the mid- and late- 1990s, many advertisers paid for each ad impression delivered to a website visitor. 
Thus, a website that attracted searchers would increase its inventory of ad impressions and make more money, 
even if searchers were misled about the website' s  relevance to their search. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, 
Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace: Trademark Liability for Metatagging, 33 GONZ. L. REv. 
277, 284, 302-03 ( 1 998); William Romanos, Internet Accuracy Wars: How Trademarks Used in Deceptive 
Metatagging Should Be Dealt with To Increase Economic Efficiency, 7 U. BALT. INTELL. PRoP. L.J. 79, 80 
(1998). Because these practices did not create real economic value, advertisers have largely moved away from 
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will use data or metadata to try to attract more searchers from search 
providers.68 Not only is this fact inevitable, but in many cases it constitutes a 
socially efficient process. Publishers will try to get search providers to 
associate their website with the keywords being used by desired searchers. If 
publishers pick the right keywords, and search providers make the right 
matches, social search costs decrease and society benefits generally. 
Unfortunately, not every publisher uses keywords in a manner that 
increases social utility. Some publishers deliberately select (and in some cases, 
excessively repeat) keywords that have no relevance to the content they are 
publishing.69 In other cases, publishers may place keywords in strategic 
locations on the web page hoping that search providers will overweight that 
placement, giving the publisher more attention than it deserves. However, in 
other cases, publishers' keyword selection and placement decisions may look 
funny but still may be legitimate; for example, this Article repeatedly uses the 
term "Canon PowerShot S400 digital camera" and search providers will 
index the Article on that term-even though this Article has zero or low 
relevance to searchers using that keyword. 
More generally, it is not possible to conclude that a publisher's keyword 
use is objectionable without understanding the searcher's  objectives. 
Searchers may use the same keyword for a variety of different meanings. In 
some cases, publishers legitimately select keywords that relate to their content, 
but that particular use of the keyword will be relevant to only a minority of 
searchers, meaning that the majority of searchers would deem the keyword 
usage irrelevant. Squelching the publisher' s use of the keyword in this context 
paying solely based on the number of ad impressions, instead preferring to pay based on a website's 
performance in generating qualified leads or actual sales. See J. William Gurley, The Persistent Rise of 
Performance-Based Advertising, CNEf News.com, July 1 0, 2000, at http://news.com.coml2 102-1071_3-
28 1334.html?tag=st.util.print. As a result, the ability to obtain greater advertising revenues merely by tricking 
users to visit a website has declined substantially (except, perhaps, in narrow ad sectors like pornography). 
68 See Michael Totty & Mylene Mangalindan, Cat and Mouse: As Google Becomes Web 's Gatekeeper, 
Sites Fight to Get In, WAL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at A I .  
69 These practices are variously called keyword stuffing (or word stuffing or cyberstuffing), keyword 
loading, spamdexing, keyword repetition and search engine spamming. See Webopedia. Keyword Stuffing, at 
http://www.webopedia.comfTERMlKlkeyword_stuffing.html (last visited Apr. I ,  2(05). See generally J.K. 
Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 2002 WL 1303 124 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2(02), vacated by 253 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 20 (N.D. 
Cal. 2(03) (discussing the various efforts the defendant, a critic of plaintiff, took to manipulate search results 
placement); Alan Perkins, The Classification of Search Engine Spam, at http://www.seoconsultants.coml 
artic1es/l OOO/search-engine-spam.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2(05). 
Many search engines prohibit keyword stuffing and penalize violators with sanctions as severe as being 
excluded from the index. See Webopedia supra. 
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may destroy the publisher's  ability to find and communicate with nonmajority 
searchers. 
IV. INTERNET SEARCH FROM THE SEARCH PROVIDER' S PERSPECTIVE 
This Part represents the third of three different perspectives on Internet 
search and looks at Internet search from the search provider's perspective. 
A. Search Providers Are Editors, Not Passive Intermediaries 
Compared with other types of search providers, search engines often 
portray themselves as passive intermediaries for web publishers' content and 
ads.7o Adherents to this view see search engines as defenseless against the 
abusive tactics of web publishers seeking to "confuse" the search engines.7 1  
There are some kernels of truth to this position. Search engines often 
automatically collect data, so publishers may be able to cause the robot to 
capture both good and "unwanted" content. Further, many web publishers 
aggressively try to "game" search engines in an effort to get as much searcher 
attention as possible. Indeed, an entire industry of "search engine optimizers" 
has emerged to help web publishers maximize their positioning under search 
. , .  I 72 englOes vanous ru es. 
However, it is 100% wrong to treat search engines as passive agents for 
publisher content. Search engines are media companies, not neutral providers 
of information.73 Thus, search engines often view their search database as a 
70 See David Becker, Google Caught in Anti-Semitism Flap, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.com/ 
2102-1 03S_3-5 IS601 2.html?tag=st.util.print (Apr. 7, 2004) (quoting Google spokesperson David Krane as 
saying "Google's search results are solely determined by computer algorithms that essentially reflect the 
popular opinion of the Web . . . .  Our search results are not manipulated by hand. We're not able to make any 
manual changes to the results."); Google, Trade11UIrk Complaint Procedure, at http://www.google.com/tm_ 
complaint.html (last visited Apr. 1 , 2005) ("As a provider of space for advertisements, please note that Google 
is not in a position to arbitrate trademark disputes between the advertisers and trademark owners.") (emphasis 
added). 
71 See J. Thomas McCarthy, Trade11UIrks, Cybersquatters and D011UIin Names, 10 J. ART. & ENT. L. 23 1 ,  
234 (200); Nathenson, supra note 53, at l I S. 
n See, e.g., Heather Lloyd-Martin, Secrets of Successful Search Engine Optimization, at 
http://searchenginewatch.com/searchday/print.php/347 I I_21750S 1 (Mar. 6, 2003) (describing how Search 
Engine Optimizations ("SEOs") can help publishers). 
73 Cf. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., 2003 WL 2 1 46456S (W.O. Okla. May 27, 2003) 
(characterizing the ranking of a publisher via the relevancy algorithm as an "opinion"). 
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proprietary asset74 that they tightly control to provide a quality user experience 
and, not coincidentally, maximize profits. 
To debunk any remaining myths about search engine passivity, it is helpful 
to consider the ways that search engines control their searchers' experiences: 
1. Aggregation 
Search engines try to build comprehensive databases,75 but no search 
engine incorporates every page on the Internet into their database.76 Instead, 
search engines make editorial choices about which websites to include in their 
database. Search engines may remove websites based on a publisher 's  
overzealous efforts to game the search engine's  system77 or due to liability 
concerns.78 In other cases, search engines may choose not to index certain 
websites based on the costs and benefits of catering to esoteric interests.79 
74 Cf eB ay, Inc. v. B idder's Edge, Inc., 1 00  F. Su pp. 2d 1058 (N .D. Cal. 200) (discussing eBay's 
attempts to keep its database of third party au ction listings proprietary). 
75 See Danny Sullivan, Search Engine Size Wars V Erupts, at http://blog.searchengi newatch.comlblogl04 
1 1 1 1-08 4221 (Nov. 1 1 , 2004). Database comprehensiveness benefits searchers because it increases the odds 
that searchers with esoteri c search obj ectives will have a successfu l search. 
76 The "Deep Web" refers to content available onli ne th at is not indexed by search engines . This content 
may be inaccessi ble to search robots because the content is presented on dynamically generated pages , whi ch 
the robots cannot access . See Michael K. B ergman, The Deep Web: Suifacing Hidden Value, 7 J. ELECfRONIC 
PUBLISHING, Aug. 2001 , available at h ttp://www.press.umich.edu ljep/07 Ol lbergman.html. However, content 
may also be exclu ded becaus e publishers i nstruct search robots to bypass them, whi ch can be done by placi ng 
a robot exclusion h eader into a robots.txt file. Other reasons content may not appear in  search engines is that a 
search engine si mply cannot handle the volu me of data, the content cannot be found by search engi nes because 
no one links to it, the content is new and the search engines h ave not i ndexed it yet, or because (as dis cussed 
later) the search engines choose not to include it. Note also that even if a search engine indexes a page, i t  may 
not index the enti re page if the page is a large file. See Sullivan, supra note 75. 
77 See Search King, 2003 WL 21 464 568 ,  at *3; Stefanie Olsen, Search Engines Delete Adware Company, 
CNET News . com, at http://news.com.coml2102-1024 3-5212479.h tml?tag=st.util.print (May 1 3 ,  2004) 
(Google and Yah oo kicked Wh enU.com out of th ei r databases for allegedly engagi ng in  cloaking). 
78 See Letter from Ava Paquette, attorney at M oxon & Kobrin and counsel for the Church of Scientology, 
to Google, Inc. (Mar. 8 , 2(02), available at h ttp://www.chi llingeffects .orgldmca5121noti ce.cgi?NoticeID=232 
(demanding that Google remove content from its database that was indexed f om a website critical of th e 
Chu rch of Scientology based on both copyright and trademark grounds ). Google h onored this request. Declan 
McCullagh ,  Google Yanks Anti-Church Sites, at http://www.wired.comlnews/pri ntlO.1294. 51 233.00.html 
(M ar. 21 , 2002). 
79 Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engines Matters, 
INFO. SOC'Y,  July Sept. 200, at 169; see also Elkin-Koren, supra note 30, at 188. 
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2. Sorting 
Search engines detennine the order of search results using a proprietary 
methodology called a "relevancy algorithm." Algorithms can be based on a 
wide variety of factors,80 and they do not need to be sophisticated. For 
example, search engines could order results alphabetically or by date of 
publication.81  However, most search engine use complex formulas in an 
attempt to get the most relevant results to the top of the search results list. 
For example, Google' s  algorithm purportedly considers 100 different 
factors,82 including words in the page title, words on the page (including their 
proximity to each other), words contained in the hypertext links established by 
third parties to that page (called "anchor text"), and the page ' s  "PageRank," a 
complex and data-intensive calculation that considers the number and quality 
of hypertext links pointing to the web page.83 
Search engines can also use cash as a "relevancy algorithm" by sorting 
search results based on how much the publisher is willing to pay for 
placement. This sorting method has received a lot of criticism, often on the 
basis that it is unfair for publishers to purchase competitor trademarks,84 that 
search engines should not profit from the sale of trademarks, or that consumers 
do not understand that search engines are using cash as a relevancy algorithm. 
Whether or not these critiques are fair, sorting search results on the basis of 
publishers' willingness to pay can work well because it forces publishers to 
carefully assess the value of being associated with a particular keyword. If a 
publisher overestimates the relevancy of a keyword association to searchers, 
the publisher overpays for searchers who are not interested in the publisher. 
Thus, rank-ordering publishers based on their willingness to pay implicitly 
introduces market forces into the publishers' attempts to characterize their 
relevancy to searchers. 
80 See generally RICARDO BAEZA-YATES & BERTHIER RmEIRO-NETO, MODERN INFORMATION 
RETRIEVAL (1999). 
81 See Greg R. Notess, On the Net: Rising Relevance in Search Engines, available at 
http://www.onlinemag.netJOLI999/net5.html (May 1999). For example, Nexis search results are, as a default, 
organized by date. Google News gives users the option to sort search results by date. 
82 Chris Ridings & Mike Shishigin, PageRank Uncovered 35 (Sept. 2002), at 
http://www.texaswebdevelopers.comldocslpagerank.pdf. 
83 [d. at 8.  
84 See G. Peter Albert, Jr. & Rita A. Abbati, Metatags. Keywords. and Links: Recent Developments 
Addressing Trademark Threats in Cyberspace, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 34 1 ,  358-59 (2003) (describing the 
practice as "predatory").  
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Regardless of which relevancy algorithms search engines use, their 
importance to the Internet search process cannot be overstated. As a practical 
matter, relevancy algorithms determine the results that searchers see and 
investigate. Searchers do not generally look at search results beyond the first 
page or two,85 which is a result consistent with bounded rationality.86 Thus, 
web publishers who fail to get into the zone of visibility will not reach 
searchers.87 In turn, degraded exposure can materially impact a publisher ' s  
business and profIts.88 Because searchers invariably judge the search 
provider' s performance based on the relevancy of the top results, a search 
engine 's decisions about what factors to include and exclude in a relevancy 
algorithm, and how to weigh each factor, are not made lightly. 89 
85 See Jansen et al., supra note 14 (over three-fourths of searchers looked at only one or two pages); 
Marable, supra note 23, at 1 3  (88% of search results links selected in ethnographic study were from the first 
page of search results). See generally Nico Brooks, The Atlas Rank Report: How Search Engine Rank Impacts 
Traffic, Atlas Institute Digital Marketing Insights, available at http://www.atlasdmt.comlmediaipdfs/insights/ 
RankReport.pdf (June 2004) (the first ranked search result should see ten times the quantity of clicks as the 
tenth ranked search result); iProspect, supra note 23 (discussing users' unwillingness to look at more than two 
search results pages). 
86 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model o/Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. EcON. 99 ( 1955). 
87 Some have expressed concerns that searchers who receive too many search results will abort their 
search in frustration. See Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 
(C.O. Cal. 1997); Ooellinger, supra note 53, at 2 1 1  "If every shoe and athletic apparel company were allowed 
to include the 'Nike' trademark in the metatags of their web sites, it would make it much more difficult for 
someone acrually searching for the Nike web site. Moreover, if every web site for every major shoe company 
contained the trademarks of every other major shoe company in the metatags of their web sites, the ability of a 
web user to find any given web site would be greatly reduced."); Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: 
Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 85 MIN. L. REV. 949, 1028 32 (200 1). 
This thinking is erroneous because of bounded rationality. If searchers focus only on the top search 
results, the quantity of "inferior" search results they ignore is irrelevant. However, if the top search results are 
not relevant, the searcher may abort the search out of frustration because the searcher will not sift through a 
larger dataset to fmd the desired information. See Marable, supra note 23. 
88 See Totty & Mangalindan, supra note 68 (discussing how a clothing retailer's sales dropped 80% after 
its search results placement had been degraded in Google's index); Adam L. Penenberg, Googling the Bottom 
Line, at http://www.wired.comlnewslprintlO.1 294.66485.OO.htrnl (Feb. 3, 2005) (quantifying the traffic and 
revenue gains from improved positioning on results lists). 
89 See Search King, Inc. v. GOOgle Tech., Inc., 2003 WL 21464568 (W.O. Okla. May 27, 2003) 
(discussing the subjective nature of deciding what factors to include or exclude and how much weight to give 
each); see also Stefanie Olsen, Ask Jeeves Denounces Paid Inclusion, CNET News.com, at 
http://news.com.coml2102-1024_3-51 68805.html1tag=st.util.print (Mar. 2, 2004) ("After much testing of paid 
inclusion, [Ask Jeeves] found that it can negatively sway search results -producing more commercial and 
irrelevant lists of Web sites" which led Ask Jeeves to end its paid inclusion program); Stefanie Olsen, MSN To 
Shake Up Search Ads, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml2 I02-1024_3-5 1 76197.htrnl1tag=st.util.print 
(Mar. 19, 2004) (discussing how MSN decided to make changes to its search engine based on testing of 
consumer responses). 
Amazon.com signaled the importance of algorithms when it hired a ''Chief Algorithms Officer" 
reporting to the Chief Information Officer. See Margaret Kane, Amazon Hires Algorithm Guru, CNET 
News.com, at http://news.com.coml2I02- 1017 _3-965068.htrnl1tag=scutiCprint (Nov. 8, 2002). 
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Because the relevancy algorithm can affect how much money they earn, 
web publishers want to learn the algorithm90 and optimize their content for 
maximum exposure. In practice, this creates an arms race between search 
engines and web publishers.9 1  Search engines start the cycle by making a 
change to their relevancy algorithm. In response, some web publishers 
(especially those guided by search engine optimizers) do everything they can 
to benefit from the change, and some web publishers succeed in getting 
premium exposure for content the search engine does not want to be so highly 
ranked. The search engine responds with a new change, and the cycle starts 
over. The process virtually mandates that search engines constantly change 
their relevancy algorithms.92 
In the end, though, search engines decide how to order search results, not 
publishers. Publishers are at the mercy of search engine changes, meaning that 
a publisher can be the top-ranked search result one day and out of the index on 
the next day-even if the publisher does not change its website at all. The 
volatility of results can be attributed to relevancy algorithm changes by the 
search engines,93 but it can also be due to changes made by third parties in 
anchor text or in the number of links third parties make to the publisher's 
website. 
Some commentators have claimed that manipulative web publisher 
practices threaten the viability of search engines.94 In fact, the exact opposite 
is true. First, search engines expect these practices. Second, abusive publisher 
90 To make it harder for publishers to game the algorithm (and to slow down competitors), search engines 
zealously keep their algorithms secret. See Search King Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV -02-1457 -M, at 3 
n.2 (W.O. Okla. Jan. \3, 2(03) ("Google's mathematical algorithm is a trade secret, and it has been 
characterized by the company as 'one of Google's most valuable assets."'); Stefanie Olsen, Project Searches 
for Open-Source Niche, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml2 I02-1032_3-50649 1 3.htm1?tag=st util_pr 
int (Aug. 1 8, 2(03). 
91 See Totty & Mangalindan, supra note 68 (discussing the "arms race[] between big search engines" and 
search engine optimizers); Notess, supra note 8 1  ("It becomes a never-ending cycle."); Romanos, supra note 
67, at 94 (noting that an arms race produces social costs but also may spur innovation). See generally 
O'Rourke, supra note 67, at 286 (discussing search engine antigaming practices). 
92 See Stefanie Olsen, Google Co-Founder: No Rush for IPO, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml 
2 102-1 025_3 5066227.htm1?tag=scutiCprint (Aug. 20, 2(03) (citing Google cofounder Sergey Brin as saying 
that Google ''tests half a dozen new algorithms a month and implements some subset of those"); Ridings & 
Shishigin, supra note 82, at 35. 
93 These changes could be the product of general algorithmic changes or targeted at specific publishers or 
practices. See Search King, No . .  CIV-02- 1457-M at 4 ("Google knowingly and intentionally decreased the 
PageRanks assigned to both Search King and PRAN."). 
94 See McCarthy, supra note 7 1 ,  at 236 (keyword stuffing in metatags ''tends to destroy the usefulness of 
a search engine"). 
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practices may endanger search engines with easily gamed algorithms, but 
search engines with robust algorithms can withstand these tests. Gaming 
efforts give search engines an additional basis for competitive differentiation­
the search engine that does a better job avoiding or mitigating these efforts will 
produce more relevant results and be rewardec:l in the marketplace accordingly. 
Web publisher games do not jeopardize search engines; instead, they are a vital 
component of a dynamic and constantly improving search engine industry. 
Some courts and commentators have suggested that a publisher' s liability 
for trademark infringement based on using a third party trademark might 
depend on if the publisher succeeds in being ranked higher than a trademark 
owner in search results.95 However, any such suggestion seems illogical given 
the practical logistics of search result placement:96 Search engines and third 
parties affect placement regardless of what the publisher does, placement can 
change daily or even more frequently, and placement can vary significantly 
between different search engines.97 
3. Filtering Content 
Search engines also make editorially significant judgments about the 
presentation of filtering content (if any).98 Filtering content can educate and 
influence the searcher, affecting the searcher's interest in pursuing a search 
result and setting the searcher's expectations for the web publisher's content. 
As part of managing the "user interface," search engines decide how much 
filtering content searchers see and in what order and prominence. 
95 See Playboy Enters.,  Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 804 (9th Cir. 2(02) (indicating that it might have 
changed its ruling if Welles had successfully shown up higher than Playboy in the search engines); J.K. Har 
& Co. v. Kassel, 2002 WL 1 303 1 24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2(02) (finding infringement based on the defendants' 
efforts to move up in the search results), vacated by 253 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2(03); see also 
Doellinger, supra note 53, at 205--D9 (proposing a complicated system of liability based on the relative 
placement of the trademark owner's search results and an interloper's search results). But see Search King, 
Inc. v. Google Tech ., inc., 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2(03) (rejecting relative placement 
as the basis of search engine liability). 
96 Cj. Doellinger, supra note 53, at 208 n. 1 94 (raising but sidestepping the issue). 
97 See Jakob Nielsen, Diversity Is Power for Specialized Sites, at http://www.useit.com!alertboxl200306 1 
6.html (June 1 6, 2003) (showing that search engines had little overlap in search results for specialized topic 
searches). 
Of course this proposal also simply cannot work for words that have multiple trademark owners. More 
generally, searchers want the most relevant results, and there could be situations where a third party site is 
considered more relevant than the trademark owner' s site. 
98 Cf Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 947 (9th Cir. 2(02) (discussing how the visual search 
engine Ditto.com was more than a passive agent in the way it delivered its visual search results). 
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4. Reinterpreting Searcher Keywords 
In their goal to satisfy searcher objectives, search engines invariably put 
words into searchers' mouths. They do so in at least two different ways. First, 
to better anticipate searchers' objectives, the search engines reinterpret the 
searcher' s keyword to mean something the searcher did not say. 
"Concept searching" is an example of this phenomenon. Using concept 
searching, a search engine associates a searcher' s  keyword with related words 
or concepts, such as synonyms. For example, a search engine might 
automatically interpret the keyword "GPS" to include "Global Positioning 
System," and then automatically execute a search on both the keywords "GPS" 
and "Global Positioning System." Search engines can also use concept 
searching to place keywords in taxonomies and to execute a search for both the 
specific and general levels within the taxonomy. For example, a concept 
search on the keyword "Canon PowerS hot S4OO" might automatically include 
search results generated from the keyword "digital camera.,,99 In such 
situations, search engines must editorially determine what taxonomical 
associations to make. 
Concept searching can also be used on a much more mechanical level. 
Search engines can automatically detect and correct typographical errors-a 
search on "recieve" can be interpreted as a search on "receive"--or 
automatically truncate the keyword to a "word stem" and look for all words 
containing that word stem. 1 00  
A variation of concept searching is called "phrase recognition." With 
phrase recognition, the search engine automatically detects a multiword 
keyword as a phrase and limits its search to the phrase (as opposed to rmding 
results containing the words individually). 1 0 1  
Second, search engines provide suggested keywords to searchers. For 
example, Yahoo Search and Snap (a new search engine) provide alternative 
99 See Playboy Enters .• Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp .• 354 F.3d 1020. 1 023 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(search engine bundled keywords for sale. requiring advertisers to buy the package even if certain keywords 
were not wanted). 
tOO The process of searching for all words containing a word stem is sometimes called "truncation." See 
Signpost. Use Search Tips: Truncate Wordy. at http://www.marquette.edullibrary/thesignpostltruncation.html 
(last visited Apr. 1 . 2005). Other analogous processes include searching the plural form of a singular word (or 
vice-versa). or different forms of word tenses (such as including "written" in any search for ''write''). 
lOt See Notess. supra note 8 1 .  
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search keywords at the top of search results pages, I02 and Google is testing a 
product called "Google Suggest" that automatically scans the search box and 
displays possible search keywords. 103 
5. Editing Publisher Content 
In addition to putting words in searchers ' mouths, search engines put words 
into web publishers' mouths .  Specifically, search engines associate metadata 
with publisher content, in many cases without the publisher knowing or being 
able to control this association. These associations can cause the web 
publisher to be displayed as a search result for keywords that the web publisher 
did not use at all. 
For example, some search engines include anchor text, the third party 
words used to establish links, in the data associated with the linked web page. 
Web publishers cannot control the words third parties use to link to their 
websites, creating the potential that a web publisher will show up in search 
results for words it never used. This exploit has become so well known that it 
has a name: "Google bombing." Google bombing occurs when third parties 
link to a web publisher using carefully chosen anchor text, which causes the 
publisher to appear as a top Google search result for keywords in the anchor 
text. 104 Victims of Google bombing include AOL and Microsoft, both listed in 
search results for the keyword "go to Hel1;,, 105 Disney, which has been listed in 
search results for pornographic keywords ; 106 George W. Bush ' s  website, listed 
in search results for "miserable failure;,, 107 and the first publicized victim of 
102 See Stefanie Olsen. MSN Launches Revamped Search Engine, CNET News.com, at http://news.com. 
coml2 102-1032_3-5254083.html?tag=st.util.print (June 30, 2004) (giving the example of how a search for the 
word "Apple" will cause Yahoo Search to prompt searchers to try "Apple Computer" as their keyword); 
Stefanie Olsen, New Snap Site Thinks Outside the Search Box, CNET News.com, at hnp:/Inews.com.com!2 1 02 
-1032_3-5397793.htmI?tag=st.util.print (Oct. 5, 2004). 
\03 See Google Suggest, at http://www.google.comlwebhp?complete=l &hl=en (last visited Apr. 1 , 2(05). 
104 See BBC News, Google Hit by Link Bombers, at http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilsciltechlI 868395.stm 
(Mar. 1 3, 2002); Danny Sullivan, Google's (and Inktomi 's) Miserable Failure, at http://www.searchengine 
watch.comlsereportlarticle.php!3296101 (Jan. 6, 2004). See generally John Hiler, Google Time Bomb, at 
http://www.microcontentnews.comlarticles!googlebombs.htm (Mar. 3, 2(02) (analyzing the phenomenon in 
some detail and subcategorizing the phenomenon into humor bombs, ego bombs, money bombs, and justice 
bombs). 
\05 See Linda Rosencrance, Google Search Leads to Gates of "Hell ", at http://www.computerworld.com! 
printthis!2002l0,4814,74566,OO.html (Sept. 25, 2(02). 
106 See CNN.com, Google Blips: Search Not Always Right, at http://www.electricsheep.us/storylEpFFuEE 
ypVzCrzbNag.shtmI (Sept. 30, 2(02) (abridged version). 
\07 See Tom McNichol, Your Message Here, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2004, at G 1  (noting that Yahoo, 
HotBot, and MSN also were affected by the bombing). 
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Google Bombing, programer Andy Pressman, whose "friend" caused 
Pressman's website to be listed as the top search result for "talentless hack.,, 108 
A different example of Google putting words into publishers' mouths 
occurs with Google' s  "description" line of filtering content. Traditionally, 
publishers used description metatags with the hope that search engines would 
display them as filtering content. However, in some circumstances, Google 
will automatically generate its own description using "snippets" from the web 
page, or it will use descriptions authored by members of the Open Directory 
Project. 109 
Compared to their approaches to algorithmically generated search results, 
search engines exercise even more editorial control over advertising they run, 
taking down (or leaving up) advertising capriciously. 1 10 
6. Reinterpreting Publisher Keywords 
Many search engines sell keyword-specific advertisements to publishers. 
For example, Canon may pay Google to display an ad for the Canon 
PowerShot S400 every time a searcher searches on the keyword "digital 
camera." However, search engines may interpret the advertiser-selected 
keywords to include other keywords that the search engine believes are 
108 See id. 
109 See Google, My Site 's Listing Is Incorrect, at http://www.google.comlwebmasters/3 .html (last visited 
Apr. I ,  2005). 
For example, an OOP volunteer editor wrote the following description for my personal website at 
http://eric ,goldman.tripod.com: ''The author's speeches, articles, perspectives on cyberspace law and internet 
law, the reasons for his name change, and favorite vegetarian restaurants." See http://search.dmoz.orglcgi­
bin/search?search=eric+goldman (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). On February 22, 2004, this exact language was 
associated with my personal site in Google (although the language truncates after "for"). See 
http://www.google.comlsearch?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=%22eric+goldman%22 (last visited Apr. I, 
2(05). I did not write that language, and the description does not appear anywhere on my personal website. 
Google's composition of "snippets" has prompted at least one lawsuit because a Certified Public 
Accountant believed that the search results language falsely represented that he had been disciplined for 
certain violations. See Seth Fineberg, Calif. CPA Sues Google Over "Misleading" Search Results, Acer. 
TODAY, Apr. 19, 2004, at 5. 
1 10 See Verne Kopytoff, Google 's Ad Rules Complex, Controversial, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 9, 2004, at FI, F5 
(quoting Google's vice president of global online sales and operations as saying "our [ad] policies will always 
involve an element of discretion and we reserve the right to reject or approve any ads"); Google Guys, 
PLAYBOY, Sept. 2004, 55, 56-57 (quoting Google founder Sergey Brin as saying "we don't accept ads for hard 
liquor, but we accept ads for wine. It's just a personal preference . . . .  We don't try to put our sense of ethics 
into the search results, but we do when it comes to advertising."). For an example of Google's arbitrariness, 
see, e.g., MSNBC, Google Bans Environmental Group 's Ads, Feb. 13, 2004, at http://www.rnsnbc.rnsn.comlid 
142635901 (reporting that Google dropped a protest ad against Royal Caribbean Cruises because it does not 
accept ads with "language that advocates against Royal Caribbean"). 
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conceptually related, much like the search engines reinterpret searcher 
keywords in concept searching. For example, Google may cause Canon's ad 
to be displayed in response to a search on "nikon digital camera," a process 
that Google calls "broad matching." I 1 1  Canon may not even realize that 
competitive trademarks are included in the broad matched set. In the future, 
search providers will go further and automatically tell publishers what 
keywords they should use for advertising. I 12 
7. Advanced Technologies 
Search engines are constantly looking for new ways to service searcher 
needs. In the long-term, searching may be redefined by collaborative filtering 
or artificial intelligence, 1 1 3 the use of personal data or past behavior to provide 
a context for a keyword search, 1 14 and more customized sorting based on 
geography or using individualized relevancy algorithms. 1 I5 In many cases, 
these advanced technologies will require the search engine to play an even 
more active editorial role in sorting and presenting search results. In the 
shorter-run, search engines will attempt to solve searcher needs through 
techniques like merchandising search results (telling searchers "If you like X, 
you will really like Y") and presenting more variations of filtering content. I 16 
1 1 1  See Google, Expanded Broad Keyword Matching, at https:lladwords.google.comlselect/expanded mat 
ching.html (last visited Apr. I, 2005). Netscape and Excite used a variation of the practice, requiring 
advertisers to purchase a "bundle" of keywords that would trigger the ads. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. 
Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2004). 
1 12 See Stefanie Olsen, Google Preps New Tool To Juice Revenue, CNET News.com, at 
http://news.com.coml2102-1024_3-5208492.html?tag=st.utiJ.print (May 10, 2004); Pamela Parker, Google 
Widens Test to Froogle Merchants, at http://www.cJickz.comlnewslprint.php/34288 1  (Oct. 29, 2004) 
(discussing Google "ad automator" tool that automatically scans merchant product feeds to recommend 
keywords that the merchant should purchase). But see Societe des Hotels Meridien v. S.A.R.L. Google 
France, NRG 04/3772 (T.G.I. Nanterre, Dec. 1 6, 2004), available at http://www.juriscom.net/documents/tgin 
anterre20041216.pdf (criticizing Google for suggesting third party trademarks to advertisers to purchase as 
keywords). 
1 1 3 See Lisa Guernsey, Making Intelligence a Bit Less Anificial, N.Y. TiMES, May I ,  2003, at G I ;  Steven 
Levy, All Eyes on Google, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2004, at 48, 58. 
1 14 See Stefanie Olsen, Searching for the Personal Touch, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml21O 
2-1024_3-5061 873.html?tag=scutil_print (Aug. 1 1, 2003); Levy, supra note 1 3, at 55-56 (discussing 
Microsoft's research project called "Implicit Query," software that will figure out what searchers should be 
asking for without having to interrupt their tasks to initiate a search); Steve Silberman, The Questfor Meaning, 
WIRED, Feb. 2000, at 173 (discussing the use of Bayesian filters to detennine user interests based on past 
activities). Google's Gmail offering may be an early example of this. 
1 15 See Stefanie Olsen, Search Upstarts Storm Google's Gates, CNET News.com, at http://news.com. 
comJ2 I 02-1038_3-5172198.html?tag=st.utiJ.print (Mar. 1 1 , 2004); Levy, supra note 1 13, at 58. 
1 16 See, e.g., Google WebQuotes, at http://labs.google.comlcgi-binlwebquotes (last visited Apr. I ,  2005). 
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8. Summary on Passivity 
Because search engines so liberally redeploy content to accomplish their 
objectives, a third party (like a plaintiff or a judge) cannot make any 
assumptions about why content is presented by a search engine. A searcher 
who searches for the keyword "canon" might see a Nikon search result because 
the search engine reinterpreted the searcher's keyword, the search engine 
reinterpreted Nikon' s  content or a third party linked to Nikon' s  website with 
the word "canon" in the anchor text. At the same time, Nikon could try its 
hardest to be indexed on the word "canon" but still completely fail to do so 
based on search engine policies. One should abandon any legal presumptions 
about why a search result or an ad appears to a searcher. This inquiry is 
resolvable only by reference to the facts; and the facts change constantly. 
B. Keyword Convergence 
Until now, this Article has primarily focused on search engines, particularly 
those that generate their databases using automated means. However, the 
historical distinctions between search engines and other Internet search 
providers have collapsed. Now, virtually all the major ways that searchers can 
obtain Internet content have converged on using keywords as the trigger for 
content. The keyword phenomenon is not limited to text; keywords have 
become fundamental to searching for all types of media, including photos, 1 I7 
musical recordings, 1 18 and pornography. 1 19 Keywords have emerged as the 
new "lingua franca" for every aspect of how the Internet can be used as a 
commercial or information resource. 
1 17 E.g. ,  Google Image Se arch, at http://www.google. com!irnghp?hl=en&tab=wi&q=google%20image% 
20search (last visited Apr. 1 , 200 5); Dino. com, at http://www. dino.com!(Ia st visited Apr. 1 , 200 5); see Kelly 
v. Arriba Soft Corp. ,  336 F.3 d  81 1 ,  81 5- 1 6  (9th Cir. 2003 ) (discussing the operation of the Dino. com website 
and Dino.com' s liability for copyright infringement). 
1 18 Searchers looking for mu sic files through peer-to-peer file sharing services search by artist name and 
song title. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3 d 6 43, 646 (7th Cir. 2003 ); A&M Record s, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1 004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001 ); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Stu dio s, I nc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 
F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
1 19 Parental co ntrol software (sometime s pejo ratively called "censorware") may use keywords to block 
access to pornograp hy and other o bjectionable co nte nt. See Reno v. Am. Civil Libertie s Union, 521 U.S. 844, 
855 (1997). Not surprising ly, overreliance on keywords to control acce ss to pornograp hy can block legitimate 
publications. Classic e xamples include the word s "breast," which is an essential word to o btaining information 
about breast cancer, and "couple s, " a word that can be used in se xual content, which caused the blocking of an 
off cial White House we bsite page containing the word. See CNET News. com, SurjWatch To Give Users 
More Control, at http://news.com.com!2102-1023-21 1 1 37. html (May 2, 1996). 
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Nevertheless, keyword-based search engines are routinely distinguished 
from other types of content searching mechanisms, such as the use of domain 
names. 120 This subsection argues that these alternative methods of accessing 
content have merged into other forms of keyword searches, so the law should 
not treat them differently. 
1. Domain Names 
The most obvious example of keyword convergence is the DNS, which is 
just a stylized type of search engine. 12 1 Just like search engines, the DNS 
works by having a searcher submit a keyword (the domain name) to the DNS 
and receiving content in return-i.e., the web page located at the Internet 
Protocol ("IP") address associated with the domain name. The DNS differs 
from stereotypical search engines in that it only returns one search result (the 
web page) 122 and does not provide any filtering content before the searcher 
receives the result. However, these are details that go to the implementation of 
the search functionality; Google replicates this implementation with its "I'm 
Feeling Lucky" feature. 123 
Although the DNS has a different technical architecture and origin than 
search engines, the DNS has always functioned as a search tool. In the 1 990s, 
it was not uncommon for searchers to guess domain names as a way to obtain 
relevant content. 124 Often, a searcher' s guess would take one of two forms. 
The searcher might select a trademark, add the suffix ".com," and assume that 
the DNS would retrieve the trademark owner's website (for example, assuming 
that kodak.com was associated with the Eastman Kodak Company). 125 Or, the 
120 See, e.g., Nathenson, supra note 53, at 87-88 (discussing the differences between domain name 
disputes and efforts to game search engines). 
121 See Expert Report of Milton Mueller, Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, Nos. 01 -2648/01 -2725 (E.D. Mich. 
2002), available at http://www.taubmansucks.comlActI08b.html [hereinafter Mueller Report]. Domain names 
also can be used for email addresses, raising issues beyond this Article's scope. 
122 See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003 ). 
123 See Google, Google Web Search Features, at http http://www.google.comlhelp/features.html (last 
visited Apr. I ,  2(05). 
124 Mueller Report, supra note 1 2 1 .  
125 This proposition has a venerable tradition in case law precedent, starting with one of the earliest 
Internet cases. See MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1 994). Appellate cases also 
endorse this proposition. See, e.g., Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 
687, 691 (6th Cir. 2003); PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.c., 3 1 9  F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir. 2003); 
Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2(00) ('The most common 
method of locating an unknown domain name is simply to type in the company name or logo with the suffix 
.com"); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entrn't Corp., 174 F.3d 1 036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1 999) 
("Oftentimes, an Internet user will begin by hazarding a guess at the domain name, especially if there is an 
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searcher might select some generic noun or verb, add the suffix ".com," and 
assume that the associated website would provide content relevant to the noun 
or verb (for example, assuming that pets.com would contain information 
related to pets). In either case, the searcher used a keyword ("Kodak" or 
"pets") in the DNS system in an effort to get relevant content. 
However, the DNS was never intended to be a search tool, 126 and it 
underperforms as a search tool for several reasons. 127 First, top level domains 
("TLDs") like .com have a "relevancy algorithm" based on the first party to 
register the domain name, which is a very weak proxy for relevancy. Second, 
searchers do not get any filtering content to make predictive determinations 
and do not get the convenience of a summary list of search results. 128 Third, 
because keywords are capable of multiple meanings, the "one website per 
domain name" architecture produces relevancy on a consistent basis only when 
most searchers share a single definition of the keyword (such as in the case of a 
well-known fanciful trademark). Finally, searchers can incur unpleasant 
consequences, such as mousetrappingl29 or unwanted pornography, if the 
obvious domain name to try. Web users often assume, as a rule of thumb, that the domain name of a particular 
company will be the company name followed by .com."); Panavision Int'! L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 13 16, 
1327 (9th Cir. 1998). 
But see Mueller Report, supra note 1 2 1  (calling the assumption a temporary phenomenon from 1994 to 
1 997 and saying "[n)o systematic empirical evidence quantifying the validity of [these) proposition[s) is 
available"). Some cases question these searcher expectations and practices. See. , e.g., Interstellar Starship 
Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2002); Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, 
377 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Chatam Int'!, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 1 5 7  F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 n.17 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Mach. 
Head v. Dewey Global Holdings, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22759, *28 (N.D. Cal. 2001 ); The Network 
Network v. CBS, 200 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 475 1 ,  at *16 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2000). 
126 Ben Edelman, DNS as a Search Engine: A Quantitative Evaluation, at http://cyber.Jaw.harvard.edulpe 
ople/edelman/DNS-as-search/ (July 1 , 2002); Mueller Report, supra note 121 .  
127 See generally Edelman, supra note 1 26 (comparing the relevance of results generated through domain 
name guessing, search engines, and the RealNames keyword system). 
128 See Rieh, supra note 25, at 159 (discussing the importance of filtering content to the search process). 
One could say that the domain name acts as filtering content, but unless a searcher has other information about 
the domain name, it provides little reliable insight into what to expect when a searcher gets there. 
1 29 Mousetrapping occurs when a web publisher effectively prevents the searcher from leaving by 
disabling the "back" button or by opening new pop-up windows faster than the searcher can close them. 
Webopedia.com, Mousetrapping, at http://www.webopedia.comITERMlMlmousetrapping.html (last visited 
Apr. 1 , 2005); see FTC v. Zuccarini, 2002 WL 137842 1 ,  at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2001) (treating mousetrapping 
as an unfair trade practice). See generally Eun S. Bae, Comment, Pop-Up Advertising Online: Slaying the 
Hydra, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 39 (2003) (discussing various harms associated with 
mousetrapping). Software is increasingly killing pop-up ads automatically, which may minimize (at least for a 
while) some of mousetrapping's perniciousness. See Stefanie Olsen, Internet Explorer To Stomp Pop-Ups, 
CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml2102-1032_3-5 105139.html?tag=sCutil_print (Nov. 10, 2003). But 
see Stefanie Olsen, Revenge of the Pop-Ups, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml2 102-I024_3-
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searcher makes a typing error130 or encounters a domain name that has expired 
and been re-registered by an unexpected third party. 13 1  
Various attempts have been made to improve the DNS's integrity as a 
search database. For example, new TLDs in the recent years have abandoned 
the "first to register" relevancy algorithm, giving priority to trademark 
owners. 1 32 However, these new TLDs have been used comparatively 
infrequently. 133 
5408453.html?tag=st.util.print (Oct. 14, 20(4) (discussing how websites are finding ways around the pop-up 
ad blockers). 
130 Domain name registrants who register typographical error versions of popular domain names are 
called "typosquatters." See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Elecs. Boutique 
Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 2001 WL 83388, at *1  (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2001), affd without comment, 33 Fed. 
Appx. 647 (3d Cir. 2002); Educ. Tours, Inc. v. Hemisphere Travel, Inc., 2004 WL 887417, at *2 (N.D. II. 
Apr. 26, 20(4). See generally Dara B. Gilwit, Note, The Latest Cybersquatting Trend: Typosquatters, Their 
Changing Tactics, and How To Prevent Public Deception and Trademark Infringement, I I  WASH U. J.L. & 
POL'y 267 (2003); Benjamin Edelman, Large-Scale Registration of Domains with Typographical Errors, at 
http://cyber.\aw.harvard.edulpeople/edelmanltypo-domainsl (Sept. 3, 2003). 
Congress criminalized some types of typosquatting in the Truth in Domain Names Act, H.R. 939, 108th 
Congo (2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.c. § 2252B). The law criminalizes using a misleading domain name 
with the intent to cause minors to view sexually explicit pictures. Notorious typosquatter Zuccarini was 
sentenced to thirty months in prison for typosquatting on domain names that might appeal to kids and 
redirecting those domain names to advertisements for hard core pornography. See Press Release, U.S. 
Department of Justice, "Cyberscarnmer" Sentenced to 30 Months for Using Deceptive Internet Names To 
Mislead Minors to X-Rated Sites (Feb. 26, 20(4), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/zuccariniSent.htrn. 
13 1 This phenomenon is referred to as "porn napping" when pornographers re-register the domain name. 
See Mike Wendland, Expired Domains Present Opportunity for Net Porn, DETROIT FREE PREss, at 
http://www.freep.com!money/techlmwendI6_2oo205 16.htrn (May I6. 2002). In one incident. a link from 
Senator Orrin Hatch's website was porn napped, leading some to wonder if Senator Hatch endorsed 
pornography. See Robert Gehrke, Hatch Removes Mistaken link to Porn Site, at http://www.sunherald.com! 
mld/sunherald/6136653.htm (June 20, 2003). 
132 More recently, new TLDs such as .info, and .us, and the .kids.us domain, have modified the first to 
register approach, using techniques like segmented registration periods where only registrants possessing a 
registered trademark in the domain name can register during the initial period. See Afilias.info, The Sunrise 
Period, at http://ww.afilias.info/register/schedule!sunrise .Period (July 26, 2001). 
133 See Caslon Analytics, Profile: Domains and the DNS, at http://www.caslon.com.auldomainsprofilel.  
htrn (Oct. 2003); see also Ben Edelman, Registrations in Open ccTLDs, at http://cyber.\aw.harvard.edulpeople 
/Edelmanlopen-cctlds/ (July 22, 2002) ("more than 80% [of .cc, .tv, and .ws domains] lead only to 
placeholders or to no web content at all," a substantially higher percentage than in .com, .net, and .org); Ben 
Edelman, Survey of Usage of the . US TW, at http://cyber.Jaw.harvard.edulpeople/edelman/dotusl (Sept. 20, 
2002) (less than 15% of .us domains provide web content); Francis Hwang, Do Domain Names Matter?, at 
http://fhwang.net/writing/do_domain_names_matter.html (July 25, 2003) (citing how most prominent 
museums have avoided using the .museum TLD, preferring to use the .org TLD); Jonathan Zittrain & 
Benjamin Edelman, Survey of Usage of the .BIZ TLD, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edultldsloo l/ (June 25, 2002) 
("74% of currently registered .BIZ domains provide no web content or provide only error messages or 
placeholders. "). 
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Also, some domain names resolve to a "gateway page" (also referred to as 
a "shared page" or "intermediate page,,)134 for the sole purpose of allowing 
multiple trademark owners or licensees to "share" the domain name through 
links on the page to their respective sites. 135 
Finally, as a DNS alternative, RealNames deployed a keyword system 
where a searcher could type a keyword into their software and receive a list of 
websites that paid to be associated with that keyword. 136 RealNames 
ultimately failed, 137 perhaps due to searcher migration away from domain 
names or perhaps because RealNames delivered less relevant results than 
search engines did. 138 
None of the efforts to improve DNS quality have rehabilitated the DNS as a 
useful search tool. Instead, the DNS ' s  shortcomings have led to two 
interesting developments in the keyword convergence process. First, domain 
name registries increasingly treat domain names as triggers for search results 
just like search engines dO. 139 In May 2003 , searchers arriving at unregistered 
domain names in the .biz and .us TLDs, operated by NeuStar, received paid 
search results instead of a typical error page. l40 NeuStar' s trial program only 
lasted for a few days, but the concept re-emerged in September 2003 when 
VeriSign launched its "Site Finder" program, which presented search results 
instead of a "page not found" message for the .com and .net TLDs. 141 
Besieged by a firestorm of 0rposition, VeriSign suspended the program after 
two weeks in October 2003 . 14 
1 34 Prominent examples include scrabble.com, playtex.com, and disc.com. See David H. Bernstein et aI., 
Trademark and Unfair Competition Issues, PLI GO-OOD2, n.45 (July 2(00). 
135 See Puneet Singh, Gateway Pages: A Solution to the Domain Name Conflict?, 9 1  TRADEMARK REp. 
1226 (2001) .  
136 See Danny Sullivan, Goodbye Domain Names, Hello ReaINames?, at hnp://www.searchenginewatch. 
com/sereport/print.php/34721_216261 1 (May 3, 2(00). 
137 See David McGuire. RealNames Going Out of Business, Shutting Down Keywords, WASH. POST, May 
I I . 2002. at hnp://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2lwp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A4680-
2002Mayl l &notFound=true. 
1 38 See Edelman. supra note 126. 
1 39 See Nick Wingfield, Internet Companies See Value in Misaddressed Web Traffic, WALL ST. J., Sept 5. 
2003. at B 1 (discussing how AOL. MSN, and others deliver search results instead of error messages). 
140 See id. 
14 1 See VeriSign, Inc., VeriSign 's Site Finder Implementation. at http://www.verisign.com/resources/gd! 
sitefmder/implementation.pdf (Aug. 27. 2(03). 
142 Press Release. VeriSign, Inc., VeriSign Site Finder Service Update (Sept. 23, 2(03). available at 
hnp://www.verisign.com/corporate/news!2003/PC2OO3 1 003 .html. The opposition included three lawsuits 
against VeriSign by GoDaddy. Popular Enterprises, and class-action lawyer Ira Rothken. 
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These successive efforts by NeuStar and VeriSign strongly indicate that 
domain names are converging with other keyword-based search methods. 
With these programs, the registries try to present content that a searcher will 
find more useful than a page saying "your search failed-tough luck.,, 143 In 
other words, the registries are delivering search results in response to 
searchers' keywords. While the NeuStar and VeriSign programs may be on 
hiatus, other TLDs deliver keyword-triggered ads for unregistered domains, 144 
and it seems inevitable that more TLDs will do so because searchers have a 
better experience and registries make some easy money. 145 
A second principal example of domain name convergence can be seen from 
searcher keyword choices at search engines. Consider the following list of top 
keywords searched at various meta-search enginesl46 in Summer 2002: 147 
143 See Elizabeth Olson, Profits in Missed Exits on Information Highway, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 15,  2003, at 
C4 (quoting a VeriSign executive as saying "A year ago, we were asking our users what was difficult for them 
. . .  [a]nd what we came up with was the frostration of not being able to find what they wanted" and noting that 
AOL removed its basic error message because it was confusing consumers). 
144 Other 1LDs and ccTLDs that present search results for unregistered domains include .cc, .museum, 
.nu, .ph, .tm, and .ws. Declan McCullagh, VeriSign Redirects Error Pages, CNET News.com, at http://news. 
com.coml2 1 02-1 032_3·S077S30.html?tag=scutil-print (Sept. 16, 2(03). 
145 Cf Stefanie Olsen, Cravingfor 'Clicks' Bogs Down Search, CNET News.com, at http://news.com. 
coml2 102.1038_3-S088SS2.html?tag=st_util_print (Oct. 8, 2003) (discussing the myriad ways, legitimate and 
not, that search providers try to generate new search sessions). 
146 A meta-search engine compiles search results from multiple search engines, allowing a searcher to 
search these disparate search engines with a single search query. Wendy Boswell, Meta Search Engine, 
ABoUT. COM, at http://websearch.about.comlodlmlglmeta_search_eng.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2(05). 
147 Wordtracker.com, Search Engine Guide: Wordtracker: Top 500 Keyword Report, at http://www.searc 
hengineguide.comlwtl2002J0729_wtl .html (July 29, 2(02). Although the phenomenon has abated somewhat, 
in November 2004 the top 20 searched keywords still include Google (#1), eBay (#2), Yahoo (#3), Mapquest 
(#7), Yahoo.com (#8), and Hotrnail (#15). See Wordtracker.com, Top 500 Keywords of the Week, at 
http://www.searchengineguide.comlwtl200411 1 1 7_wtl .html (Nov. 17, 2004). 
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In all of these cases, if the searcher was looking for the website, they could 
have merely put the search term into the address bar instead of going to a meta­
search engine. 148 Especially striking are the keywords .. www.hotmail.com .. 
and .. www.yahoo.com ... where searchers had all of the information they 
needed to find the website merely by entering the keyword into the address 
bar. However, searchers-enough to rank these keywords in the top twenty of 
all searched keywords--chose to initiate their search at a search engine instead 
of typing the keyword into their address bar, even though the latter would have 
been more efficient. 
This search behavior may portend the eventual death of domain names. 
Some searchers, frustrated with the DNS 's low relevancy or adverse 
consequences, like typo squatting, porn-napping, and mousetrapping, may have 
become trained to start every search at a search engine instead of entering 
domain names into the address bar.149 For some searchers, search engines 
have supplanted the DNS' s  core search function of delivering known websites. 
In tum, top search engine placements have eclipsed domain names as the 
premier Internet locations. 150 
148 See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp .• 204 F.R.D. 460. 468 (C.D. Cal. 2001 ) 
(characterizing a search for nissan.com in a search engine as "pointless"). 
149 A universal search methodology eliminates the transaction cost of time spent making choices about 
each search. 
150 See Dan Gillmor. 'Goog/e Ef ect ' Reduces Need for Many Domains. SILICONVALLEY.COM, at 
http://www.bayarea.comlmldlsiliconvalleylbusiness/columnists/dan�illmorI253 l424.htrn?template=contentM 
odules/printstory.jsp (Jan. 1 2. 2002) (describing how the author let domain name registrations lapse because 
search engine placement had become more important than the domain names); Tamara Loomis. Domain Name 
Disputes Decline as Internet Matures. at http://www.nylawyer.comlnews/03/02l020603c.html (Feb. 6. 2003) 
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2. Link Navigation 
Although keyword convergence has been especially pronounced in the 
domain name arena, it is also occurring with respect to link navigation. 
Specifically, searchers navigating around websites implicitly trigger keyword 
searches whether the searcher knows it or not. 
Historically, web publishers organized taxonomies manually, meaning that 
an editor would manually determine the organization of links. Increasingly, 
however, publishers use links in a taxonomical structure to trigger searches in 
the publisher's database. 15 1  For example, if a taxonomy has a navigation link 
called "digital cameras," that link could cause the display of information 
resources that the web publisher manually assembled, or the link could trigger 
a search for the keyword "digital camera" in the publisher's searchable 
database. 152 Either approach leads to the same outcome: The publisher 
presents putatively relevant content about "digital cameras" to the searcher. 
Meanwhile, by dynamically generating a search results page, the publisher can 
take advantage of constantly changing data in the database without having to 
manually maintain each page. 
Link navigation triggers keyword searches in a second way: through search 
engine programs that "distribute" search results and paid advertising. Google' s  
"AdSense" program is a flagship example of these distribution programs. 153 
Web publishers that participate in the AdSense program place Google-supplied 
HTML code on their web pages. When a visitor accesses one of those pages, 
the HTML code asks Google' s  servers to supply ads to the visitor in 
(citing a trademark attorney who said domain name registrations were becoming less important due to search 
engines). See generally Carl Bialik, Lawyers Bid Up Value of Web-Search Ads, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2004, at 
B I (discussing how lawyers pay $90 or more per click on advertisements triggered by the keyword 
"mesothelioma attorney"). 
Not surprisingly, the changes in searcher behavior has adversely affected the value of domain names. 
See Joanna Glasner, Looking for the Beef (.com), at http://www.wired.comlnews/printlO . l 294.58763.OO.html 
(May 12, 2003). This change has correspondingly reduced the number of fights over them. See Loomis, supra 
(citing statistics that Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP") proceedings dropped 50% 
in two years). See generally Milton Mueller, Success by Default: A New Profile of Domain Name Trademark 
Disputes Under ICANN's UDRP, at http://dcc.syr.edulmarkie/markie-report-final.pdf (June 24, 2002). 
1 5 1 See Hagen, supra note 53, at 16. 
152 In light of concept searching, a taxonomy-initiated search could, in fact, use different or additional 
words to "digital camera" without the searcher even knowing or realizing it. 
153 See Google, Google AdSense Overview, at https:llwww;google.com!adsense!overview (last visited 
Apr. I, 2005). See generally Stefanie Olsen, All the Search That's Fit to Print?, CNET News.com, at 
http://news.com.coml2 102-1 023-984252.html (Feb. 1 2, 2003) (discussing a range of news publishers who 
display paid search listings from Google or Overture). 
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conjunction with the web page. Google's proprietary algorithms evaluate the 
publisher' s page to automatically assess what keywords best characterize that 
page. Google then serves keyword-triggered ads to the web visitor. By 
dynamically assessing the page' s  contents and selecting ads based on that 
assessment, AdSense increases the likelihood that an ad will be relevant to the 
page's  content-and thus to the searcher as well. From a technical standpoint, 
the net effect is that visitors receive these keyword-triggered ads as they 
navigate around the Internet, irrespective of whether they intended to conduct 
dynamic searches. 
Google' s  AdSense program, and the many other competitive keyword­
triggered ad programs,154 have revitalized an Internet advertising industry that 
virtually collapsed in the early 2000S. 155 Their phenomenal success is 
attributable to a simple fact: Contextually relevant keyword-triggered ads do a 
better job of meeting searcher objectives than other ways of delivering ads to 
consumers. Based on this fact, advertisers and publishers will continue to 
favor keyword-triggered ads. 
3. Software Agents 
Software agents are software tools that present content based on a 
searcher' s  perceived interests. Although these software agents are sometimes 
pejoratively maligned as "adware," software agents can deliver more than just 
paid advertisements. 
Often, the software agents will make judgments about a searcher' s  possible 
interests based on the searcher's online conduct.156 Like AdSense, software 
agents contextually determine keywords to trigger search content. For 
example, adware vendor WhenU.coml57 treats the searcher' s  input of a domain 
name into the address bar as a search and, in response, delivers advertising 
154 See Danny Sullivan, Overture 's Content Match Takes on Google's Contextual Ads, at http://www. 
searchenginewatch.comlsearchday/print.php/3471 1_2230221 (July 2, 2003) (comparing Overture's Content 
Match program with Google's AdSense program). 
155 See Jim Hu, Online Ad Sales Hit New High, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml2 102-1024_3-
5 158 1 88.html?tag=st.util.print (Feb. 12, 2004) ("Much of this growth has come from commercial search 
. . . .  "). 
156 See David Bank, What's That Sneaking into Your Computer?, WAL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at R I  
(discussing the various factors considered b y  software agents). 
157 WhenU.com is one of an emerging class of "adware" vendors. Adware is software that resides on a 
user's computer and causes ads to be displayed to the user. See Adware.info, Quck Reference on Adware and 
Spyware Software, at http://www.adware.info/ (last visited Apr. I ,  2005). 
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content that WhenU.com thinks is responsive to that keyword. 158 As with the 
other methods of Internet search, the designated keyword becomes the link 
between the searcher' s  objectives and putatively relevant content. 
Although software agents often operate passively (in the sense that 
searchers do not affirmatively choose them in Stage 2), software agents still 
respond to keywords affirmatively selected by the searcher, making them 
indistinguishable from other intermediaries delivering keyword-triggered 
content. 
4. Implications of Keyword Convergence 
Historically, legal doctrines have treated Internet search methods as legally 
distinct "SilOS.,, 159 However, technology, business practices, and searcher 
behavior have effectively mooted the distinctions between domain names, 
search engines, directories, and other search approaches. Instead, virtually all 
Internet searches are now keyword-driven, as that methodology (combined 
with skillful content presentation by search providers and publishers) does a 
superior job helping searchers accomplish their objectives. This insight should 
changes the way one thinks about policymaking regarding Internet search. 
Integrated laws that reflect the converged keyword-driven search environment 
are essential. 
158 For example, WhenU.com uses the phrase " 1800contacts.com" as a keyword to trigger competitive 
ads. See 1 -800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2(03). 
159 For example, legislators have passed a number of laws treating domain names as a special class of 
keywords. See, e.g., Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-1 13 ,  1 1 3 Stat. 1501 
(1999); Truth in Domain Names Act, H.R. 939, 108th Congo (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.c. § 2252B) 
(prohibiting the use of misleading domain names that lead children to pornography); Dot Kids Implementation 
and Efficiency Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-3 17, 1 1 6  Stat. 2767 (2002) (creating and implementing a kid-safe 
Internet zone at .kids.us); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1 7525 28 (West 1997) (prohibiting the bad faith 
registration, use or trafcking of another person's name as a domain name). 
However, Congress may be realizing the convergence between keywords and other forms of keywords. 
See Children's Online Safety Act of 2004, H.R. 4305, 108th Congo (2004) (proposing to extend 1 8  U.S.c. 
§ 2252B to apply to domain names and metatags equally). 
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V. THE DEVOLUTION OF INTERNET TRADEMARK LAW 
A. A Brief Primer on Trademark Law 
Federal trademark lawl60 applies to Internet conduct in three principal 
ways: trademark infringement, 161 trademark dilution, 162 and anti­
cybersquatting. 163 While all three laws have important implications for 
Internet search, this Article focuses on trademark infringement. 
Trademark infringement prohibits trademark use in a manner that "is likely 
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the 
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial 
activities by another person."I64 This prohibition serves dual purposes: 
protecting consumers from confusion when making purchasing decisions and 
protecting producers' investments in quality that creates consumer goodwill 
towards them. 165 In addition, by reducing confusion and sharpening the 
communicative effects of words, trademarks can help lower consumer search 
costs, 166 an outcome that benefits searchers, trademark owners seeking to be 
found, and society in general. 
The common law has developed a multifactor test to determine the 
likelihood that, when two parties use the same or a similar trademark, 167 
consumers will be confused about the source of their respective goods and 
services. This Article refers to the multifactor likelihood of consumer 
confusion test as the "MFLOCC" test. Each federal circuit has developed its 
160 This Article concentrates on federal law . Many state laws track federal trademark laws closely enough 
that this Article's analysis applies equally to them. 
161 15  U.S.c. § I I 25(a) (2000). 
162 Trademark dilution protects owners of famous trademarks from junior uses that reduce the trademark's 
capacity to act as source identifiers. Id. § I I 25(c). 
163 Anticybersquaning protects trademark owners from bad faith registrations of confusingly similar or 
dilutive domain names. Id. § 1 125(d). 
164 Id. § 1 1 25(a)( 1)(A). 
165 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 1 59, 163-64 (1995). 
166 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 
Hous. L. REv. 777 (2004); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcON. 265 (1987). 
167 The Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof . . .  used by a person . . .  to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from 
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."  
1 5  U.S.C. § 1 127. 
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own set of factors to consider under the MFLOCC test, although the factors are 
similar across the circuits. Frequently referenced versions of the MFLOCC 
test include the Ninth Circuit's Sleekcraft testl68 and the Second Circuit's 
Polaroid test. 169 Professor McCarthy provides a summary version of an 
MFLOCC test using the following factors: 
• The degree of resemblance between the conflicting designations; 
• The similarity of the marketing methods and channels of distribution; 
• The characteristics of the prospective purchasers and the degree of 
care they exercise; 
• The degree of distinctiveness of the senior user' s mark; 
• Where the goods or services are not competitive, the likelihood that 
prospective buyers would expect the senior user to expand into the 
field of the j unior user; 
• Where the goods or services are sold in different territories, the extent 
to which the senior user's designation is known in the junior user's 
territory; 
• The intent of the junior user; and 
• Evidence of actual confusion. 170 
B. The Breakdown o/the MFLOCC Test and Goodwill Misappropriation 
The MFLOCC test has not fared well in the Internet era. The MFLOCC 
test is a workhorse, expected to apply with equal vigor across multiple media 
and contexts ranging from product packaging to corporate names, from 
television advertisements to decorated blimps. Not surprisingly, a one-size­
fits-all test will have some frayed edges. 
Internet search has exposed two of those edges. First, Internet cases have 
accelerated a nascent judicial trend to use legal heuristics to bypass the 
MFLOCC test. Second, Internet cases have exposed trademark law' s inability 
to sharply distinguish between the different ways words can be used. 
168 See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekeraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). 
169 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elees. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). 
170 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:29 (4th ed. 
2(03). 
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The "goodwill misappropriation" doctrine illustrates both deficiencies. 
Some courts use goodwill misappropriation as an alternative to the MFLOCC 
test in finding infringement. 1 7 1  Other courts use goodwill misappropriation as 
an analytical tool to evaluate one or more of the MFLOCC factors, but 
goodwill misappropriation replaces any concrete demonstration of plaintiff 
harm. 172 In both cases, goodwill misappropriation is a conclusion rather than 
an analytical tool; if a junior user can be said to have misappropriated the 
senior user's goodwill, then the junior user has infringed. 
The misuse of the goodwill misappropriation doctrine is partially 
definitional, as there is no uniformly accepted definition of goodwill 
misappropriation. McCarthy describes goodwill in at least five different ways: 
"the lure of the place," "the lure to return," "buyer momentum," "the legal and 
economic recognition of buying habits," and the "expectancy of continued 
patronage.,, 173 With so many definitions, the goodwill misappropriation 
doctrine provides courts with flexibility to reach any desired conclusion. As a 
result, goodwill misappropriation analysis adds little to an infringement 
analysis. 
Considering how trademarks can be used as communicative tools in 
Internet searching provides a better understanding of goodwill 
misappropriation and distinguish it from other forms of trademark uses. 174 
This Article will explore three types of uses: referential uses, associative uses, 
and misappropriative uses. While these three uses are not exhaustive, the 
interaction between them sheds important light on the Internet search context. 
1. Referential Uses 
Wordsl75 successfully transfer information between a speaker and listener 
when both parties attach the same meaning to them. Mechanically, when the 
speaker uses a word, the listener attempts to cognitively associate the word 
with a pre-existing definition. If the listener does not have a pre-existing 
171 See Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2(02); Brookfield 
Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entrn't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
172 See 1 -800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2(03). 
173 I McCARTHY, supra note 170, § 2: 1 8. 
174 See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 166, at 786-88 (discussing the role of trademarks in 
lending precision to words as communicative tools). 
175 This discussion principally refers to word trademarks, but this discussion applies with equal force to 
non word trademarks. 
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definition and cannot figure out a definition from the context, the word fails to 
communicate. 
Trademarks work the same way. 176 A speaker using a trademark attempts 
to cognitively trigger the listener's definition for the trademark. However, 
trademarks have special properties as words because the trademark owner has 
caused consumers to establish a new and unique definition in their minds-i.e., 
when a listener is exposed to X's trademark, the listener thinks of X's 
products. 177 
By definition, trademarks necessarily enter the social lexicon. 178 Once a 
trademark owner has created a new proprietary definition for a term, the term 
becomes the exclusive way to reference that definition; there is no other 
effective way to implicate that definition without doing SO.179 Therefore, if I 
ask my wife to pick up a package of "Sudafed" at the drugstore, I am hoping 
she and I will each make the same cognitive association-the association 
created by Pfizer. 
I define trademark use for its lexical content, not as a source identifier, as a 
"referential use." My reference to Sudafed treats Sudafed just like any other 
word as the only logical term available to describe the referent. 
Referential uses should not be restricted by trademark law, which applies 
only to trademark "uses in commerce.,, 180 Therefore, my repeated use of the 
term Sudafed in this Article should be excluded from trademark law on that 
basis. Alternatively, referential use in commerce still should not be trademark 
infringement because there should be no consumer confusion about the 
referent's source. In some cases, courts excuse referential use under the 
176 Landes & Posner, supra note 166. See generally Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications 
Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1 070 (CD. Cal. 1 999) (treating "Playboy" and "Playmate" as dictionary words, not 
trademarffd terms), rev 'd 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
177 This is true whether the word has a single definition (i.e., only one trademark owner has trademark 
rights in the word) or if multiple trademark owners all have protectable rights in the same word. In the latter 
case, the word can take on additional definitions in the consumer's mind, but the consumer distinguishes each 
definition from the others. 
178 See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE LJ. 1687, 
1711 (1999). 
179 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2(02) (giving examples of how 
silly it would be to try to describe the Chicago Bulls basketball team without using the words "Chicago Bulls" 
or Playboy Magazine without using the word "Playboy"). 
180 1 5 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000). 
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"nominative use" doctrine,18 1  which applies when a junior user uses a 
trademark to describe the senior user' s prodUCt.182 
2. Associative Uses 
Some referential uses form associations in the listener's mind with other 
words or concepts that the listener already knows. A paradigmatic example is 
comparative advertising. 183 To make the comparison, the junior user needs the 
listener to associate the junior user' s product with the senior user's product, by 
finding common properties between the two products, such as that the products 
serve the same consumer need, but the junior user' s product has a superior 
attribute (e.g., cheaper price or better quality). 
Associative trademark uses thus work similarly to referential trademark 
uses. In each case, the junior user taps into the listener's pre-existing 
definition and uses the word for that referential effect. However, in associative 
uses, the junior user links that trademark' s  definition with some 
communicative point the junior user is trying to make. 
If the communicative point is that the junior user's product comes from the 
senior user, the junior user may be creating confusion about the product' s  
source and the trademark use may be infringing. The Article revisits this point 
under misappropriative uses. False associative uses may create harms beyond 
trademark infringement, such as false advertising or possibly trademark 
dilution. 
1 8 1 McCarthy defines nominative use as "a use of another's trademark to identify. not the defendant's 
goods or services, but the plaintiff s goods or services . . .  so long as there is no likelihood of confusion." 3 
McCARTHY, supra note 170, § 23: 1 1 ; see Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318  F.3d 900, 903--D4 (9th Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 824 (2003); Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 801 .  Sometimes the term "nominative 
� � � �  U 
182 Not all courts recognize nominative use as a defense. See PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.c., 
319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003), overruled in part by 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004); see also Chad J. Doellinger, 
Nominative Fair Use: Jardine and the Demise of a Doctrine, I Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PRoP. 66 (2003), 
available at http://www.law.northwestern.eduljournalslnjtip!v lln1l5. Under my approach, the plaintiff cannot 
establish a prima facie case of trademark infringement when a trademark is used referentially in the Internet 
context, so there should be no need to reach defenses. 
183 Another example of associative use is parody. For a trademark parody to work, the trademark must be 
used enough to conjure up the subject trademark. See 5 McCARTHY, supra note 1 70, § 3 1 : 153; see also Davis 
& Boustani, supra note 38, at 10 1 1 (discussing initial interest confusion and parody). 
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Otherwise, accurate associative uses help consumers by facilitating useful 
cognitive links. l84 If Canon says that "If you are considering a Nikon digital 
camera, you should also consider Canon's digital cameras," the associative use 
helps the listener understand that there are two product families in the digital 
camera group of products, and both Canon and Nikon may fill the same 
consumer needs. Unquestionably, this type of statement references the 
definition of "Nikon" in consumer's heads, but linking the definition of Nikon 
to Canon facilitates a quick understanding of Canon products' properties and 
how they interrelate with the already-known properties of Nikon's products. ISS 
This may also cause the consumer to expand his or her consideration set, but so 
long as the consumer's search is not tainted by some defect (like credibility 
transference, as discussed below), adding competitors to a consumer's search 
promotes socially beneficial competition. I S6 Canon could reach the same point 
by brute force-that is, by defining its product attributes without any 
association to Nikon's attributes-but this is both socially wasteful and, more 
importantly, the consumer ends up worse off because the consumer' s 
respective understandings of the attributes of Canon and Nikon are less easily 
compared.I S7 
The previous example focused on comparative advertising and suggests 
that any accurate comparative advertising should be a permitted associative 
use. ISS More generally, any associative uses that help consumers build 
cognitive taxonomies of relationships between products and services should be 
184 See Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right To Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REv. 29 1 ,  3 1 6-19 (2003) (discussing 
some of the social benefits that can arise when a junior user evokes a senior user). 
185 See August Storck K.O. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting how comparative 
advertising referencing the competitor helps consumers because "[tJhey leam at a glance what kind of product 
is for sale and how it differs from a known benchmark"). 
186 See Katherine Ivancevich, Comment, Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corporation: Perpetuating 
the Metatag Fallacy, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35 1 ,  383 84 (2002) (discussing how trademark 
owners will feel competitive pressure to improve their products as a result); Brian D. Kaiser, Note, 
Contributory Trademark Infringement by Internet Service Providers: An Argument for Limitation, 7 J. TECH. 
L. & POL'y 65, 99 (2002) (same). 
187 The Federal Trade Commission encourages narning competitors in comparative advertising. See 16 
C.F.R. § 14. 1 5(b) (2004) ("Commission policy in the area of comparative advertising encourages the narning 
of, or reference to competitiors [sic], but requires clarity, and, if necessary, disclosure to avoid deception of the 
consumer."). 
188 See generally 4 McCARTHY, supra note 1 70, § 25:52 (trying to make sense of confused comparative 
advertising jurisprudence). 
HeinOnline -- 54 Emory L.J. 558 2005
558 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54 
ex.cluded from trademark infringement. Nothing proprietary to the trademark 
. ak . h' . . 189 owner IS t en In t IS aSSOCIatIve process. 
3. Misappropriative Uses 
In contrast, a class of associative uses goes beyond building cogrutlve 
taxonomies. At some point, the association also takes advantage of a 
trademark owner' s goodwill, and should be classified as a misappropriative 
use. 
To distinguish associative uses from misappropriative uses, there should be 
a clearer understanding of consumer goodwill. As indicated earlier, goodwill 
has no broadly accepted definition, so I offer my own: Goodwill represents a 
consumer's aggregated positive feelings towards the trademark owner's 
products that may facilitate subsequent transactions with the trademark owner. 
A junior user can take advantage of these positive feelings towards the senior 
user to increase a consumer's propensity to transact with the junior user. 
Goodwill misappropriation occurs when a junior user makes a trademark 
associative use that causes consumers to transfer good feelings established by 
the senior user over to the junior user, and the junior user derives some benefit 
from that transference .  This Article refers to the transference of good feelings 
as "credibility transference." 
Properly cabined within the MFLOCC test, treating this misappropriative 
use as goodwill misappropriation serves a valuable purpose. To find goodwill 
misappropriation, courts should isolate the good feelings developed by the 
senior user, determine how those good feelings have been transferred to the 
junior user, and identify some benefit the junior user derived from the 
transference. As a practical matter, a properly executed MFLOCC test will 
make many of these inquiries; this means that the goodwill misappropriation 
doctrine should collapse back into the MFLOCC test. Indeed, McCarthy 
counsels that trademark "misappropriation" should not be used as a shortcut 
around trademark law's standard doctrines. 190 
189 See John P. Liefeld, How Surveys Overestimate the Likelihood of Consumer Confusion, 93 
TRADEMARK REp. 939, 962--Q3 (2003) (pointing out that just because a consumer has a trademark definition in 
his or her head, the consumer is not necessarily confused at time of purchase). 
190 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 170, § 10:72. McCarthy adds: "[Olne cannot dispense with the carefully 
constructed requirements for trademark protection by blithely claiming that defendant 'misappropriated' some 
symbol of plaintiff . . . . " [d. 
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Unfortunately, some courts have used goodwill misappropriation in a far 
less nuanced way. Instead of requiring credibility transference, courts have 
found trademark infringement in situations where associative uses, or in some 
cases mere referential uses, were being made. Such unrestrained views of 
misappropriative uses makes trademark law unpredictable, illogical and 
socially counterproductive, by inhibiting socially beneficial or necessary 
secondary uses. 
C. Initial Interest Confusion 
The "initial interest confusion" doctrine ("lIC") exemplifies the devolution 
of trademark law. lIC lacks a rigorous definition, a clear policy justification, 
and a uniform standard for analyzing claims. With its doctrinal flexibility, lIC 
has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs to shut down junior users who have 
not actually engaged in misappropriative uses. 
1. The Development of the Doctrine 
lIC traces its roots to the 1975 Second Circuit case Grotrian, Helferich, 
Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf v. Steinway & Sons. 191 In that case, two high-end 
piano manufacturers used trademarks that were partial homonyms ("Steinway" 
and "Grotrian-Steinweg," with the latter word pronounced in German 
phonetically the same as Steinway). Although piano purchasers are careful 
and sophisticated, the court still found the trademark usage harmful: 
The harm to Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a consumer, 
hearing the "Grotrian-Steinweg" name and thinking it had some 
connection with "Steinway," would consider it on that basis. The 
"Grotrian-Steinweg" name therefore would attract potential 
customers based on the reputation built up by Steinway in this 
country for many years. The harm to Stein way in short is the 
likelihood that potential piano purchasers will think that there is some 
connection between the Grotrian-Steinweg and Steinway pianos. 192 
Although the Second Circuit did not expressly state it, the court predicated the 
harms on credibility transference between competitors. In other words, 
potential piano purchasers might transfer their good sentiments towards 
Steinway pianos to the benefit of Steinway's  competitor. Thus, if piano 
purchasers considered Stein way a credible choice based on their past 
191 523 F.2d 133 1 (2d Cir. 1975). 
192 [d. at 1 342 (footnote omitted). 
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interactions with the brand, Grotrian-Steinweg might also be considered a 
credible choice if the purchasers viewed the two competitors as related. 
Perhaps recognizing the risks of recognizing harm even when the implied 
sponsorship does not directly cost the trademark owner sales, the court issued 
two important caveats. First, the court said that the mere possibility of 
consumers making an association between the two companies would not be 
enough. 193 Second, the court immediately cautioned that "each trademark 
infringement case is to some extent sui generis,,, 194 suggesting the court was 
concerned that this particular portion of the ruling would be applied too 
mechanically. 
The Second Circuit reiterated the link between IIC and credibility 
transference in a 1987 case involving two companies in the oil business, Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp. 195 Mobil Oil had a consumer-oriented 
retail petroleum business branded under its familiar Pegasus logO. 196 Mobil 
Oil also had a business-to-business bulk oil trading business that did not use 
the Pegasus logo. The junior user, Pegasus Petroleum, competed with Mobil 
Oil in the oil trading business but not the retail consumer business. The court 
observed that Pegasus Petroleum gained additional credibility in initial sales 
pitches because bulk oil customers miftht assume, based on the name, that 
Pegasus was associated with Mobil Oil. 97 Based on that implicit association, 
customers might be willing to listen to Pegasus's sales pitch where they may 
have otherwise rejected it. Thus, despite the purchasers' sophistication and no 
evidence of actual confusion, Pegasus Petroleum misappropriated goodwill 
from Mobil Oil. 
Grotrian and Mobil Oil squarely locate lIe in the realm of sponsorship 
confusion. 198 In other words, the credibility transference is problematic 
because the purchaser may believe that the senior user is sponsoring or 
affiliated with the junior user. While sponsorship confusion is not a crystal­
clear doctrine, treating the lIe doctrine as a subset of sponsorship confusion 
kept lIe from having a huge impact on trademark jurisprudence. 
193 /d. at 1 342 n.20. 
194 [d. at 1342. 
195 8 1 8  F.2d 254 (2d CiT. 1 987). 
196 � 
197 Mobil Oil Corp. , 8 1 8  F.2d at 259. 
198 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 170, §§ 23:6, 23.8. 
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In 1999, in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment 
Corp. ,199 the Ninth Circuit divorced IIC from credibility transference. Instead, 
Brookfield merely required searcher "diversion." In this case, Brookfield 
commercially licensed, under the trademark "moviebuff," databases of 
entertainment industry information targeted towards high-end customers.2OO 
Meanwhile, West Coast intended to make available a searchable database of 
movie information at moviebuff.com and include the term "moviebuff.com" in 
its keyword metatags. The court found that, as the junior user, West Coast's 
domain name infringed using a standard MFLOCC analysis.201 
Addressing keyword metatags, the court found IIC because West Coast's 
keyword metatags diverted traffic from Brookfield to West Coast, which meant 
that West Coast "impro�erly benefit[ed] from the goodwill that Brookfield 
developed in its mark.,,2 2 The court explained its reasoning with a billboard 
analogy: 
Using another' s  trademark in one's metatags is much like posting 
a sign with another's trademark in front of one's store. Suppose 
West Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster") puts up a 
billboard on a highway reading-"West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead 
at Exit 7"-where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but 
Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's 
store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to 
locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the 
highway entrance, they may simply rent there. Even consumers who 
prefer West Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue 
searching for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster right there. 
Customers are not confused in the narrow sense: they are fully aware 
that they are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to 
believe that Blockbuster is related to, or in any way sponsored by, 
West Coast. Nevertheless, the fact that there is only initial consumer 
confusion does not alter the fact that Blockbuster would be 
misappropriating West Coast' s  acquired goodwil1.203 
The Article defers a substantive critique of this analogy to Part V.C.3. For 
now, the analogy illustrates how Brookfield changed the basis of lIC from 
credibility transference to diversion. As the analogy states, customers do not 
199 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
200 [d. at 104 ! .  
201 See id. at 1054-60. 
202 [d. at 1062. 
203 [d. at 1064. 
I 
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consider Blockbuster because of some transferred credibility from West Coast; 
instead, customers transact with Blockbuster because the advertising diverted 
them to a place where Blockbuster would be considered. 
The Brookfield definition of lIC reflects this shift. Brookfield defined lIC 
as "the use of another' s  trademark in a manner calculated to capture initial 
consumer attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result 
of the confusion.,,204 The linchpin is capturing initial consumer attention; 
everything after that appears immaterial. 205 
Following Brookfield, courts have characterized lIC in a variety of ways.206 
Some courts have focused on "deceptive diversion.,,207 For example, IIC in the 
Seventh Circuit has required bait-and-switch competitive passing off208 or 
some deception that causes consumers to think the junior user is the senior 
user.209 
Other courts have focused on competitive diversion?lO For example, in the 
January 2004 Playboy v. Netscape ruling, the Ninth Circuit redefined lIC as 
"customer confusion that creates initial interest in a competitor's product. 
204 Id. at 1062 (quotations and citations omitted). McCarthy echoes this definition. See 3 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 170, § 23 :6. 
Other cases have used more abbreviated definitions, such as "momentary" or "brief' confusion. See, 
e.g., Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d S08, 812 (7th Cir. 2002) ("briefly"); OBH, Inc. v. 
Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 195 (W.D.N.Y. 200) ("momentarily"); Simon Prop. Group v. 
mySimon, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1 049 (S.D. Ind. 2(00) ("Even if the consumer immediately became 
aware of his or her mistake and immediately learned that mySimon is not affiliated with SPG, initial interest 
confusion still would have occurred."); Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 
935, 972 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ("fleeting"); N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 
79 F. Supp. 2d 33 1 ,  342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("momentarily"). 
205 Promatek Indus., 300 F.3d at 812-13 ("What is important is not the duration of the confusion, it is the 
misappropriation of [the trademark owner's) . . .  goodwill. [The metatag user) . . .  cannot unring the bell."). 
206 See David M. Klein & Daniel C. Glazer, Reconsidering Initial Interest Confusion on the Internet, 93 
TRADEMARK REp. 1035, 1039-41 (2003). 
207 See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. The Savin Group, 2004 WL 2829324, at *17  n.13 (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 2004) 
("Internet initial interest confusion requires a showing of intentional deception."); Deere & Co. v. MTD 
Holdings Inc., 2004 WL 324890, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2004); see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 170, 
§ 23:6 ("Initial interest confusion can be viewed as a variation on the practice of 'bait and switch."'); Martin 
Schwimmer, Inured to False Starts: Applying Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine to Paid Search (July 2(03) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) (defining and applying the tort of "deceptive diversion"). 
208 See AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimJerChrysler Corp., 3 1 1  F.3d 796, 830 (7th Cir. 2002) (saying no IIC in 
trade dress case where there was no "bait and switch"); Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Ruid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 
(7th Cir. 1996). 
209 See Promatek Indus., 300 F.3d at S 1 2-13. 
2 10 See, e.g., Row Control Indus. v. AMHI, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1 193, 1200 (W.D. Wash. 2(03); Klein 
& Glazer, supra note 206, at 1 037. 
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Although dispelled before an actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion 
impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is 
therefore actionable trademark infringement.,,2 1 1  The Playboy case aligns (for 
now) the Ninth Circuit with the Third Circuit, which also constrains nc to . 2 12 competItors. 
So far, this Article has addressed four different characterizations of TIC: (1) 
as a subset of sponsorship confusion predicated on credibility transference 
(Second Circuit Grotrian and Mobil Oil cases), (2) attention diversion 
(Brookfield), (3) deceptive diversion (Seventh Circuit cases), and (4) 
competitive diversion (Playboy v. Netscape).213 The First Circuit has a fifth 
approach, which does not recognize IIC at al1.214 Given these varying 
approaches, courts clearly lack consensus about what causes nc. The 
confusion over IIC does not stop there. Courts have used divergent methods to 
determine the interaction between IIC and the MFLOCC test. 
Originally, IIC was a nondispositive tool to analyze one or a couple of 
MFLOCC factors,215 including purchaser care,216 consumer sophistication,217 
'd f al f '  218 d . . . . 219 Th eVl ence 0 actu con uSlon, an competItIve proXlffilty. en, 
Brookfield, in a footnote, suggested that in cases involving keyword metatags, 
the MFLOCC test was inappropriate, allowing the IIC doctrine to become a 
2 1 1 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th CiT. 2004) 
(citations omitted). 
2 12 See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 294 (3d CiT. 2001); see 
also Albert & Abbati, supra note 84, at 356--57 (noting that noncompetitiveness appears to be a defense to 
IIC). 
2 13 Admittedly, the division of cases into these four buckets is somewhat arbitrary. For example, 
Brookfield can be accurately characterized as a competitive diversion case even though the court's language 
focuses on attention diversion. 
2 14 See The Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 290 F. Supp. 2d 241 (D.R.I. 2003), rev'd on 
other grounds, 376 F.3d 8 (lst CiT. 2004); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 7 18  F.2d 
120 1 , 1207 ( l st Cir. 1983). Based on Weiss Associates, Inc. v. HRL Associates, Inc., 902 F.2d 1546 (Fed. CiT. 
1990), some also argue that the Federal Circuit does not recognize IIC either. See, e.g., Rachel Jane Posner, 
Manipulative Metatagging, Search Engine Baiting, and Initial Interest Confusion, 33 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. 
PROBS. 439, 462 (200). 
2 15 Davis & Boustani, supra note 38, at 7. 
2 16 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th Cir. 1 997). 
2 17 See, e.g., Rust Env't & Infrastructure, Inc., v. Teunissen, 1 3 1  F.3d 1210 (7th Cir. 1997); Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 8 1 8  F.2d 254 (2d CiT. 1 987); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg 
Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 523 F.2d 1331  (2d Cir. 1975). 
2 18 See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., lnc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1 998). 
2 19  See, e.g., IntersteUar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix Inc., 184 F.3d 1 107, 1 1 10-1 1  (9th CiT. 1 999), ajJ'd, 
304 F.3d 936 (9th CiT. 2002). 
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bypass of the MFLOCC test. 220 The MFLOCC bypass approach has since 
been followed by a number of courtS.22 I 
The Ninth Circuit has twice reversed Brookfield to eliminate IIC as a 
bypass to the MFLOCC test, fIrst in the 2002 Interstellar Starship case222 and 
then again in the 2004 Playboy case.223 However, not every court in the Ninth 
Circuit has gotten the message,224 and even the Ninth Circuit bypassed the 
MFLOCC test in the 2003 Horphag case involving keyword metatags.225 
Courts have also been unclear whether IIC supports a determination of a 
"likelihood of consumer confusion," or if IIC creates a different measurement 
for infringement, such as a "likelihood of initial interest confusion." Once 
again, the Ninth Circuit has led the way, implying in the 2002 Interstellar 
Starship case that the appropriate standard is "likelihood of initial interest 
confusion,,,226 a standard fully endorsed in the 2004 Playboy case.227 
However, most other courts considering IIC have not adopted a "likelihood of 
initial interest confusion" standard.228 Other courts have used IIC in unusual 
220 Specifically, the court said: 
As a district court within our circuit recognized in a recent case involving a claim of trademark 
infringement via metatags usage, "[tJhis case . . .  is not a standard trademark case and does not 
lend itself to the systematic application of the eight factors." Because we agree that the 
traditional eight-factor test is not well-suited for analyzing the metatags issue, we do not attempt 
to fit our discussion into one of the Sleekcraft factors. 
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp, 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 n.24 (9th Cir. 1 999) (internal 
citation omitted). . 
221 See Key3Media Events, Inc. v. Convention Connection, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4043, at *8 (D. 
Nev. Jan. 25, 2002); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190-9 1 (W.D.N.Y. 200); 
Simon Prop. Group v. mySimon, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1049 (S.D. Ind. 200); Bihari v. Gross, 1 1 9 F. 
Supp. 2d 309, 3 1 9  (S.D.N.Y. 200) (but finding no violation). 
222 Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2(02). 
223 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
224 See J.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 20, 1 124 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2(03); Edge Wireless, 
LLC v. U.S. Cellular Corp., 2004 WL 1661992, at * 1 7  (D. Ore. July 23, 2004). 
225 Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040-42 (9th Cir. 2(03), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1 1 1 1  (2004). The court did not conduct an MFLOCC analysis or reference IIC at all. 
226 See Interstellar Starship, 304 F.3d at 945. 
227 See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1026-27; see also 1 -800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 
(S.D.N.Y. 2(03) (also using a "likelihood of initial interest confusion" standard). 
228 I did a search in Westlaw's ALLCASES database on December 12, 2004 for the term "likelihood of 
initial interest confusion." The search yielded only twelve cases using the term out of the 100+ cases 
referencing lIC (search results on file with the author). 
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ways, such as treating IIC as a new ninth Polaroid MFLOCC factor229 and 
finding that IIC supported a trademark dilution claim.23o 
As should be evident by now, the Brookfield case took an already unclear 
IIC doctrine and threw it into chaos. Courts simply have no idea how to apply 
the IIC doctrine.23i Perhaps there is no better evidence of that chaos than the 
Ninth Circuit's own jurisprudence, which has addressed IIC (or analogous 
keyword metatags) six times in five years and seemingly made up new rules 
each time.232 Realizing the illogic of the Ninth Circuit's approach to IIC, 
Judge Berzon's concurrence in Playboy calls for the Ninth Circuit "to consider 
whether we want to continue to apply an insupportable rule" articulated in 
Brookfield.233 
2. The Failings of the Doctrine 
Judge Berzon is correct: The IIC rule is unsupportable. IIC commits the 
cardinal sin of enabling a finding of trademark infringement when the junior 
user is making associative or referential uses of a trademark. It does this in 
large part because IIC is predicated on multiple mistaken and empirically 
unsupported assumptions about searcher behavior.234 
229 See Katz v. Modiri, 283 F. Supp. 2d 883, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 2(03); Savin Corp. v. The Savin Group, 2003 
WL 2245 173 1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003), rev 'd on other grounds, 391 F.3d 439 (2d Cir. 2004). 
230 See Avlon Indus. v. Robinson, 2003 WL 22025004, at *3 (N.D. III. Aug. 27, 2(03). 
23 1 See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham 
Trademark Act, 183 A.L.R. FED. 553 (2003) (collecting, and trying to organize, the conflicting cases). 
232 The chronology in order: 
• Apr. 1999: lIC bypasses MFLOCC test; keyword metatags create lIe. Brookfield 
Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
• Feb. 2002: Keyword metatag usage was nominative use; nominative use bypasses the MFLOCC 
test. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2(02). 
• June 2002: lIC is subordinate to MFLOCC test; articulating a likelihood of initial interest 
confusion standard. Interstellar Starship, 304 F.3d 936. 
• July 2003: Keyword metatag usage infringes; no reference to either lIC or MFLOCe. Horphag 
Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). 
• Jan. 2004: lIC subordinated to MFLOCC test; search provider who enables keyword-triggered ads 
may cause likelihood of initial interest confusion; court does not distinguish between direct or 
contributory trademark infringement for detennining the search provider's liability. Playboy, 354 
F.3d 1020. 
• Aug. 2004: Considering only a few MFLOCC factors, but not linking lIC to any of those factors; 
IIC found because the website was displaying relevant content that searchers might find useful. 
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004). 
233 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1036 (Berzon, J., concurring); see Doellinger, supra note 53, at 174 (calling the 
IIC doctrine "muddled and nearly incoherent"). 
234 Cj. Mueller Report, supra note 121  (IIC "lacks an established corpus of social science research 
confirming its existence and defming its characteristics."). 
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First, IIC assumes that a searcher using a trademarked keyword is looking 
for the trademark owner (or, perhaps, some authorized licensee or secondary 
user).235 This assumption is unsupportable because of objective opaqueness. 
Searchers' objectives cannot be inferred from the keywords they employ. As 
the examples above in Part II.B illustrate, it is impropl'r to assume that using a 
trademarked keyword means that the searcher wanted to fmd the trademark 
owner. Because of objective opaqueness, any IIC doctrine built on diversion is 
inherently flawed. Finding searcher "diversion" is not possible until one 
knows where searchers were heading in the first place.236 
Second, a keyword search at a search engine should result in some filtering 
content (Stage 5). IIC ignores the impact this content can have on the 
searcher's decision to proceed with the search. A searcher who proceeds from 
the results evaluation stage (Stage 5) to the investigation stage (Stage 7) has 
already made a decision (Stage 6) that the results may be relevant to the 
searcher's  objectives. 
Third, filtering content may educate the searcher in ways that cause the 
searcher to dynamically change search objectives.237 For example, a searcher 
seeking more information about Canon cameras might search using the 
keyword "Canon" and receive a Nikon ad that reminds the searcher about prior 
positive impressions of Nikon.238 The searcher may then decide to suspend the 
search for Canon cameras and digress to explore more about Nikon. At this 
point, the searcher is no longer searching for Canon. Thus, based on the 
235 See OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (W.D.N.Y. 200); see also 
Shipman, supra note I ,  at 276 (trademark owners suffer harm because they are not at the top of the search 
results list); Note, supra note 53, at 2405-07. 
236 See Yelena Dunaevsky, Comment, Don't Confuse Metatags with Initial Interest Confusion, 29 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1349, 1384-85 (2002). 
Presuming diversion without knowing searcher objectives brings to mind Alice's conversation with the 
Cheshire Cat: 
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" 
'''That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat. 
"I don't much care where -" said Alice. 
'''Then it doesn't much matter which way you go," said the Cat. 
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 100 (Richard Kelly ed., Broadview Press 2000) 
(1 865). 
237 See ROSENFELD & MORVILLE, supra note 9, at 104; Kurt M. Saunders, ConfuSion Is the Key: A 
Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword Banner Advertising, 7 1  FORDHAM L. REv. 543, 573-74 (2002). 
238 See Mark S. Nadel, The Consumer Product Selection Process in an Internet Age: Obstacles To 
Maximum Efectiveness and Policy Options, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 183, 250 (2000) (noting how memory 
prompts can facilitate beneficial competition). 
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exposure to Nikon-oriented filtering content, the searcher dynamically 
develops a new search objective-"get more information about Nikon"-and 
investigates the search result accordingly. The dynamic shift in search 
strategies might frustrate some trademark owners, but so long as the searcher is 
not confused, the searcher will optimize the search as he or she sees fit. The 
fact that it was prompted by a search for Canon, which may reinforce in the 
searcher's  mind that Nikon and Canon are in the same product class, is an 
example of associative use discussed earlier. 
Finally, to the extent that IIC has been used in metatag cases, the lIC 
doctrine has been predicated on incorrect understandings about metatags, 
particularly keyword metatags. From a legal standpoint, keyword metatags 
have earned mythical status, which has led to some courts to deem their usage 
as per se infringing239 or, at minimum, confmnation of a publisher's  bad 
faith. 240 
However, keyword metatags' powers have never been all that mythical. 
Starting in the mid-1990s, some search engines weighted keyword metatags in 
their relevancy algorithms?41 When publishers then manipulated their 
keyword metatags to provide suboptimal keyword associations, search engines 
progressively realized that keyword metatags were a poor indicator of 
relevancy. 
As a result, almost all search engines have removed keyword metatags 
from their relevancy algorithms.242 Since 2002, only one major search engine, 
Inktomi, still incorporates keyword metatags in its algorithm243-meaning that 
239 See Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). 
240 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2000), see also Doellinger, 
supra note 53, at 220 ("[Tlhe only reason a competitor would include the trademarks of another in the 
metatags of its web site would be to attempt to divert some of the trademark holder's potential customers."); 
O'Rourke, supra note 67, at 303 ("[Tlhere seems to be general agreement that metatagging at best is an unfair 
way to compete and at worst is morally reprehensible. "). 
241 Danny Sullivan, Death of a Meta Tag, at http://www.searchenginewatch.com!sereportlprint.php/34721 
_2165061 (Oct. I,  2002). Sullivan says that Infoseek and Alta Vista both started recognizing keyword 
metatags in early 1 996, Inktomi starting in mid- 1 996 and Lycos starting in mid-1 997. [d. 
242 [d. 
243 [d. As of Fall 2002, Inktomi remains the only major search engine to recognize keyword metatags; 
Google, FAST, AltaVista, and Lycos do not. According to Inktomi, 'The meta keywords value is just one of 
many factors in our ranking equation, and we've never given too much weight to it." Id. 
A secondary search engine, Teoma, is also rumored to include keyword metatags in their algorithm, but 
Teoma has not clearly announced its policy. See Email from Darcy Cobb, Dotted Line Communications 
(public relations firm for Teoma), to Eric Goldman, Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law 
School (Sept. 2, 2003, 10:23 am) (on me with author) (citing Teoma's policy as "When crawling a site, Teoma 
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keyword metatags currently influence search result rankings for a small 
percentage of searches. Because of their low impact, search engine industry 
analysts now routinely advise publishers not to waste their time carefully 
crafting keyword metatags.244 
Concern has also been expressed about the surreptItIOUS or invisible 
operation of keyword metatags,245 but these concerns are misguided on several 
fronts. Even if keyword metatags operate invisibly, so do most other aspects 
of search engine operations. Because search engine algorithms are secret, 
searchers have no idea how search results are generated246 or what the results 
are (editorial content versus ads).247 Thus, a search engine's consideration of 
"invisible" keyword metatags text is just one more factor that searchers do not 
understand.248 By way of comparison, searchers cannot see or understand 
anchor text used to Google bomb. The fact that invisible words were used to 
match searchers with content is immaterial to searchers. Searchers care about 
the relevancy of the results, not how they were generated.249 If keyword 
metatags lead to relevant results, the searcher accomplishes his or her goals 
even if the process is opaque to searchers?50 
collects as much infonnation as possible. While metatags are not always helpful, they can sometimes be 
helpful. Therefore, Teoma collects metatag infonnation when it helps improve the relevance of search 
results."). 
244 See Andrew Goodman, An End to Metatags (Enough Already, Part 1), at http://www.traffick.com!artic 
le.asp?aID= 102 (Sept. 2, 2002); Markus Hoevener, The Death of the Meta Tags, at http://www.bloofusion.com 
Iwhite papers/meta_tags/death-of-meta tags.pdf (last visited Apr. I ,  2005) ("Most of the web sites operated by 
Bloofusion don't even have meta tags and still rank on #1 positions."); Sullivan, supra note 241 ;  Jill Whelan, 
No Meta Keyword Tags, at http://www.searchengineguide.com!whalenl2002/1004jwI .html (Oct. 4, 2002). 
245 See. e.g., Nathenson, supra note 53. 
246 See Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 79, at 177; Marable, supra note 23, at 5; see also Olsen, supra 
note 90 (discussing Nutch, an effort to develop an open-source search engine with transparent algorithms). 
247 Marable, supra note 23, at 5. This report followed up an earlier report also showing that searchers did 
not understand how search engines work. See Consumer Web Watch, A Matter of Trust: What Users Want 
From Web Sites, at http://64.78.25.46/view article.cfrn?id=10155&at=51 O  (Apr. 16, 2002) ("Users are largely 
unaware that search engines may not be neutral guides to the online world."). 
248 This same critique applies with equal force to keyword-triggered ads. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. 
Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring). 
249 See Stefanie Olsen, Are Search Engines Confusing Surfers?, CNET News.com. at http://news.com. 
corn!2102-1024_3-509070I .html?tag=sCutil_print (Oct. 1 3, 2003) (quoting Yahoo! spokesperson Diana Lee). 
250 lntrona and Nissenbaum argue that search engines do not disclose enough infonnation about their 
practices, hindering searchers from making infonned choices between search engines. lntrona & Nissenbaum, 
supra note 79, at 181 .  While search engines do withhold crucial information about their coverage and 
algorithms to prevent search results manipulation, that infonnation may be irrelevant to searchers so long as 
the searchers subjectively feel that they are getting good results. 
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Furthermore, publishers can visibly use third party keywords in ways that 
are, in practice, no less invisible than keyword metatags.251 For example, 
publishers can display a trademark using a font color that is virtually identical 
to the web page's background color or using a miniscule font size, or in text so 
far "below the fold"-i.e., below the top portion of the page initially displayed 
to a searcher who visits the page-that few searchers realize it is there. Trying 
to distinguish keyword meta tags from these techniques would emphasize form 
over substance. And, of course, if the keyword in the keyword metatag also 
appears in the "on the page" content, there is nothing surreptitious about 
putting the keyword in the keyword metatag. 
Finally, no matter what the publisher does, search engines ultimately 
decide what data to collect, how to weigh it, and how to present it.252 
Therefore, a publisher's inclusion of a term in a keyword metatag does not 
guarantee that the search engines will index it, that the publisher will appear in 
the search results,253 or that any searcher will ever see the search results. No 
matter what steps a publisher takes to be indexed on a third party trademark, 
search engines have the final say. While it may never have been appropriate to 
craft special legal rules for keyword metatags, evolved practices make these 
rules anachronistic. The keyword metatag is dead from a marketing 
standpoint;254 its legal significance should end as well. 
Description metatags operate differently from keyword metatags, so they 
warrant a brief discussion. Unlike keyword metatags, some search engines 
display the description metatags verbatim as filtering content in the search 
results. In these cases, the searcher may see the text-and any trademark 
references by the publisher-and use it to decide whether to investigate the 
search results further. In those cases, the description metatag actually filters 
25 1  See Nathenson, supra note 53, at 62 (discussing a variety of practices). Note that keyword metatags 
are not completely hidden from searchers; anyone can see keyword metatags by viewing the web page's 
source file. See Lastowka, supra note 20, at 861 n. l 3 1 .  Keyword metatags just seem invisible because 
searchers have to take that extra step, and usually there is no reason to do so. 
252 See Perkins, supra note 69 (stating that keyword metatags should not be considered bad search engine 
practices because search engines decide what to do with them). 
253 Many search engines truncate the number of search results made available to searchers. For example, 
Google cuts off search results at 10. Ridings & Shishigin, supra note 82, at 7. Truncation reduces the 
amount of computations a search engine needs to make in determining its search results order. ld. 
254 Sullivan, supra note 241 .  
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searchers before they make the choice to investigate the website, and this 
filtering function may save searchers time.255 
On the other hand, not every search engine indexes or displays description 
metatags. As discussed earlier, Google may display a description in its search 
results authored by a third party.256 In these cases, including a trademark in the 
description metatag (like putting the trademark in the keyword metatag) may 
not affect search engine indexing. 
3. Deconstructing Brookfield 
The various failings of the IIC doctrine (including the mistaken 
assumptions about metatags) pervade almost every case finding infringement 
due · to IIC or metatags. The multiple and repeated errors courts make 
regarding IIC and metatags can be seen by re-examining the seminal 
Brookfield case and, in particular, the oft-cited (and oft-criticized) billboard 
analogy.257 
First, in the billboard analogy, the searcher is not actively conducting a 
search. Rather, the driver is passively exposed to content (the billboard). The 
court's hypothetical assumes that the content is impactful enough to cause the 
driver to instantly develop a search objective and start implementing the 
search. The court further presumes that the search objective is to find West 
Coast Video, an assumption that may be reasonable in context?58 
In the search engine context, the searcher proactively selects a keyword 
that encapsulates his or her search objective. Due to objective opaqueness, the 
searcher's  goals are not clear from the keyword. Thus, making an inference 
that a searcher using the keyword "moviebuff.com" is looking for Brookfield's 
255 See Bihari v. Gross, 1 19 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2(0) (discussing how a gripe site's filtering 
content-that clearly disparaged the trademark owner in the filtering content itself-removed any confusion 
the searcher might have experienced before investigating the site). 
256 See supra Part IV .A.S. 
257 See supra note 203. 
258 However, this fact pattern is especially stylized because of the unique attributes of video rental 
searches. To watch a video, a searcher needs access to a video player. This usually limits video rentals to 
geographic locations where the searcher has easy access to a video player, such as the searcher's house or 
business or a friend's house-in other words, usually in geographic areas the searcher knows. In the billboard 
analogy, the searcher is attempting to spontaneously rent from a store in an unfamiliar neighborhood. Though 
possible, this type of search seems extremely rare. 
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website is far less reasonable than the analogous presumption when a driver 
initiates a search in response to a billboard featuring West Coast Video.259 
Second, the analogy makes an apples to-oranges comparison.260 In the 
search engine context, keyword metatags act as a trigger to cause the display 
of filtering content, but the searcher never sees the text contained in the 
keyword metatags. In the billboard analogy, the billboard is the filtering 
content. Therefore, keyword metatags and billboards do not perform the same 
search function. 
Furthermore, the filtering content displayed to searchers using the keyword 
"moviebuff.com" remains unknown. The billboard analogy deliberately uses a 
stylized example of intentionally false filtering content that prominently 
displayed the competitor' s trademark. In the Internet context, this is most 
closely analogizable to pagejacking. However, imagine if the search engine 
filtering content displayed for the keyword "moviebuff.com" was both 
accurate and did not reference a Brookfield trademark. For example, assume 
the filtering content triggered by "moviebuff.com" said: "Welcome to West 
Coast Video, A Great Place to Rent Movies."Z61 At that point, does it seem 
likely that a searcher would expect to find Brookfield' s offerings at this site? 
Especially if another search result unambiguously indicated that the associated 
site was Brookfield's? Because the content the searchers saw is unknown, 
there is no fair comparison of the billboard's  false filtering content to the 
metatag's trigger of unknown filtering content. 
In any case, the display of filtering content triggered to a moviebuff.com 
metatag is an associative use. It merely educates the searcher about products 
259 The presumption was also unreasonable in Brookfield because West Coast Video had legitimate and 
protectable trademark rights in the term "Movie Buff' in some contexts. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. 
v. W. Coast Entm't Corp, 174 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999). The court makes a point of distinguishing 
between "movie buff' and "moviebuff' based on the omission of the space. [d. at 1066. Yet, this distinction 
seems unreasonable given that searchers do not choose keywords precisely and some search engines 
automatically correct typographical errors. See Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 8 1 1  
(7th Cir. 2(02) (finding that including the term "copitrack" in the keyword metatags was infringing when the 
plaintiff had a trademark in "copitrak," even though a searcher using the keyword "copitrak" would not find 
the defendant's website unless the search engines reinterpreted the keyword to include the typographically 
erroneous version "copitrack"). 
260 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(Berzon, J., concurring); see also Jason Allen Cody, Note, Initial Interest Confusion: What Ever Happened to 
Traditional Likelihood o/ Confusion Analysis?, 12 FED. OR. B.J. 643, 68 1 (200212003) (discussing this point 
generally). 
261 Because West Coast Video had some protectable rights in a phrase that included the term "Movie 
Buff," I think the same result attaches if West Coast Video's filtering content displayed "Movie Buff." 
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that may share some attribute. The Brookfield case improperly manufactured 
goodwill misappropriation out of a benign associative use. 
Finally, the court ignored differential search costs between physical space 
and cyberspace. In the billboard analogy, the driver initiates a search doomed 
to fail, but during the course of conducting the search, the driver does not get 
additional feedback along the way about whether or not the driver is making 
progress towards the objective. Furthermore, the driver may not have a cast­
or time-effective way to obtain more information to correct the search. In 
contrast, cyberspace searchers get continuous feedback about their search 
progress each time searchers see an additional web page, and the "costs" to 
correct their search can be as minimal as hitting the back button?62 
The Brookfield court's analogy of keyword metatags to a deliberately 
deceptive billboard fundamentally misapprehends the nature of Internet 
search.263 However, the point of deconstructing the billboard analogy is not to 
prove that it reached the wrong outcome. Instead, the analogy' s  fact pattern 
may appropriately give rise to a Lanham Act violation, either as false 
advertising264 or perhaps under a standard MFLOCC analysis. Nonetheless, a 
262 Indeed, because of the constant feedback and lower correction costs, Internet searchers may become 
much more willing to take chances in their Internet searches than they would be in physical space searches. 
263 Compare the defciencies of the Brookfield analogy with a counteranalogy offered in the district court 
opinion in Playboy v. Netscape: 
This case presents a scenario more akin to a driver pulling off the freeway in response to a sign 
that reads "Fast Food Burgers" to find a well-known fast food burger restaurant, next to which 
stands a billboard that reads: "Better Burgers: I Block Further." The driver, previously enticed 
by the prospect of a burger from the well known restaurant, now decides she wants to explore 
other burger options. Assuming that the �ame entity owns the land on which both the burger 
restaurant and the competitor's billboard stand, should that entity be liable to the burger 
restaurant for diverting the driver? 
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1075 (c.n. Cal. 1999). Notice 
that the searcher forms a search objective based on accurate, nonbranded filtering content. Then, the searcher 
receives additional relevant, accurate, nonbranded filtering content responsive to that search objective. Unlike 
videotapes, searchers may spontaneously seek fast food in an unfamiliar geographic area. Thus, while all 
billboard examples are poor analogies to Internet searching, the Playboy analogy may be closer to describing 
Internet search than the Brookfield analogy. 
264 Professor McCarthy similarly confuses the applicable doctrines in his analogy describing IIC: 
The analogy to trademark initial interest confusion is a job-seeker who misrepresents ectucational 
background on a resume, obtains an interview and at the interview explains that the inflated 
resume claim is a mistake or "typo." The misrepresentation has enabled the job-seeker to obtain 
a coveted interview, a clear advantage over others with the same background who honestly stated 
their educational achievements on their resumes. In such a situation, it is not possible to say that 
the misrepresentation caused no competitive damage. 
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billboard-initiated search cannot be properly analogized to Internet search. 
The policy inferences made by the Brookfield court, and followed by many 
other courts, based on such an analogy are erroneous.265 
4. Consequences of a Bad Doctrine 
Because TIe lacks a rigorous definition, defendants are virtually powerless 
to combat it--specially under Brookfield's framework of treating any efforts 
to capture initial consumer attention as goodwill misappropriation. Search 
engine robots can capture and index every word on every Eage, making it possible for those words to capture initial consumer attention.2 6 Further, some 
publishers can successfully communicate with searchers only by using 
trademarks for their referential and socially-beneficial associative uses. As 
Judge Berzon said in Playboy, "the metatag holding in Brookfield would 
expand the reach of initial interest confusion from situations in which a party is 
initially confused to situations in which a party is never confused.,,267 
The contradictory and unstable results in lIe cases may be, in part, due to 
courts' desires to reach a less harsh result than the result Brookfield seems to 
require. However, courts still do not have a solid doctrinal grasp of the harms 
lIe supposedly causes. The lack of a clear understanding of the harm leads to 
paradoxical rulings like those permitting publishers to put a third party 
trademark on their web pages-where it is almost guaranteed to be indexed by 
search engines, while, at the same time, deeming it infringement for the 
publisher to put the same term in the keyword metatags-where, more likely 
than not, it would be ignored by search engines ,z68 
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 170, § 23.6. McCarthy's analogy is perplexing because the job seeker uses the 
university's trademark as a false "product" attribute (i.e., inflated credentials of the person's services being 
sold), not a confusing designation of the product source (the job seeker, not his degree-granting institution, 
supplies those services). Further, the job seeker does not use the trademarks of other job seekers, so the other 
job seekers would not have standing to sue for trademark infringement. Therefore, the "competitive damage" 
experienced by other job seekers may be due to false advertising or misrepresentation, but not trademark 
infringement. 
265 See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1036 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
266 All marketing is, by definition, an effort to capture initial consumer attention. See Dunaevsky, supra 
note 236, at 1 376 ("[W]hat other purpose can a business owner have in setting up a website, if not to attract 
consumers?") . 
267 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
268 See Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 8 1 1  (7th Cir. 2002) (finding Equitrac's use 
of the term "Copitrack" in its metatags infringing, but at the same time mandating that Equitrac display the 
text on its website in a manner that should likely cause search engines to index the term "Copitrak"); 
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entrn't Corp., 174 F.3d 1 036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (permitting 
West Coast Video to display an advertisement saying "Why pay for MovieBuff when you can get the same 
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More problematically, the IIC doctrine has been used as a content 
regulation tool to shut down websites that the trademark owner does not like, 
such as parody websites,269 gripe websites,270 websites marketing gray market 
d 271 b '  bl' h'  
. b d ' d I 272 goo s, we SItes pu IS mg  a out use eqUIpment ea ers, 
web sites publishing information relevant to their inquiries,273 websites 
providing conference attendees with a directory of resources for their trip,274 
and websites advertising a provider of postsale equipment servicing.275 
Normally, trademark law should not interfere with these socially beneficial 
trademark uses. Also troubling are cases suggesting that search providers can 
be liable for IIC,276 a result that could circumscribe search providers' ability to 
facilitate keyword searches. These results are deeply troubling for the free 
flow of relevant content. Trademark law should not deplete the social 
discourse of valuable content, yet lIC has emerged as a tool to do just that. 
thing here for FREE?" but preventing West Coast Video from including "moviebuff.com" in the metatags); cf 
O'Rourke, supra note 67, at 298 (giving the example of a clothing website putting the phrase "This site is not 
in any way affiliated with the Gap gap or Babygap babygap" into the keyword metatags).  
269 See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2(01); OBH, 
Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 1 76 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Dr. Seuss Enters. ,  v. Penguin 
Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). 
270 See 1.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 2002 WL 1 303 1 24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2(02), rev'd, 253 F. Supp. 2d 
1 120 (N.D. Cal. 2(03); DBH, 86 F. Supp. 2d 176. See generally Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, 
Towards a Bright-Line Approach to [Trademarklsucks.com, 20 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., July 2003, at 4, 
10 (criticizing the use of UC against gripe sites). 
271 See Bayer HealthCare LLC v. Nagrom, Inc., 2004 WL 2216491 (D. Kan. Sep. 7, 2004); see also Bayer 
Corp. v. Custom Sch. Frames, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D. La. 2003) (although based on the facts in this 
case, the usage may have violated the Lanham Act in other ways); cf. Empresa Cubana del Tabaca v. Culbro 
Corp., 2004 WL 602295 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004) (UC found even though the trademarked goods are 
embargoed), rev'd in part, 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2(05). 
272 See PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., LLC, 3 1 9  F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2(03) (providing information 
about accessories and dealers using the plaintiffs trademarks in the domain names); Caterpillar Inc. v. 
TeleScan Techs., LLC, 2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 3477 (C.D. m. Feb. 13, 2002) (providing database of dealers of 
plaintiffs products). 
273 See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004) (displaying 
automobile-related information at nissan.com is 1IC). 
274 See Key3 Media Events, Inc. v. Convention Connection, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4043 (D. Nev. 
Jan. 25, 2002). 
275 See Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2(02). See generally Ivancevich, 
supra note 186 (criticizing the Promatek case for failing to recognize the defendant's role as an after-market 
service provider). 
276 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004); 1-800 
Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2(03). 
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VI. DEVELOPING AN INTEGRA TED LAW OF KEYWORDS 
Recognizing the foregoing problems, some commentators have tried to 
salvage IIC by limiting it to competitors277 or metatags.278 While these 
alternatives would improve upon the existing law, minor patches to IIC do 
little to cure the problem. More structural doctrinal reform is needed. 
The problem of achieving reform is that trademark law has principally 
derived from situations where consumers passively receive commercial 
communications. Cases like Mobil Oil provide such an example, where the 
customer had a latent search-"will buy oil at the right price"-that was 
activated by an unsolicited telephone call using a trademark that allegedly 
transferred some credibility. Similarly, in the Brookfield billboard analogy, the 
driver did not have any search objective until the deceptive billboard created 
one. With passive search processes like these, there may be a greater risk that 
a consumer is sent in the wrong direction ("diverted") because the content 
containing the trademark also creates the search objective. At minimum, it 
becomes more supportable to treat those searchers as having homogeneous 
search objectives, because the search objectives derived from the same content. 
Keyword-based Internet searches are different. In most situations, 
searchers actively pick the keywords they use to find information and actively 
choose between intermediaries to help convert those words into relevant 
content. Models built on passive-based search strategies do not work. To 
enable searchers to pick keywords that manifest their interests, and to permit 
publishers and search providers to cater to those interests, deregulation of the 
keyword is necessary. This Part proposes three complementary ways to do so. 
A. Move Infringement Analysis Back in Time 
As currently applied, the IIC and goodwill misappropriation doctrines have 
pushed trademark infringement analysis into the early stages of the search 
process. Doing so creates two principal concerns: ( 1 )  liability may reduce the 
information searchers receive to conduct predictive evaluations, which may 
277 Brief of Amicus Curiae Google, Inc. at 12-13, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, (2d Cir. 2004) 
(No. 04-0026-cv) (authored by Mark A. Lemley and supporting neither appellants nor appellee-but 
supporting reversal) [hereinafter Google Brief]; Maynard, supra note 55. 
278 Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, 1.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 253 F. Supp. 2d 
1 130 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C 02-0400 CW) (authored by Fred von Lohmann and supporting the defendant's 
motion for reconsideration), available at hrtp:!lwww.eff.orglIPI2002071O-taxes-com-amicus.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 1 , 2005). 
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make searches less efficient and effective, and (2) there is less confidence that 
trademark owners suffer actual harm from diversion because whether the 
searcher intends to transact with anyone is unknown. 
1. Searchers Benefit from Filtering Content 
This Part turns first to problems arising from reducing information at early 
search stages. At early stages, the searcher may be doing associative learning. 
If trademark law restricts information considered by the searcher based on 
assumptions about the searcher's objectives, trademark law may counter­
productively increase the search costs by delaying or preventing associative 
learning. 
In addition to facilitating associative learning, filtering content speeds up 
predictive judgments. Filtering content allows searchers to quickly grade for 
topicality and make decisions about which search results to investigate more 
deeply. Therefore, searchers benefit from more filtering content earlier in the 
process, not lesS?79 This is especially true for searchers using a keyword for a 
"minority" or esoteric definition; good filtering content helps them make 
efficient topicality determinations to find publishers who use the keyword for 
the same nonmajority meaning.280 All of this suggests that searchers benefit by 
having an appropriate quantity of accurate filtering content; or stated 
negatively, searchers are harmed by legal doctrines that dissuade search 
providers and publishers from providing filtering content. 
Along these lines, the Playboy court tried to mandate filtering content with 
its suggestion that liability for keyed banner ads could be avoided if the ad 
"clearly identifies [the ad's] source . . .  or a search engine clearly identifies a 
279 See Rieh, supra note 25, at 159 ("Web users would make their predictive judgments more efficiently if 
they could see more clues to indicate the facets of information quality and cognitive authority . . . .  Without 
enough clues, users often had to open one Web page based on guessing rather than decision, and often had to 
come back to the search results page because their choice was not what they expected."); Zachary Rodgers, 
Ask Jeeves Bows New Search Functions, Hints at Future Plans, at http://www.clickz.comlresources/search_ref 
erence/heavyweightslprint.php/3370961 (June 2 1 ,  2004) (discussing how better filtering content virtually 
eliminated "pogo sticking" between search results and associated publisher pages); see also Julie A. Rajzer, 
Comment, Misunderstanding the Internet: How Courts Are Overprotecting Trademarks Used in Metatags, 
2001 L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 427. 
280 Consider that in some cases, lower-ranked search results result in higher conversion-to-sale. See Nico 
Brooks, The Atlas Rank Report-Part II: How Search Engine Rank Impacts Conversions, Atlas Institute 
Digital Marketing Insights (2004), available at http://www.atlasdmt.comlmedialpdfslinsights/RankReportPart2 
.pdf. This data suggests that searchers may be more interested in specific search results because they have 
sorted through the filtering content on the search results page. 
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banner advertisement's source.,,28 1 Unfortunately, the court had no empirical 
evidence to demonstrate that the labels would dispel confusion or that 
searchers have any confusion that needs to be dispelled.282 In a choice 
between judges and search providers as to who is better positioned to decide 
how to present filtering content, search providers-guided by information 
scientists and market forces will always reach better results.283 
The Playboy court also worked from the wrong premise. The court, and 
many others, believed that searchers who see filtering content in response to a 
trademarked keyword search are confused about the sponsorship or affiliation 
of the filtering content. 284 This assumption has never been backed up 
empirically,285 and it appears to be another intuition-driven myth. As 
discussed earlier, searchers do not understand why they get the search results 
they get, so they have no basis to infer some connection between a trademark 
owner and search results.286 There is also zero evidence that searchers care 
about the behind-the-scenes machinations that produce the content they see. 
More problematically, the assumptions about sponsorship or affiliation 
build off the false assumption that we know what the searcher expected to find 
based on the keyword they chose. Instead, searchers' "true" search objectives 
are partially revealed only when they act upon the filtering content.287 If a 
searcher decides to investigate search results further, the searcher indicates that 
the publisher' s information may be relevant to the search objectives. On the 
other hand, if a searcher ignores the filtering content, then it is possible to infer 
281 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1030. 
282 Compare Playboy's mandatory disclosure with Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc. , 293 F. Supp. 
2d 734, 757-58 (E.D. Mich. 2003), in which the court said that WhenU's keyword-triggering of ads was not a 
use in commerce in part because it did not display the trademark owner's trademarks. 
283 Cf Jon H. Oram, Note, The Costs of Confusion in Cyberspace, 107 YALE LJ. 869, 874 (1997) 
(,'Technological solutions often will do a better job of solving intellectual property problems than legal 
institutions could ever hope to do."). 
284 This assumption pervades the Brookfield case. See also Doellinger, supra note 53, at 219 (''Tbe mere 
appearance of a defendant's website on a search engine results list necessarily indicates consumer confusion at 
a certain level."); Mark Sableman, Search Service Keyword-Based Advertising: Trademark Infringement or 
Fair Competition? 134 (Aug. 6, 2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
285 The surveys offered in the 2004 Playboy and 1-800 Contacts cases did try to establish this proposition 
but both surveys were flawed beyond repair. 
286 See Klein & Glazer, supra note 206, at 1 061-63; cj. Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 749 (making that 
determination for keyword-triggered ads). 
287 Cf Google, Optimization Tips, at https:lladwords.google.comlselectltips.html (last visited Apr. I ,  
2005) (discussing the importance for advertisers to write good ad copy/filtering content to generate cost­
effective leads). 
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that the searcher deemed the content irrelevant. Either way, the searcher 
suffers no harm. 
This discussion prompts an obvious solution: Do not base trademark 
infringement on a search provider's or publisher' s accurate display of filtering 
content.288 Such liability jeopardizes the delivery of filtering content, to 
searchers' detriment, assuming phantom harms to the searcher and the 
trademark owner. 
In contrast, false filtering content raises some concern because it can 
increase search costs, such as when filtering content causes searchers to 
incorrectly believe that the search results are from the senior user.289 Once 
searchers pursue this search result, a publisher can cause searchers to continue 
their investigation without clarifying or removing the false expectations. In 
some cases, even after searchers realize the mistake, searchers may stick with 
the publisher because they irrationally overvalue the sunk search costS?90 
Alternatively, searchers may persist with the falsely induced search because 
"switching costs"-i.e., the search costs incurred from stopping the existing 
search and starting a new one-to fmd the trademark owner are not justified by 
the benefit.291 Unclear or deceptive information from the publisher could lead 
searchers to a "point of no return," where even rational searchers will persist 
with the publisher rather than find the originally intended trademark owner. 
The searcher reaches the "point of no return" because the searcher's goodwill 
towards the trademark owner caused the searcher to invest more search costs 
into the publisher. A publisher who causes a searcher to reach the point of no 
return on that basis has engaged in "switching cost exploitation." In this sense, 
switching cost exploitation is a species of credibility transference. 
288 While this is a simple solution, it would unavoidably reverse decisions like Playboy v. Netscape and 1-
800 Contacts v. WhenU, both of which held the search provider liable merely for displaying filtering content 
(in both cases ads) triggered by keywords. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp. ,  354 
F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004); 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
289 See Saunders, supra note 237, at 565 (discussing differences between true, false and unclear filtering 
content). 
290 Economists generally consider it irrational to include sunk costs in decisionmaking about future 
behavior. However, psychological studies suggest that people do so nonetheless. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & 
Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Costs, 35 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 1 24 
(1985). 
291 See H.A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product af Thaught, 68 AM. ECON. REv. I ,  10  (1978); 
see also Romanos, supra note 67, at 9 1 .  
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The Mobil Oil case presents a possible example of switching cost 
exploitation. When the Pegasus salesperson cold-called buyers, the implicit 
credibility (that the call was coming from Mobil Oil, a major industry player) 
caused buyers to investigate a transaction further. Ultimately buyers would 
realize, prior to closing, that Pegasus was not Mobil Oil. However, price was a 
paramount basis of competition for commodity Oil,292 so a buyer might transact 
with Pegasus rather than seeking out Mobil Oil if the price savings from 
dealing with Mobil Oil did not warrant the search costs. By then, the buyer 
had passed the point of no return. 
However, online searches differ from offline searches because the 
switching costs online are trivial throughout most search stages. The buyers in 
Mobil Oil needed to find Mobil Oil and negotiate a new deal from scratch, with 
no certainty that they would achieve a comparable or superior price. Internet 
searchers on the wrong path can hit the back button, pull down a bookmark, or 
type a new address in the address bar.293 With such low switching costs, few 
online publishers will cause searchers to reach the point of no return prior to an 
actual transaction. 
This discussion prompts three legal conclusions. The first conclusion is 
that filtering content, by itself, cannot cause trademark infringement. If the 
filtering content accurately informs searchers what to expect from a publisher, 
neither the searcher nor the trademark owner is being exploited. Even when 
the filtering content falsely creates the impression that the publisher is the 
senior user, the publisher may immediately correct the imrsression at the 
website before searchers invest anything further in their search. 94 
292 Credibility about delivering on promises also could have been a major factor. and the implicit 
association with Mobil Oil may have helped. However, during the course of negotiations, buyers would form 
their own independent assessment of Pegasus's ability to deliver. When the buyer realized that Mobil Oil and 
Pegasus were two different companies, Pegasus could have successfuUy earned enough independent credibility 
during the negotiations that Pegasus cleared the buyer's minimum threshold for credibility. 
293 See Bihari v. Gross, 1 19 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 n.l5 (S.D.N.Y. 200) ("[Rlesuming one's search for the 
correct website is relatively simple. With one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay, a viewer can return 
to the search engine's results and resume searching for the original website."). 
294 See Thomas F. Presson & James R. Barney, Trademarks as Metatags: Infringement or Fair Use?, 26 
AIPLA Q.J. 147, 170 ( 1 998). 
For an example of how website content can cure any initial misapprehensions, see Scholastic, Inc. v. 
Escolastica.com, 1 00  Fed. Appx. 152 (4th Cir. 2004), in which the fact that the allegedly infringing activity led 
English-speaking customers to the Spanish-language website supported the court's finding that no consumers 
were actually confused. See also Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 779 (7th Cir. 2004) (proximate display 
of search results does not confuse consumers when website visits will allow searchers to distinguish the 
parties). 
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Furthermore, as previously discussed in Part IV .A.S, publishers do not 
control what filtering content searchers see. Even if a publisher tries to 
disseminate deceptive filtering content, such as by putting misleading text into 
the description metatag, there is no guarantee that any search engine will 
display that content or that any searchers will see the false content, act upon it 
or find the resulting content irrelevant. The dissemination of false filtering 
content might trigger other legal doctrines, such as false advertising,295 but it 
would be inappropriate to find trademark infringement per se based on false 
filtering content. 
The second conclusion is that, due to the low switching costs, publishers 
will likely need to publish a significant quantum of deceptive content to exploit 
switching costS?9 Searchers will constantly judge the progress they are 
making towards their objectives, and can exit at any time with low costs. 
This leads to the third conclusion: The MFLOCC test can adequately 
handle any situation where a publisher has engaged in sufficiently deceptive 
conduct to exploit switching costS.297 No heuristic, like IIC or goodwill 
misappropriation, is necessary to cover these circumstances. Further, all 
factors should be considered what false filtering content searchers saw, how 
the publisher perpetuated the misconception, and why searchers did not switch 
despite the putatively low cost of doing so. 
Similarly, disclaimers also can serve the purpose of correcting initial searcher impressions, although 
some courts have rejected disclaimers as a fix to TIC because the courts improperly found harm in a referential 
or associative use. See Ford Motor Co. v. Ford Fin. Solutions, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1 126, 1 1 28 (N.D. Iowa 
2(0); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (W.D.N.Y. 2(0). 
295 See FTC v. Pereira, No. 99-J 367-A (E.D. Va. 1999), available at http://ftc.gov/os!caselistl9923264/99 
23263.htm; see also O'Rourke, supra note 67, at 296-99 (discussing metatags and false advertising); Dogan & 
Lemley, supra note 166, at 821 ; Saunders, supra note 237, at 575 (discussing false banner ads). 
296 Searchers are surprisingly tolerant of lost time in searches. It takes, on average, twelve minutes for a 
searcher to get frustrated with a search. Danny Sullivan, WebTop Search Rage Study, at http://searchengine 
watch.comlsereportlprint.php/34721_216345 1 (Feb. 5, 2001). Only 7% were frustrated in three minutes or 
less. [d. 
Pernicious mousetrapping seems like another type of switching cost that publishers might impose. 
However, mousetrapping that blocks the searcher's exit, but does not increase the searcher's propensity to 
transact with the publisher, is not really a switching cost that dissuades the searcher from finding the senior 
user (although it may support other causes of action). 
297 See Klein & Glazer, supra note 206 (arguing that the MFLOCC test should apply, and giving examples 
of how IIC is redundant with other legal doctrines); see also Cody, supra note 260. 
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2.  At Early Search Stages, There Is Less Reason To Believe that Trademark 
Owners Suffer Any Hann 
Having discussed the benefits of filtering content, this subsection turns to 
the second principal problem of pushing trademark law too early into the 
search process. At early stages, there is less reason to believe that the searcher 
will actually transact with anyone. Therefore, any purported harms to the 
trademark owner are especially speculative.298 
Consider the following assertion from the 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU.com 
case, where the WhenU system caused a competitor' s  advertisement to appear 
when a searcher entered 1 800contacts.com into their browser' s address bar: 
"consumers who have typed Plaintiff s <1 800contacts.com> URL into the 
browser bar are clearly searching for contact lens products, and expect to 
complete a transaction with Plaintiff in a short span of time, with little effort or 
transaction costS.,,299 
Not surprisingly, the court did not cite any supporting evidence for this 
statement. In doing so, the court made three unsupportable assumptions that 
contravene the objective opaqueness principle: 
• Searchers using the keyword "1800contacts.com" are "clearly" 
searching for contact lens products. There could be lots of reasons 
why they selected that keyword. 
• Those searchers expect to complete a transaction with 1-800 Contacts. 
Searchers could be comparison shopping or could be dissuaded by 
stockouts or high prices.  
• Those searchers expect to transact "in a short span of time." Searchers 
may transact in stages, separating an investigation from an associated 
transaction by hours, days, or even months. 
As this discussion illustrates, judging trademark infringement at the outset 
of a search requires the court to make too many assumptions about subsequent 
searcher behavior. As one expert explained: 
298 See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 755 (E.D. Mich. 2(03) (stating that, 
in keyword-triggered ads case, "plaintiffs have failed to come forward with concrete evidence of even a single 
customer or potential customer who failed to purchase products or services from them because of WhenU" ). 
299 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 2003 WL 22999270, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2(03). 
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Online shoppers do not conduct the linear purchases that many 
retailers envision. Rather they browse a catalog, talk to friends, go 
online to research a product, visit the store to experience it, go back 
to the Web to comparison shop, then make the purchase either online 
or offline . . . .  Retailers think of shop�ing as a funnel . . .  but it's 
non-linear, sporadic and [unpredictable]. 00 
[Vol. 54 
In contrast, deeming the keyword-triggered ad as infringing treats every 
searcher exposed to the ad as a lost customer to 1 -800 Contacts301 --even 
though some searchers may never transact for contact lens products at all, other 
searchers who were comparing prices choose to transact with competitors for 
procompetitive reasons, and yet other searchers end up transacting with 1 -800 
Contacts anyway despite the ads. In other words, the 1-800 Contacts court 
assumed an immediate and linear shopping process even though consumer 
behavior does not necessarily follow that model. 
Instead, it is very likely that not every person who entered 
" 180Ocontacts.com" was going to transact. Ecommerce web sites measure 
"conversion to sale," the ratio between the number of visitors to the website to 
the number of actual purchasers. No website has 100% conversion to sale; 
conversion to sale varies by industry and website, but it is often expressed in 
300 See Eisenberg, supra note 60 (quoting Kelly Mooney); see also Q3 2004 E-Commerce Site Trend 
Report, at http://www.doubleclick.comluslknowledge_centralldocumentsltrend_reportsldc_q304ecommerce_ 
04l l .pdf (Nov. 2004) (26% of all online retailer sales came from searchers who returned to abandoned online 
shopping carts) [hereinafter DoubleClick Trend Report] ; Press Release, comScore Networks, Inc., comScore 
Study Reveals the Impact of Search Engine Usage on Consumer Buying (Dec. 13, 2004), at 
http://www.comscore.comlpresslrelease.asp?id=526 ("[O]nly 15 percent of online purchases following a 
[consumer electronics or computer (CFJC)] search occurred in the same user session as the search itself, with 
85 percent of conversions occurring in a latent (or non search) session."). 
301 Consider the following statement from American Blind's lawsuit against Google based on searchers 
who click on keyword-triggered text ads for competitors: ''these competitors will have obtained a customer, or 
potential customer, solely as a result of the goodwill and reputation associated with American Blind and its 
products and services." See Complaint at 13,  Am. Blinds & Wallpaper Factory, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2004) (04-CV 00642) (emphasis in original). Competitors will need to provide lots of 
information to searchers between the time the searcher clicks from Google and closes a transaction, much of 
which will inform the searcher about the respective goodwill and reputation of their company. American 
Blinds conveniently omits all of that activity in trying to connect the dots. 
A recent Note in the Harvard Law Review systematically makes this same error, presuming that the mere 
selection of a trademark as a keyword guarantees business to the trademark owner to the exclusion of all other 
competitors. See Note, supra note 53. This erroneous assumption leads the Note to conclude that trademark 
owners will overinvest in preemptive or combative marketing and underinvest in product quality because of 
the "diversions." [d. at 2400-05. At minimum, these arguments ignore objective opaqueness, dynamic 
evolutions of search objectives and nonlinear behavior between searching and transacting. 
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the 1 % to 2% range.302 In other words, for every 100 visits to a retail website, 
only one or two of those visits will result in a transaction with the retailer; the 
other 98 or 99 visits do not result in a sale. Therefore, without any empirical 
evidence to show what happened with specific users, the 1-800 Contacts 
court' s massive overestimation of lost sales manufactured a significant 
quantum of harm where none may have existed.303 
At the same time, while shopping processes may be episodic and nonlinear, 
it is important not to forget that searchers pick keywords with a search 
objective in mind. In that regard, consider the following from the Playboy 
case: "We presume that the average searcher seeking adult-oriented materials 
on the Internet is easily diverted from a specific product he or she is seeking if 
other options, particularly graphic ones, appear more quickly.,,304 
On what basis did the court presume this?305 To make this presumption, 
the court must oxymoronically assume that ( 1 )  the searcher entered the search 
term "playboy" into the search engine with such strong brand loyalty that the 
searcher was looking only for Playboy Enterprises, and (2) the searcher's 
brand loyalty was not strong enough to prevent diversions the moment that 
alternative graphic options were presented. 
The Playboy court cannot have it both ways. Without any empirical 
support, it strains credibility to believe that easily diverted searchers actually 
intended to transact with Playboy. One might feel differently if the filtering 
content (i.e., the contents of the ads) caused a credibility transference such that 
searchers clicked on the ads thinking they were heading towards Playboy 
Enterprises. In that case, the advertisers may commit switching cost 
exploitation, depending on what content the advertisers displayed on their site. 
However, without a credibility transference, why did these Playboy diehards 
abandon their search objective so easily? I offer one theory: Searchers who 
302 See Bryan Eisenberg, Benchmarking an Average Conversion Rate, at http://www.clickz.com!expertsl 
cnn/trafc/print.php/3362641 (June 4, 2004); cf. Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 756 (noting the plaintiff's 
low conversion rates). As another way of evidencing the vast chasm between searches and conversion, note 
that searchers who put items into an online shopping cart (thus strongly manifesting an interest in transacting 
with the website) abandon those shopping carts 57% of the time. See DoubleClick Trend Report, supra note 
300, at 3.  
303 See Klein & Glazer, supra note 206. at 1045 47 (IIC protected lost sales in offline world. but no 
evidence of Jost sales online). 
304 Playboy Enters .• Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.,  354 F.3d 1020. 1028 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(emphasis added). 
305 This is an especially vexing question given that the appeals court made this finding of fact. even 
though it remanded the case for trial. 
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were so easily diverted were using Playboy as a proxy or otherwise were not 
really looking for Playboy Enterprises. If so, treating their "diversion" as a 
harm overestimates the real consequences. 
3. Summary on the Timing oj Infringement Analysis 
The Playboy and I -800 Contacts courts simply made up the trademark 
owners' harms-and, in the process, significantly overinflated them-by 
mistakenly focusing on early stages in the searchers ' process. Pushing the 
infringement determination later in the search process will inhibit the 
speculation that can lead courts astray. 
B. Modernize the MFLOCC Test 
Perhaps surprisingly, given its venerability and the lack of academic 
criticism directed towards it, the MFLOCC test lacks any deep pedigree in the 
social sciences. The MFLOCC test traces its roots to the 1961 Polaroid 
case,306 where Judge Friendly laid out the factors with a brief citation to the 
1939 Restatement oj Torts.307 There is no evidence that the MFLOCC test was 
predicated on social science, nor did any body of literature validate that the 
MFLOCC test accurately characterized consumer search behavior at the time. 
Since the Polaroid case, the information science field has grown 
substantially and search behavior has changed radically (due in large part to 
changes in mass media), but the MFLOCC has remained basically unchanged. 
At some point, the MFLOCC test should be revised to reflect evolutions in 
consumer search behavior. For now, this Article suggests some short-term 
modifications to the MFLOCC test to reflect Internet search practices. 
1. Add a "Relevancy " Factor to the MFLOCC Test 
The MFLOCC test should include a factor considering if searchers found 
the junior user' s content relevant to their search. The current factors do not 
directly consider search objectives and content relevancy, but they should. 
Without a content relevancy factor, courts mechanically applying the existing 
306 Polaroid COIp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1 961) .  
307 See id. at 495 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 729-3 1 ( 1939)). 
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factors can reach the anomalous conclusion that content was relevant but 
infringing.308 
In some cases, courts attempted to resolve this anomaly by basing 
infringement on consumer confusion about the content 's source.309 
Unfortunately, this inquiry contradicts basic trademark law, which should 
focus on consumer confusion about the source of goods.3IO Confusion about 
content source at an intermediate stage does not, by itself, give us any insight 
into the consumer's ultimate confusion about a transaction. Furthermore, even 
if a searcher is confused about content source, this confusion may be alleviated 
or eliminated by the content itself (i.e., the filtering content). Finally, even if 
the searcher is confused about the content's  source, the content could still be 
relevant to the searcher's  objectives; in which case the searcher may not care 
about the content's source so long as the content helps the searcher. 
Content relevancy does not need to be a per se defense to trademark 
infringement. Perhaps it will become that in practice, but for now the 
suggestion is relatively narrow. Content relevancy should be a factor in the 
MFLOCC test as a way to remind courts not to allow trademark law to block 
content that reduces search costS.3 1 1  
2. Consider the Search Stage 
As previously discussed in Part VLA.2, courts should consider a search's 
stage when the searcher is exposed to a junior user' s trademark usage. That 
section proposes that filtering content delivered in response to a contextless 
keyword should never be trademark infringement, while trademark uses that 
create switching cost exploitation could be. 
308 A prime example of this is Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 
2(04), which found fiC because searchers would find the provided content relevant and useful. 
309 See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
3 10 See Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 776 (6th CiT. 2003) ("[I)t is irrelevant whether customers 
would be confused as to the origin of the web sites, unless there is confusion as to the origin of the respective 
products."); Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 923 (2d CiT. 1990) (rejecting confusion about 
advertising content as actionable trademark confusion when the source of the advertised services was clear). 
This analysis becomes more complicated where the trademarked product is the content, such as with 
publishers like newspapers. 
31 1  Cf O'Rourke, supra note 67, at 306-07 (expressing concern that the MFLOCC factors do not account 
for increases in consumer search costs, creating the possibility that no trademark infringement will be found 
even if such costs increase). While I completely agree with this concern, I reject any assumption that 
metatagging increases consumer search costs. 
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3. Consider Minority Definitions 
The MFLOCC test currently does not account for vanatlons among 
searchers in their search objectives or tactics. As McCarthy says, "In 
determining trademark infringement and unfair competition, everything hinges 
upon whether there is a likelihood of confusion in the mind of an appreciable 
number of 'reasonably prudent' buyers.,,3 12 
Unfortunately, the reasonably prudent buyer standard necessarily leads to 
incorrect legal results. By measuring activity against a single standard, the 
reasonably prudent buyer standard treats searchers as having equal information 
needs or ultimate objectives. However, this contradicts fundamental principles 
of information science, which is built on the principle that different searchers 
have different needs.3 I3  
The reasonably prudent buyer standard does have some utility. For 
example, when competitive products are on a store shelf, and a consumer is 
trying to select between them, the reasonably prudent buyer standard makes a 
lot of sense. In those cases, given the relative proximity of the transaction, it is 
efficient to consider if the packaging and trademark usage would confuse a 
reasonably prudent buyer. 
However, Internet search suggests a different approach. Because the test 
only requires an "appreciable number" of confused consumers, the reasonably 
prudent buyer standard forecloses majority definitions of words, in some cases 
protecting only 1 1  % of the relevant population.3 14 Stated alternatively, a usage 
that 89% of the population understands could be trumped by an 1 1  % minority. 
This makes no sense, and it has a collateral cost. In order to recognize and 
preserve space for minority definitions of a trademarked word, it is important 
to make sure that even if only a small fraction of the consumer base 
understands the term as used, they can still communicate with each other. In 
the search engine environment, where keywords are decontextualized, this is 
3 12 3 McCARTHY, supra note 170, § 23:91.  See generally Michael J. Allen, The Scope of Confusion 
Actionable Under Federal Trademark Law: Who Must be Confused and When?, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 321 
(1991) (discussing the various approaches used to detennine the relevant class of consumers in a consumer 
confusion analysis); Shashank Upadhye, Trademark Surveys: Identifying the Relevant Universe of Confused 
Consumers, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PRoP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 549 ( 1 998). 
313 ROSENFELD & MORVILLE, supra note 9, § 6.2.1 ("Many studies indicated that users of information 
systems aren't members of a single-minded monolithic audience who want the same kinds of information 
delivered in the same ways."). 
314 3 McCARTHY, supra note 170, § 23:2. 
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especially crucial. Otherwise, the reasonably prudent buyer standard will, in 
effect, remove minority definitions from the social lexicon.315  
The MFLOCC test can accommodate mUltiple definitions of trademarked 
words merely by segmenting users into classes. Each class of users would be 
evaluated separately .  If an appreciable number of users fit into a class that 
wants to communicate with each other using a trademark, and those users all 
clearly understand the word usage, trademark law should step aside. 
4. Require Plaintifs To Provide More Rigorous Evidence of Confusion or 
Hann 
McCarthy says that "There are at least three routes of proof of likelihood of 
confusion: ( 1 )  Survey evidence; (2) Evidence of actual confusion; and/or (3) 
Arguments based on a clear inference arising from a comparison of the 
conflicting marks and the context of their use., ,3 16  
Throughout the Internet era, courts have skipped options ( 1 )  and (2), 
instead basing their likelihood of confusion finding on option (3). However, 
the intuition based approach has been riddled with errors, as courts make 
unsupportable assumptions and misapprehend facts about the Internet. 
This Article has already addressed several examples of poor judicial 
factfinding, such as the overemphasis on keyword metatags as misleading 
consumers (even as search engines have phased out reliance on them) and the 
1-800 Contact court' s belief that entering a domain name into the address bar 
meant that consumers were ready to close deals. There are plenty of other 
examples. 
The solution is simple: Courts should not rely on their own intuition about 
possible harms.317 Instead, they should require trademark plaintiffs to provide 
rigorous evidence of proof of confusion or harm.318 
315 See James Gleick, Get Out of My Namespace, N.Y. liMEs, Mar. 2 1 ,  2004, at §6, p. 44 (discussing the 
problem of overlapping namespaces and the risk of overriding legitimate names). 
316  3 MCCARTHY, supra note 170, § 23:2.1 (citations omitted). 
317 See generally Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 4 1  SAN DIEGO L. REv. 721 (2004) (discussing 
how judicial intuition and stereotyping has lessened the standards for actual harm from trademark usage). 
318  See Lemley, supra note 1 78, at 17 \3;  Feingold, supra note 50, at S2 (discussing how empirical 
evidence of consumer expectations is the analytically proper way to determine trademark infringement); Uli 
Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 603 (2004); cf Moseley 
v .  V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (requiring trademark dilution plaintiffs to provide evidence of 
actual dilution rather than being able to assert "likelihood of dilution"). See generally Stephen W. Feingold et 
al., Web-Tracking Data: An Under-Utilized Legal Resource, INTERNET L. & STRATEGY, Mar. 2004, at I 
HeinOnline -- 54 Emory L.J. 588 2005
588 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54 
In fact, two recent cases suggest a small trend towards Internet plaintiffs 
actually providing survey evidence. In 1-800 Contacts and Playboy, trademark 
plaintiffs introduced surveys purporting to show the likelihood of consumer 
confusion? 19 While this is a positive development, the courts have 
overweighed defective surveys. In both cases, the courts effectively deemed 
the survey evidence methodologically tainted but still found the defective 
survey probative of a likelihood of initial interest confusion?20 
Given the judicial casualness towards survey evidence, it is not surprising 
that courts generally are willing to accept weak evidentiary proof from 
plaintiffs. And there is no question that it is not easy to provide rigorous 
evidence. 321 However, without courts requiring plaintiffs to prove some harm, 
there have been too many inconsistent and indefensible outcomes. 
C. Immunize Search Providers 
1. Why Search Providers Need a Safe Harbor 
By casting search providers in a starring role as Internet power brokers, this 
Article diverges from prevailing stereotypes that publishers control search 
results. Due to search providers' active editorial role--especially where search 
providers draw a profit from the trademarked keyword-it seems logical that 
trademark owners would want to hold them liable for trademark 
infringement.322 In fact, a few attempts to hold search providers liable for 
(discussing the type of evidentiary showings that trademark owners might make to establish consumer 
diversion). 
3 19 In addition, in Wells Fargo, the court noted its inability to find confusion about the source of WhenU's 
ads "without evidence of how [WhenU users] perceive WhenU's ads," implying it needed to see that evidence 
on an advertiser-by-advertiser (or even an ad-by-ad) basis. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 
F. Supp. 2d 734, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
320 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1 020, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2004) 
("The expert study [Playboy] introduced establishes a strong likelihood of initial interest confusion among 
consumers . . . .  Defendants may have valid criticism of Dr. Ford's methods and conclusions, and their 
critique may justify reducing the weight eventually afforded Dr. Ford's expert report."); 1 -800 Contacts, Inc. 
v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 499-500 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Plaintiffs survey statistics rely on numerous 
leading questions that suggested their own answers, and that are therefore entitled to little weight in assessing 
consumer confusion . . . .  [Tlhe survey is burdened by other flaws . . .  , Accordingly, Mr. Neal 's  survey, as 
designed and carried out, is not dispositive of whether pop-up advertisements generated by the SaveNow 
software has caused actual confusion among SaveNow users, and is not evidence of actual confusion. 
However, Mr. Neal's survey is at least suggestive of the likelihood of initial interest confusion."). 
321 See Allen, supra note 3 1 2, at 344; Doellinger, supra note 53, at 2 1 7-18. 
322 See Christine D. Galbraith, Electronic Billboards Along the Information Superhighway: Liability 
Under the Lanham Act for Using Trademarks To Key Internet Banner Ads, 4 1  B.C. L. REv. 847, 877-79 
(2000) (arguing for such liability); Lastowka, supra note 21 (reaching the opposite conclusion). 
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trademark infringement based on keyword usage already have been made to 
date in the courts323 and by legislators.324 
In contrast, domain name registrars have long enjoyed protection from 
trademark infringement lawsuits for �erforming their DNS functions. 
Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions3 5 gave domain name registrars a 
common law shield from liability, and Congress subsequently codified an 
expansive safe harbor in 1999 as part of the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act. 326 
It is anomalous to treat domain name registrars differently from other 
keyword-based search providers.327 As explained above in Part IV.B.l ,  the 
DNS is just another form of keyword search, where the registrars are the 
search providers and the registrants are the publishers. 
Further, domain name registrars manage the keywords in their database, 
just as other search providers do. For example, in the late 1 990s, Network 
Solutions manually reviewed 10% of domain name registrations and rejected 
323 See Playboy, 354 F.3d 1020 (finding liability was possible; reversing the district court opinion finding 
no liability); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004) (denying the 
search engine's summary judgment motion); 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (finding liability); U-Haul 
Intern., Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003) (no liability); Wells Fargo, 293 F. 
Supp. 2d 734 (no liability); Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. v. Gator Corp., 2002 WL 3 1356645 
(E.D. Va. Jul. 17, 2002) (granting injunction). 
Other lawsuits against search providers have been irresolute because these cases have settled. See In re 
The Gator Corp. Software Trademark & Copyright Litig., Case No. MDL- 1 5 1 7  (N.D. Ga. 2003); Reed 
Elsevier, Inc. v. Innovator Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Fragrance 
Counter, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Some have been abandoned. See Mark Nutritionals, Inc. v. 
Alta Vista Co., No. SA-02-CA-0087 EP (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 31, 2002). Some are pending. See Am. Blinds 
& Wallpaper Factory, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 04-CV-00642 (S.D.N.Y. complaint filed Jan. 27, 2004); 
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc. (N.D.N.Y. complaint filed Sept. 6, 2004), available at 
www.rescue.comlgooglesuit. pdf. 
The issue has been litigated internationally as well, in some cases resulting in adverse rulings against 
search providers. See Pamela Parker, German Firm Vows To Take Google to Court, at http://www.clickz.com/ 
news/print.php/3350371 (May 6, 2004); David A. Vise, Firms Sue Google for Ad Links to Competitors, WASH. 
POST, May 26, 2004, at E I .  
324 These efforts have principally been attached to laws addressing "spyware" or "adware." See, e.g., 
Utah Spyware Control Act, H.B. 323, 2004 General Session, Part 2 (Utah 2004) (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 13-40-201). 
325 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997), affd, 1 94 F.3d 
980 (9th Cir. 1999). 
326 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106- 1 1 3  § 3004, 1 13 Stat. 50 I (1999) 
(codified at 15 U.S.c. § 1 1 14(2)(D) (200» . 
327 See Google Brief, supra note 277, at 18-19. 
HeinOnline -- 54 Emory L.J. 590 2005
590 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54 
registrations that contained "prohibited" character strings.328 Domain name 
registrars also "sell" third party trademarks by prompting potential registrants 
to select alternative domain names as a way to generate more domain name 
registrations.329 Further, some domain name registrars serve keyword­
triggered ads on the "coming soon" pages displayed for "parked" domain 
names.330 
Based on this behavior, it is impossible to distinguish the DNS from other 
search providers. If domain name registrars "deserve" a safe harbor, then so 
do all other search providers. However, there are at least two compelling 
policy reasons why Internet search providers warrant a safe harbor. First, 
search providers compete with each other to do a better job for searchers. The 
search engine market is dynamic and competitive. There has been significant 
turnover among the most popular search engines,33 1 and new competitors-
328 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 1999) (observing that 
the character strings were "specific variations on the words Olympic, Red Cross, or NASA, and certain 
'obscene' words"). 
329 For example, on March 7, 2004, I conducted a search at networksolutions.com for the domain name 
"nike.com." Network Solutions informed me that nike.com was unavailable, but "similar names" were 
available, specifically i-nike.com, webnike.com, 4-nike.com, fomike.com, and freenike.com. See Network 
Solutions, Domain Name Search Results, at http://www.networksolutions.com/en_US/name-itlsearchresults.jht 
ml;jsessionid=A3ZIC2ZJTN I OWCWLEAMCFEQ?_requestid=94 1 422 (last visited Mar. 7, 2004). 
Search engines also prompt keyword advertisers to consider additional terms to purchase, including 
terms trademarked by third parties. See Complaint 'H 29, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc. (No. 04-9484) (filed 
Nov. 19, 2004) , available at http://cyber.\aw.harvard.edu/blogs/gerns/palfrey/PerfectiOCornplaintPD 
FCropped.pdf (last visited Apr. 1 , 2(05). 
330 See Zurakov v. Register.com, Inc., 304 A.D.2d 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). 
33 1 See Jakob Nielsen, Statistics for Traffic Referred by Search Engines and Navigation Directories to 
Useit, at http://www.useit.com/aboutlsearchreferrals.htmI (Apr. I I , 2(03) (stating that ''the Web is nowhere 
close to being locked down; there is still plenty of opportunity for new sites"). 
Rankings of search engines are controversial, especially given complex interrelationships where some 
search engines integrate search results from other search providers. Nevertheless, an argument can be made 
that in Summer 1998, the top five search engines were, in order, Yahoo!, Excite, Infoseek, Lycos, and 
Alta Vista. See Search Engine Guide, Ratings of Most Visited Search Engines (1998) (on file with author) 
(showing this order using three different survey providers and methodologies). By early 2003 , an argument 
can be made (based on Nielsen NetRatings data of total search hours) that the top five search engines were, in 
order, Google, AOL, Yahoo!, MSN, and Ask Jeeves. See Brian Morrissey, Search Guiding More Web 
Activity, at http://www.clickz.com/news/print.php/2108921 (Mar. 12, 2(03). Assuming that these rankings 
can be fairly compared against each other, then in less than five years, the # 1  search engine dropped to #3, and 
the other top four search engines dropped off the list (including two, Excite and Infoseek, that effectively went 
out of business), while a new # I player emerged that was not even on top 10 lists in 1998. 
An early 2004 survey shows the same top five players as in 2003 , but changes the order to be Google, 
Yahoo!, MSN, AOL, and Ask Jeeves. See Press Release, NetRatings, Inc., One in 'Three Americans Use a 
Search Engine, According to NielsenlNetRatings (Feb. 23, 2004), available at http://direct.www.nieIsen­
netratings.com/pr/pc 040223 _us.pdf. 
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both powerful and small--continue to enter the market. 332 Search engines all 
share the same basic interface-a search box-making it easy for searchers to 
switch between them,333 and many searchers regularly use multiple search 
engines?34 
As a result, search engines compete for searchers at the search provider 
selection stage (Stage 2). More than any other attribute, search engines 
compete on the relevancy of their search results-searchers want relevant 
results.335 Thus, search engines that do a better job anticipating and solving 
searcher needs should have competitive success in the marketplace.336 
332 See John Markoff, Google Envy Is Fomenting Search Wars, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 2004, at C I ;  see also 
Jim Hu & Mike Ricciuti, Search and Destroy: Microsoft, Google May Go Head-to-Head, at http://ecoustics­
cnet.com.com!Microsoft,+Google+may+go+head-to-headl2009-1 032_3-1 02064I .html (June 25, 2(03); Levy, 
supra note 1 13; Olsen, supra note 1 15; Brad Stone, Little Engines that Can, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2004, at 59. 
333 See TELANG, supra note 12; cf. Nielsen, supra note 14 ("As we've seen in recent studies, [searchers] 
typically scan the home page looking for 'the little box where I can type. "') (emphasis in original). 
334 See Keynote Systems, Search Engine Industry Research Abstract, at 5, at http://www.keynote.coml 
downioadslcemlKeynote_SearchEngine_abstract.pdf (June 2004) (up to 20% of searchers "regularly use 
different search engines for different types of searches"); see also Sullivan, supra note 32. 
335 See Lloyd-Martin, supra note 37 (quoting a Google official as saying that searchers first determine if 
their search results are relevant before looking at any other aspect of a search results page); Press Release, 
NetRatings, Inc., supra note 33 1 ,  (says Jason Levin, NetRatings analyst: ''The message is loud and c1ear­
search engine users value relevant and credible information over all else and they are choosing their search 
engines accordingly."). This phenomenon also applies to search engines attached to ecommerce websites. See 
Ann Badnarz, Staples Switches Web Search Tools, NetworkWoridFusion, at http://www.nwfusion.coml 
newsI2003/0428staples.html (Apr. 28, 2003) ("[P]eople were abandoning Staples' consumer and small­
business Web site when their searches yielded poor results"); Robert D. Hof, Commentary: Desperately 
Seeking Search Technology, at http://www.businessweek.com:/printlmagazinelcontentlOl_391b3750038.htm? 
mz (Sept. 24, 2(01) ("80% of online users will abandon a site if the search function doesn't work well."); 
Nielsen, supra note 14 (saying that users make quick assessments about the quality of search results and 
abandon the site if the results "look like junk"). 
336 See Matt Hines, Future of Search Rides on Relevence, at http://news.com.coml2 102-1032_3-
5555954.html?tag=st.util.print (Jan. 29, 2(05); Susan Kuchinskas, MSN Fights for Google Search Share, at 
http://www.internetnews.comlbus-news/print.php/3435481 (Nov. 12, 2004) (quoting an Ask Jeeves 
representative as saying that relevancy is one of the biggest competitive differentiators today); see also 
Romanos, supra note 67, at 96; Shannon N. King, Note, Initial Interest Confusion: Brookfield 
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 313  (200). 
Introna & Nissenbaum express concern that competition will force search engines to cater to majority 
interests, in the process underserving minority interests. See Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 79; see also 
Eszter Hargittai, Open Portals or Closed Gates? Channeling Content on the World Wide Web, 27 POETICS 233 
(2000) (agreeing with Introna & Nissenbaum and proposing the creation of a publicly funded or charitable 
portal site to be the online analogue of public broadcasting, along with aggressive marketing of the site). 
However, the more likely scenario is that searchers will use multiple search providers-some catering to mass­
market interests and others occupying niches-and that search providers will personalize relevancy algorithms 
to better serve the diversity of searcher objectives. 
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It bears reiteration that search providers are trying to solve a very difficult 
problem: 337 inferring searcher intent from a keyword that lacks context and 
may have been poorly chosen by the searcher. 338 To overcome these obstacles 
and still deliver search results that searchers consider relevant, search providers 
must anticipate searchers' systematic errors.339 Necessarily, correcting these 
errors requires search providers to make editorial decisions about what 
searchers mean, not what they say. Further, to divine searcher intent, search 
providers must innovate-and some innovations may require search providers 
to use trademarks. 340 Preventing search providers from using trademarks as 
one of the tools to anticipate searcher needs would prevent search providers 
from achieving optimal content relevancy. 
Second, many trademarked words can have multiple trademark owners 
(separated by industry, geography, or both). Search providers cannot, with 
1 00% accuracy, determine which meanings are meant by either searchers or 
publishers. Creating liability for search providers based on using a trademark 
to make keyword associations would, in effect, force the search provider to 
engage in a costly and possibly irresolute inquiry into each use of that word in 
their database. More likely, prudent search providers would remove keyword­
associated content based on unsubstantiated claims of infringement, in effect 
allowing trademark owners to purge search providers databases despite the 
. I I h 341 potentla re evance to some searc ers. 
337 Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 79 ("Relevancy ranking is an enormously difficult task. Some 
researchers working on search technologies argue that relevancy ranking is currently the greater challenge 
facing search engines."); Levy, supra note 1 13, at 56- 58 (quoting the CEO of search engine A9.com). 
338 See Novak v. Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[T]he user's intent is 
rarely crystalline. Thus, the search process is imperfect."). 
339 See Hagen, supra note 53, at 8 ("15% of online search failures come from user errors like misspelled 
words or typos, and another 40% come from customers and firms using different terms."). 
340 See Michael Kanellos, Microsof Aims for Search on Its Own Terms, CNET News.com, at 
http://news.com.com!2 102-1008_3-5 1 1091O.html?tag=scutil_print (Nov. 24, 2003) (describing how new 
Microsoft products may analyze text that users are working on and may initiate queries using keywords (that 
may be trademarks) from the text without the user specifically initiating the query). 
At least one court has hinted that making keyword reinterpretations, even if it requires the use of a 
trademarked term, should not necessarily dictate trademark infringement. See Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Ga.-Pac. 
Corp., 2004 WL 2660566, at *6 (2d Cir. Nov. 23, 2004) (even if the search engine "confuses" a defendant's 
product with the plaintiff s trademarked term, this "reflects little, if anything, about whether consumers are 
actually confused") (internal quotations omitted). 
341 See Ina Steiner, eBay Bans Goog/e Keywords, at http://www.auctionbytes.com!cab/abnly03/m08/i07/ 
s02 (Aug. 7, 2003) (discussing how eBay demanded that Google curtail keyword-triggered ads for listing 
software that can be used with eBay's website, a demand that Google complied with). Google has since 
refused to stop selling keywords on a trademark owner's request, although Overture continues to do so. See 
Stefanie Olsen, Goog/e Plans Trademark Gambit, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.com!2102-1 038_3-
5 190324.html?tag=st.util.print (Apr. 13, 2004). 
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In other words, if search providers are liable for using trademarked 
keywords, trademark owners can obtain an unwarranted outcome: exclusive 
ownership of the word, regardless of context.342 Such exclusivity arrogates the 
word from the social vernacular to a single trademark owner' s benefit, and in 
the course of doing so, deprives society of any minority definitions for the 
term. That particular trademark owner may benefit, but the rest of society 
loses.343 
In contrast, when search providers do their jobs successfully, they can 
increase the probability that searchers will find what they were looking for. 
This success does not merely create private benefit for the search providers; it 
creates social utility by lowering social search costs,344 which promotes 
marketplace competition (both on price and product attributes) and increases 
social knowledge.345 Put differently, searchers want search engines to solve 
their needs by delivering the highest relevance results to them, and the law 
should remove any impediments to doing SO.346 
2. Implementing a Safe Harbor 
Search providers could be immunized from liability using a rigorous 
definition of trademark "use" under the Lanham Act. Not every trademark 
reference is a "use." The Lanham Act says a trademark is in "use in 
commerce" in the following two circumstances: 
( l )  on goods when . . . it is placed in any manner on the goods or 
their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or 
labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such 
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the 
goods or their sale, and . . . (2) on services when it is used or 
d·  I d . h i d . . f '  347 ISp aye In t e sa e or a vertlSlng 0 servIces . . . .  
342 See Lemley, supra note 178. 
343 Cf Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1 16 1 ,  1 165 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (discussing how 
depriving publishers of the right to use indexable words would make the publisher effectively invisible). 
34 See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Informntion, 69 J. POL. EcON. 213 (1961). 
345 See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 756 (E.D. Mich. 2(03) ("Harm to 
WhenU would harm the public as well. WhenU benefits participating consumers by improving access to 
relevant, useful and money-saving information about products and services that interest them. WhenU's 
advertisements increase the choices available to consumers and thereby promote competition."); Elkin-Koren, 
supra note 30, at 1 85 ("Decentralized competition among search engines is therefore essential for keeping a 
competitive market in electronic commerce."); Klein & Glazer, supra note 206, at 1063. 
346 See Nadel, supra note 238. 
347 15 U.S.C. § 1 127 (200). 
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The words "placed" and "displayed" make this definition fairly explicit. 
Consumers need to perceive the trademark before the mark is being used in 
commerce.348 If the alleged junior user does not use the trademark in a 
perceivable manner, such as in marketing actually presented to potential 
consumers, the use cannot confuse consumers about a product' s  source.349 
This is particularly true when Internet searchers have no clear understanding 
about search providers' technical operations. 
Cases addressing whether a search provider uses a trademark are split: 
Two cases involving the adware defendant WhenU.com held that automated 
keyword associations do not "use" the trademark,35o one WhenU.com case 
directly and deliberately contradicted those two opinions,35 1 the GEICO 
opinion (in the context of keyword-triggered ads sold by search engines) cast 
its vote with the latter WhenU.com opinion,352 and the Playboy opinion punted 
on this question by saying that it did not need to decide if liability was based 
on direct or contributory infringement. 353 
While these authorities indicate the divisive nature of the question, the 
cases suggesting search providers "use" trademarks are both contrary to the 
statute and detrimental to search efficiency. Search providers do not "use" a 
trademark regardless of the editorial role played by search providers. This 
argument is not based on treating the search providers as passive conduits for 
the dissemination of publisher content. Instead, search providers should make 
editorial decisions about how third party trademarks can be used in their 
systems to help searchers achieve their search goals. 
348 Widmaier makes this point in a very detailed and compelling argument. See Widmaier, supra note 
3 1 8; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 166, at 799, 820 (noting that trademark use requires the defendant 
to actually market goods and services under the trademark); Michael R. Sees, Comment, Use of Another's 
Trademark in a Web Page Meta Tag: Why Liability Should Not Ensue Under the Lanham Act for Trademark 
Infringement, 5 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 99 (1 998). 
349 See, e.g., DaimletChrysler AG v. Bloom, 3 1 5  F.3d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 2(02); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 
Reservations, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1 996). 
350 See V-Haul In!'I, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (E.D. Va. 2(03) (noting, among 
other things, that WhenU.com "merely uses the marks for the 'pure machine-linking function'''); Wells Fargo, 
293 F. Supp. 2d at 762 ("WhenV does not use any of the plaintiffs' trademarks to indicate anything about the 
source of the products and services it advertises"); see also Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877-79 (6th Cir. 
2(02) (regarding a website that auctions domain names, "[tJhe possibility that its customers might buy or sell 
infringing domain names does not alter the fact that Aftemic does not use those names"). 
351 See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenV.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2(03). 
352 See Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704-05 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
353 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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To ensure some breathing room for search providers to make those editorial 
judgments and to solve the hard relevancy problem, ultimately legislative 
intervention-like the registrar safe harbor in the Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act-may be appropriate. For now, however, the public 
would greatly benefit from judicial recognition of the hazards of creating 
search provider liabilitls and a strict statutory reading of "use in commerce" 
under the Lanham Act. 54 
CONCLUSION 
The Internet is one of the great democratizing technologies, ranking 
alongside Gutenberg' s  printing press and the rise of public libraries. Among 
other attributes, it democratizes communication by fully empowering users to 
search for information using their own words, rather than being constrained by 
words selected by some editorial intermediary.355 For the first time, searchers 
and publishers need not rely upon the words selected by intermediate editors. 
Trademark law threatens to take away what technology enables. At a time 
when keywords show unprecedented promise to empower searchers, the legal 
system is interposing itself as the new intermediary to guarantee content 
relevancy. Unfortunately, any effort to legally impose content relevancy is 
destined to fail dramatically. Blunt legal instruments cannot make the nuanced 
judgments required to deliver content that searchers find relevant. 
The collateral costs of trademark law's "war on relevancy" in Internet 
searching are substantial. Minority definitions of words may become invisible, 
shrinking our lexicon. Criticism of trademarks may become risky and 
imperiled. Trademark owners are legally mandated to gamer attention at the 
expense of all others, increasing search costs for searchers with different 
expectations or desires. Cumulatively, these effects may increase overall 
search costs by hampering the ability of searchers to use keywords to find what 
they want. 
354 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 166, at 838 (arguing that existing trademark law is '1ust fine," it just 
needs to be applied with restraint). 
355 For example, the library card catalog was organized by keywords chosen by the librarians . A searcher 
who wanted to search on some other keyword simply could not do so. The same phenomenon occurs with 
every publication with an editorially-produced index, such as books, Yellow Pages and magazine indexes. See 
Nielsen, supra note 14 ("A typical comment is: '1 don't want to have to navigate this site the way they want 
me to. 1 just want to find the thing I'm looking for. '''). 
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The solution is simple: Deregulate the keyword in Internet searching. This 
solution, however, requires significant self-restraint to realize that judges and 
legislators cannot infer searcher objectives from decontextualized Internet 
keywords, no matter how obvious it seems. It also requires one to believe that 
search providers will deliver relevant content or will be punished in the 
marketplace for failing to do so. Keyword deregulation is essential, however, 
for Internet search to achieve its democratizing potential. 
